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How much did you Trust your “Inner Voice” in Vietnam?

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Just like the commercial for Dos Equis Beer, Rev. Bill McDonald is a most interesting man.  He is a Vietnam Veteran and was a crew-chief/door-gunner on a Huey helicopter for the famed “Tomahawks” – 128th Assault Helicopter Company in Phu Loi, South Vietnam in 1966-67.  He was wounded, shot down several times and almost captured. His awards include The Distinguished Flying Cross, The Bronze Star, The Purple Heart, 14 Air Medals, and other medals and ribbons.

Today, he is an inter-faith/non-denominational minister who helps veterans, the homeless, inmates and others seeking his services and advice. He  performs chaplain services for several non-profit organizations, is an author, award winning poet, International Motivational Speaker, documentary film advisor, veteran advocate, artist, yoga meditation teacher, actor and a frequent radio and TV show guest.

In 1967 he was a crew-chief/door-gunner with The 128th Assault Helicopter Company out of Phu Loi, S. Vietnam. He had a vision that foretold what would happen to Huey #744 and tried unsuccessfully to prevent it from happening.

Rev. Bill is the founder and past president of both “The American Author’s Association” & “The Military Writer’s Society of America”, has written many books and helped other authors with contributions to dozens of their books (forewords, book cover blurbs, contributing stories and chapters to their books etc.).

My veteran brother has a YouTube channel where he has published over 50 different videos – some detailing his experiences during the Vietnam War.  I did find two of his videos quite interesting and have posted them here for this article.  I highly encourage visiting his page and looking over his collection…there’s something for everybody.  His page address:  https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCXUVf8UOT237rw2RfsB9haA

In his first story, Rev. Bill McDonald talks about the visions he had on April 5, 1967 predicting the crash and the deaths of those flying on Huey #744 (his aircraft) on the following day. He refused to fly in that helicopter and warned his company commander and those in charge that it was going to crash the next day and that men would be killed.

Crew members lost that day: CPT Richard Newton, WO1 James Darcey and door-gunner Al Durell. Four passengers were also killed in that April 6th crash. Cause of crash was later determined to be from a trunnion bearing failure.  This story is told in even greater detail in Rev.Bill’s book “Warrior A Spiritual Odyssey.”

In his second story, Rev. Bill McDonald tells how he and the door-gunner on his Huey faced a horrible choice – obey a direct order order from a Major, or face a charge of mutiny. In the military when two or more people choose to disobey a lawful order they can be courts-martialed. They could have been sent to prison for up to life, or even put in front of a firing squad for the most serious offense that you can be charged with in the Army – mutiny.

So, when Rev. Bill and his fellow door-gunner refused to fire at a formation of 30 “enemy” troops with their M-60 machine guns – they were making a life changing decision. Whatever way they choose, it will be life altering.

His first published book is “A Spiritual Warrior’s Journey” and followed by two poetry books and an autobiography titled, “Warrior a Spiritual Odyssey”.  Rev. Bill is currently awaiting publication of his newest book about detailing his spiritual experiences of the last six years and is titled “Alchemy of a Warrior’s Heart”.

The Reverend volunteers with many non-profit organizations and spends some of his time each year in overseas countries like India, Germany, Peru, Bolivia, Canada, and The United Kingdom. He married his high school sweetheart, has two grown children and 6 grandchildren.

Rev. Bill McDonald stands in front of the Black Virgin Mountain (Nui Ba Den) during one of his many trips back to Vietnam.  This is the area of operations where Bill’s helicopter unit flew support for those units on the ground. 

Bill founded Spiritual Warrior Ministries as way to help the veteran community and works with veterans, battered woman, police and first responders on issues of PTSD and “Moral Injuries.  If  you wish to contact him, Rev. Bill’s email address is Huey576@gmail.com

Rev. Bill McDonald’s autobiography book cover is shown below – click on the photo to read a sample portion of his story without leaving this page.

Thank you brother for allowing me to post your incredible stories on my website.  Thank you also for all you’ve done and for all you continue to do!  God Bless!

Here is a second article written by JC Pennington that is well worth reading: I had published in Air Facts Journal about a “gut feeling” that saved my life…and three others. https://airfactsjournal.com/…/gut-feeling-might…/…

Did anybody else have a similar “inner voice” in Nam – one that you listened to and saved your life?


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Reaction to Ken Burns’“The Vietnam War” documentary

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My friend, RL Del Vecchio, contacted me after posting my article about the NVA / VC atrocities of the Vietnam War to inform me that none of what I posted was even mentioned in Ken Burns’ documentary about the Vietnam War. Instead, he showed My Lai and other photos of the “napalm girl” (ARVN pilot and not US dropped it in error), the assassination of the plainclothes VC officer on a Saigon street, and American soldiers burning villages. Making it look like we were the bad guys during the war.

Del mentioned that he is part of a group, Vietnam Veterans for Factual History, who is trying to get Mr. Burns to set the record straight and to come clean with the inaccuracies in the film. I was part of a special group of veterans who was invited to a private showing of the one-hour long preview that circulated the country prior to the event beginning on local PBS stations. It was during that preview that my wife continued to mention that the film was biased and leaned more toward the POV of the enemy than from our own soldiers. Her opinion was confirmed after watching the first two episodes. I soon heard from other Vietnam Veterans and how disappointed they were in the documentary; citing the same reasons.

Mr. Burns’ camp continues to evade the VVFH, however, the group did receive a response from PBS which I quote here in part: “…the film generated a tremendous amount of attention, from the public, members of the military community and veterans, nearly all of which praised the film’s respect for our soldiers and its balance. Maybe more poignantly, not a day goes by when I do not hear from veterans of the war about how thankful they are for the film, helping them speak about their experience with family and friends, something they had rarely done before.

“Ken and Lynn went to great lengths to include diverse voices in the film. We did the same in our outreach across the country, meeting with veterans’ groups, Vietnamese-Americans and those who opposed the war, as well as with a wide-range of historians and military experts. The film was extremely well received at the Air Force and Naval Academies, the Army Command and General Staff College, as well as at the Pentagon…”

Do you believe that “nearly all” of the veteran community “praised the film”?

I’ve put together a short video (less than 2 min.) using the Powerpoint presentation Del forwarded to me last week:

Images of compassion
These are assorted pictures of US soldiers and Marines protecting, helping, carrying Vietnamese in the midst of the war.
Why didn’t Ken Burns include photos like this in “The Vietnam War” instead of portraying us differently?

CREDITS
Original PowerPoint presentation/photos:
R J Del Vecchio
Video/audio set up: John Podlaski
Music: Buffalo Springfield (1967) “For what it’s Worth”
Vietnam Veterans for Factual History website:
http://vvfh.org/

For those who have interest, here is the presentation Del made in Georgia to the Atlanta Vietnam Veterans Association, to whom he’s indebted for the availability of this video. He hopes people find it useful, and please feel free to disseminate (56 min).

Atlanta Vietnam Veterans Business Association presents R.L. Del Vecchio, “Correcting The Myths of the Vietnam War” – Ex. Sec. of Vietnam Veterans for Factual History – February 6, 2018. NOTE:  I have a mistake in my speech.  For some reason I said it was Paul Vallely in the Burns show, but it was Thomas Vallely. There is a real Paul Vallely who is a vet and a fine guy. 

So, what’s your opinion?  Here’s the direct link If you wish to visit the website of VVFH and perhaps join their cause: http://vvfh.org/

Thank you, Mr. Del Vecchio for allowing me to share your information with my readers. Good luck with VVFH’s mission!

If readers are interested in viewing my earlier article about the Communist atrocities of the Vietnam War – click here::  https://cherrieswriter.wordpress.com/2017/11/02/vcnva-terrorist-doctrine/


Thank you for taking the time to view this article!  Don’t miss out on the many other stories, pictures and videos available to you on this website (see below).

If you enjoyed this article and want to learn more about the Vietnam War – subscribe to this blog and get each new post delivered to your email or feed reader.  Meanwhile, you can check into my special pages, most recent articles and those most popular – all listed to the right of each article. If you’d rather sample every post, then click HERE to be redirected to this blog’s main page.  There, you can scroll down through all the published titles, listed chronologically – the most recent is first.

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What was the French death toll in their Vietnam War?

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I found this article interesting and thought to share these facts with you. It is also information that I never considered and if asked could not respond. So here are the facts about French losses during their war in Vietnam. The question above was asked on the website “Quora” and was answered by Gérard Briais, who used data from “Teachings of the Indochina War.” I found some additional data on the website, “UQAM” The French Faculty of Social Science and Humanity, and added it to the original.

French losses in Indochina from 1946 to 1954
  • Army:

Generals: 3 killed

Colonels: 8 killed

Lieutenant-Colonels: 18 killed; 1 disappeared or not returned from captivity

Commanders: 69 killed; 5 missing or not returned from captivity

Captains: 341 killed and 60 missing or not returned from captivity

Lieutenants and Sub-Lieutenants: 1,140 killed and 134 missing or not returned from captivity

NCOs: 2,683 killed

French soldiers: 16,008 killed

French Colonies of North African & Black African: 15,200 killed and 13,900 wounded

Foreign Legion: 11,600 killed and 7,200 wounded

Indigenous Officers and Soldiers (mainly ethnic Vietnamese) : 27,700 killed or not returned from captivity

Indigenous auxiliary troops (supplétifs) and the armies of the Associated States of Indochina together accounted for 17,600 deaths and 12,100 wounded

2,755 known French officers and soldiers are still missing in action – beyond those 16,118 POW’s returned by DRV.

  • Marine (Navy)

Officers: 27 killed and 53 missing or dead as a result of injury or illness

Petty Officer: 39 killed and 157 missing or dead as a result of injury or illness

Sailors: 235 killed and 615 missing or dead as a result of injury or illness

Total for the navy: 1126

  • Air Force

General: 1 killed

Officers: 60 killed and 85 missing or dead as a result of injury or illness

NCOs: 160 killed and 243 missing or dead as a result of injury or illness

Soldiers: 49 killed and 52 missing or dead as a result of injury or illness

Total for the Air Force: 650

In all, according to these 1955 official statistics, the armed forces of the French Union lost 92,800 individuals and 76,400 wounded.

Since the end of the Indochina War, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), nor its successor since 1976, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, have ever revealed publicly the total casualties suffered by their armed forces between 1945 and 1954. The French have advanced the rough figure of 500,000 Vietnamese killed during the Indochina War, apparently including civilians. More methodically sound estimations put the number at 300,000. No reliable figures exist for the number of wounded, missing in action, or deserters on the DRV side. Nor do we have statistics on gender, age, or the social origins of those killed.

To see the original  article in Quora follow this link: https://www.quora.com/What-was-the-French-death-toll-in-the-Vietnam-War


Thank you for taking the time to view this article!  Don’t miss out on the many other stories, pictures and videos available to you on this website (see below).

If you enjoyed this article and want to learn more about the Vietnam War – subscribe to this blog and get each new post delivered to your email or feed reader.  Meanwhile, you can check into my special pages, most recent articles and those most popular – all listed to the right of each article. If you’d rather sample every post, then click HERE to be redirected to this blog’s main page.  There, you can scroll down through all the published titles, listed chronologically – the most recent is first.

I’ve also included a poll to help identify my website audience – before leaving, can you please click HERE and choose the one item best describing you.  Thank you in advance!

The search for a soldiers’ identity in 1968 TET photos

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Shell-shocked: Anthony Loyd goes in search of the Vietnam War veterans photographed by Don McCullin

The award-winning Times war correspondent has spent two years tracking down the traumatised young men whose images by McCullin defined the horror of the conflict. So what happened to those US Marines photographed 50 years ago this month at the battle of Hue?

This article originally appeared in The London Times on February 23, 2018.  The direct link is included at the end of this piece.

The Marine was swallowed by the night. When he was found he was mute, though in his eyes lay a stare best unmet while dreaming: a gaze that was part trance, part fear, but mostly horror. The men who had located him recall that he neither blinked nor uttered a single word.

His true name is lost and his fate has become a mystery. But you may know his face already, for a photograph of him remains his only known legacy. Taken by Sir Don McCullin during the brutal battle for Hue in Vietnam 50 years ago this month, it is the portrait of the frozen man who became better known to the world by a clumsy caption: “Shell-shocked US Marine”.

Other than his photograph and those words, all that remains of the Marine at the centre of one of the most totemic war images of the 20th century are shards of memory, a half-century old, smoke-edged and bullet-griddled, from the few men who encountered him in the ruins of Hue and managed to survive.

It was to them I turned when I began to look for him. It took me nearly two years’ work to track them down.

It was monsoon season, February 1968, when the Marine went missing. The night air was cold and heavy with mist, which mingled with the smoke from burning buildings set ablaze by shellfire, reducing visibility to a few yards. To the US Marines crouched there, the city of Hue was reduced to snapshots of rubble and fog, which shrouded their memories of the fight there even before time eroded them further.

Long after the battle was over, the smell of smoke and fire and the bodies of the dead, the cold of the rain and the imprint of fear and grief came more readily to the minds of many of those left alive than any sense of orientation, time or visual depth.

Standing in the gloom of a ruined hooch, or shelter, on the front line in the southeast of the city, wearing a dead man’s shirt – his own had been ripped off by a North Vietnamese Army (NVA) rocket four days earlier – exhausted from lack of sleep and already twice wounded, Staff Sergeant Robert “Cajun Bob” Thoms waited for a pair of his Marines to report back.

He did not know their names. Thoms had been given command of a platoon from Delta Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, a few days earlier, and many of his new command had been killed or wounded after his unit reached Hue and became embroiled in the battle inside the city’s walled citadel. The turnover of casualties and replacements was so fast there was little time to get to know individuals.

That night, while consolidating a newly won block of houses near a street nicknamed “rocket alley” by the Marines, Thoms had sent the two men out into the darkened ruins to check a house to their rear was clear of NVA.

But only one Marine came back.

“Where’s the other guy?” Thoms asked. The Marine could not explain his absence.

“F***,” said Thoms. He collected a couple more men to search for the missing man, suspecting he had somehow been overpowered and killed by the NVA.

Minutes later, as Thoms and these Marines moved though the darkness of the house in which the man had disappeared, the sergeant saw something white in the corner of a room.

It was a face,” Thoms tells me. “I went over and this was the Marine. Just kinda sitting against the wall with his eyes open.”

The missing Marine – described as a tall, well built, good-looking man – was so still that at first Thoms assumed he was injured, and checked him for wounds.

“I thought someone had cut his throat, the way he looked,” Thoms recalls. “Because I’ve seen people with their throats cut and their eyes just wide open.”
But there was not a mark on the man, who neither moved nor spoke. Unnerved by this petrified figure, as the other Marines consolidated their positions around the house Thoms laid him down on the floor. At dawn he had his men fetch a young navy corpsman, a medic, to examine him. The corpsman duly checked out the frozen figure, then turned to Sergeant Thoms.

“Sarge,” he murmured, “his mind is not there. We need to get him out of here.”

———-

I started the search for the Marines in McCullin’s photographs in 2016, with just one name that the photographer recalled: Captain Myron Harrington.

The young Marine officer, in February 1968 a company commander aged 29, had already lost more than half of the 120 men under his command in the battle for Hue when he was told that one of his Marines was “not willing to participate in the action”.

1968: Myron Harrington, Delta Company commander, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, shown sitting behind Don McCullin

Though he had been in Vietnam for six months and was an experienced career officer who eventually retired as a colonel, Captain Harrington had only been given command of Delta Company five days before the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong launched the Tet offensive on the night of January 30, 1968. Within 24 hours, 80,000 communist NVA troops and VC guerrillas were attacking more than 100 different towns and cities across South Vietnam.

2018: Myron Harrington today  Anthony Loyd

The communists’ plan was ambitious, and hoped to ignite an uprising against the South Vietnamese government and its US allies. That uprising never materialised, and in most areas the communist forces were quickly defeated.

But in Hue the story was different. The city, a former capital of Vietnam during the Nguyen dynasty sited on the Perfume River 430 miles south of Hanoi, was captured almost in its entirety by thousands of regular NVA troops within hours of the start of the Tet offensive.

On the north bank of the river, Hue’s ancient citadel provided an ideal defensive location for these fighters, protected by a stone wall that was in places more than 20ft high and 30ft wide. Access was only possible by a number of arched gateways, overlooked by towers that gave the defenders a commanding view of any attacking force. And inside the citadel, a network of smaller walls, alleys and canals further complicated the plans of the US Marines tasked to recapture Hue.

US commanders underestimated the forces they were up against in Hue, and it took 4 weeks and 1,800 US casualties before the city was finally recaptured. The battle proved to be the turning point of the war in Vietnam: the intense urban fighting and scale of casualties shocking the US public so that never again would they believe the official narrative of the war suggesting that the communists were nearing defeat.

Delta Company was committed to the struggle on February 15, after entering the citadel through its northeastern gate. The ensuing ten days saw the heaviest fighting of the battle. Overall, the week of February 11-17, 1968, was the worst for the Americans in the entire Vietnam War, with 543 US troops killed and 2,547 wounded. Overall, 16,592 Americans died in Vietnam that year.

“I went into Hue with approximately 120 Marines in Delta Company,” Harrington tells me when we meet. “By the time the battle was over at the end of February, I had 39 still standing.”

Fifty years after the battle, Harrington still appears deeply bonded to the Marines he commanded there, although he had entered the city to fight a lonely figure, knowing few men in the company he had so recently been given to command.

“When you share the battlefield and the communion of blood and guts that occurs there, every emotion an individual has is forthcoming,” he says. “We all feel fear; we all feel apprehension. You are watching each other, in some cases, die. The attachment you have for those people stays with you for ever.”

Plunging from the forging fire of this sacrament fell the shell-shocked Marine. It was early in the morning of February 21 when Captain Harrington was called to see the traumatised man, who was being escorted away from the front towards Delta Company headquarters by two of Sergeant Thoms’s men.

“He was in a state of shock,” Harrington recalls. “He had the classic thousand-yard stare, and was kind of frozen. I ordered that he be evacuated. That’s my last sighting of him.”

I hand him McCullin’s picture to double-check we are talking about the same man. We are. Harrington stares at the details I am so familiar with: the filthy flak vest and combat jacket; the stubble; the bitten fingernails; the pen in the top left breast pocket; the suggestion of tattoos on the man’s left knuckles.

This was no newly arrived grunt; no “FNG” – “f***ing new guy”. This was a seasoned veteran, broken by a moment of war we could only guess at.

“The human mind can only take so much,” concludes Harrington. “If we had taken him behind a building and slapped him around a little bit, would he have come out of it? I don’t know. But it was imperative to get him out of the battle area as quickly as possible.”

Minutes later, the shell-shocked Marine was escorted to the Delta Company command post, situated in a small yard beneath the citadel’s eastern wall. He was left there awaiting evacuation, as Delta’s most senior NCO, Gunnery Sergeant Odell Stobaugh, tried and failed to communicate with the staring man.

McCullin appeared. The photographer, then 32 years old, had arrived in Hue a week earlier on assignment for The Sunday Times. There was no formal “embed process”. He had crossed the Perfume River on a barge filled with reinforcements and assimilated himself with Delta Company inside the citadel.
Now, on seeing the frozen Marine, he dropped to one knee to photograph the traumatised man.

Eric Henshall, a 24-year-old Marine sniper attached to Delta Company in Hue, 1968, and pictured at home in Arizona this month DON MCCULLIN/PATRICK FRASER

“I noticed he was moving not one iota. Not one eyelash was moving,” McCullin says. “He looked as though he had been carved out of bronze. I took five frames and I defy you to find any change or movement in those frames.”

Then the photographer left the yard. Minutes later, at 7.45am, an NVA rocket hit the edge of the wall above the command post, air-bursting shrapnel onto the Marines below. Seven were wounded, including Stobaugh.

Private First Class (PFC) Eric Henshall, a Marine sniper attached to Delta Company, was there when it happened, and the explosion threw a lump of debris right between his eyes, which hurled him to the ground, semi-conscious. For Henshall, it was the end of what had already been an eventful battle.

“Hue was flattened,” he tells me. “The wall was in pieces. You saw bodies everywhere. The USS New Jersey was firing over our heads at one point from about 25 miles out. It was like a freight train coming over your head. Hue was just a mess.”

One week earlier Henshall had won the Bronze Star after sniping the NVA crew of a 126mm rocket launcher, before calling in tank fire that had wiped out the survivors. As part of a two-man sniper team he had crawled as close to the enemy position as he could, and spotted through his binoculars as his sniper partner shot one man before Henshall grabbed the Remington 700 rifle for himself.

“I got seven of them.”

Twenty-four hours later he was wounded in the legs, but returned to combat after two days, when McCullin took his image in one of the most haunting portraits of the battle: “The Sniper”. Twenty-four years old at the time, Henshall was born in Glasgow. His father was a soldier killed in 1943 in North Africa, and his mother emigrated to the US six years later. The Glasgow boy entered the fight in Hue with gusto.

Not one veteran I met could talk me through their Hue experience as a contiguous story. Instead, their recall consisted of memory slices, which often included searing detail and black holes. Though McCullin recalls speaking to Eric Henshall for some time during the battle while taking his photograph, Henshall remembers nothing of the photographer nor the moment his picture was taken.

His memory of the rocket strike at the command post was also hazy and he could not recall the shell-shocked Marine. However, this highly decorated career Marine whose own courage was so publicly acknowledged drew no distinction between his own fixed stare in McCullin’s photograph, and that of the Marine.

“I look like that,” he adds, staring at the picture of the frozen man when we meet at his home in Arizona. “Something had to have happened to have me looking this way,” he murmurs. “I don’t know what it was, but it wasn’t good.”

———-

Although I always tried to focus my questioning on what each Marine recalled of the moment McCullin took their picture, if they remembered the incident at all then their answers always took me elsewhere.

Like Henshall, PFC Selwyn “S-Man” Taitt had no recall either of Don McCullin or the precise moment of battle in which he was photographed.

The young black Marine from the Bronx had joined the Corps as an alternative to a custodial sentence in 1966, signed into military service by his mother when he was just 16. He was one of a small group of Marines led by Sergeant Thoms who on February 16 had crawled up the rubble to capture the Dong Ba Tower, a strategic gateway overlooking the citadel that was the scene of some of the worst fighting of the battle.

1968: Selwyn ‘S-Man’ Taitt (bottom left), the youngest Marine in Delta Company at 17  Don McCullin

“I can’t remember anything after Dong Ba,” he tells me as I sit with him and two of his sons, 45-year-old Skeet and Sean, 31, when we meet in Washington DC. “I blocked a lot out because I had to. I lost too many people there and the memories are too painful.”

In one of McCullin’s photographs from Hue, S-Man appears on the bottom left of a trio of black Marines, his hand on the knee of a wounded comrade. I noticed McCullin’s work in Hue swung between capturing the essential loneliness of individual Marines’ combat and moments of searing tenderness as Marines struggled to comfort their wounded or to save each other’s lives.

1968: Taitt may also be the subject of this McCullin image, captioned ‘US Marine throwing hand grenade’Don McCullin

S-Man may also be the subject in McCullin’s famous “athlete” throwing a grenade in Hue, an image that conjures up an Olympian moment as a black Marine hurls a hand grenade skyward over a vista of ruin.

“What the hell was I doing?” he muses, holding the photograph. “And what the hell was Don doing, too? We were both sniper’s bait.”

2018: Taitt today  ANTHONY LOYD

It is an impossible photograph to verify, because the Marine’s face is hidden. Other Marines I met testified that S-Man had certainly hurled a lot of grenades during the action, but doubted he was the Olympian because his build was slighter. McCullin, an excellent witness, recalls the athlete as having been a big man, who was shot in the hand minutes later. Either way, other Marines confirm S-Man’s position in the trio picture.

Seriously wounded on two occasions in Vietnam, S-Man’s “back in the world” experience – the phrase Vietnam veterans used to describe returning home – had an inauspicious start. Within hours of landing in California he punched an anti-war protester who had spat on him in Los Angeles.

“The cops were called and I told them I had just got back in the world,” S-Man recalls. “I showed them my papers and they let me go.”

America was a turgid and divided nation in 1968, and whatever emotions a returning Vietnam veteran came home with were likely to be sealed inside their hearts – sometimes for ever – by the rabid anti-war sentiment they encountered the moment they landed back on home soil. Sniper Eric Henshall tells me one of his half-brothers had spat on him and called him a “baby killer” when he returned, adding that divisions in his own family over the war remain unresolved even today.

This combination of circumstances at home – solitude, hostility, uncertainty – provided fertile ground for veterans’ traumas to curdle into something much worse. And it was in this environment, with chronic PTSD, that S-Man sank into a mire of alcohol abuse and domestic violence, which kept aftershocks of the battle of Hue rolling out not just into the lives of his four marriages, but also into the upbringing of his eight children.

“It is another story that the Vietnam War gets to tell – the effects on the kids of veterans,” says S-Man’s son Sean, a social worker at the University of Southern California. “I felt the effects of his PTSD as a child, five or six years old. Pretty much my young adulthood and childhood was Dad’s PTSD attacks.”

During every interview with each Marine – usually at a point towards the end – came a moment of acute emotional resonance. Most often it involved grief. Twice I had turned off the recorder to allow a weeping man the time to compose in private. On another occasion it involved the intimate details of the killing of an NVA soldier in desperate hand-to-hand combat at night, with a knife, on a bed of rubble in total darkness.

This was such a moment, but the intimacy was not of killing, but of a family endeavouring to make its peace with the battle of Hue that still played out among them, and had resulted in years of domestic violence at home.

“I was abusive to his mum. I was abusive to all my wives,” admits S-Man. “I was out of my f***ing mind back then.”

He managed to hold down a job for 14 years as a paramedic after leaving the Marine Corps before burning out, and kicked drinking more than 40 years ago, but he still attends regular veterans’ group meetings to help deal with his PTSD and “the demons” the war yet unleashes.

“I was an asshole,” he tells me. “Their mums did not deserve what I gave them. The abuse. They were damned good women. I had the chance to go back and apologise to them. That much I did.”

———-

Today, thanks to the internet, it would be relatively easy to search for the identity of a contemporary US Marine in a photograph from, say, Iraq or Afghanistan. Yet no internet existed for returning Vietnam veterans. Moreover, they completed their tours as individuals and returned home alone rather than as a unit.

None of the Marines I found from either Delta or Charlie Company had maintained contact with one another after returning home. It was only the advent of mainstream internet use, and with it veterans’ sites and Facebook pages, that allowed some of them to reconnect 30 years after they fought in Hue.

Having first contacted Captain Harrington, within a few months I had managed to trace three other Marines from Delta. These in turn introduced me to other men among the network of surviving Hue veterans.

In tandem with this research, I secured a copy of the microfilm archives of Delta and Charlie companies’ unit diaries for the year 1968, as well as the 1st Battalion’s after-action report. The unit diary was essential, because it contained the daily details of casualty reports, and night after night, month after month, I pored through thousands of documents for February 1968, hoping to narrow down the identities of the shell-shocked Marine and the other men photographed by McCullin.

A major breakthrough occurred last summer, when McCullin mentioned that he had left the Marine in the company of Delta’s gunnery sergeant, and recalled that the gunny had been wounded minutes later by a rocket attack on the command post.

Knowing each Marine company only had one gunnery sergeant, I called Harrington, confirmed that his gunny was Odell Stobaugh, then cross-referenced that name with the microfilm entries to see which date he was wounded, thereby confirming the date and time McCullin had taken the photograph.

I was convinced that this was the eureka moment, and that by tracking down each man evacuated that morning I would identify the shell-shocked Marine. Yet I ran immediately into two problems. First, Odell Stobaugh, who would probably have remembered the name of the Marine, had died in 1999. Second, my faith in documentation as a primary verification method was misplaced. No record of a non-injury evacuation existed during the key week. Although I managed to track down the Delta Company clerk in California, he pointed out that in the bureaucratic bedlam surrounding the battle, the details of a non-physical injury may never have been recorded.

Other serials in the unit diary I found misdated, sometimes by weeks. Names appeared spelt in three different ways, accounting for wounds to different individuals when there was only one involved. One Marine was recorded AWOL when in fact he was in hospital wounded in action.

I hunted the shell-shocked Marine from the strangest places. During the nine-month battle for Mosul in Iraq, I sometimes returned from the front to scour microfilm details from Hue in my hotel at night, hoping that the weird link-up between the ruin of two cities would afford karmic aid. It didn’t.

Then at one point last year, staying in a dirty guesthouse on the Iraqi side of the Syrian border, waiting to cross over, I spoke with a go-between in the US who twice weekly met a severely traumatised Delta Company veteran in a café. A fragmented entry of a document suggested this might be the man I was after. The go-between duly handed this veteran a carefully worded and extremely gentle letter I had written asking for his help in identifying Marines in photographs from Hue. The picture of the shell-shocked Marine was attached. Yet the moment the man saw the photograph, the effect was terrible. He became distraught and walked out of the café. The go-between told me the attempt could never be repeated.

Yet I searched on, aware as I did so that with each voice of another veteran I encountered, so the ghostly, shell-shocked Marine became more a guide than a quarry. He had begun in my mind as the distillation of every man’s worst fear – frozen and reduced. Yet he changed. In his footsteps I met others, and learnt of time and war and grief and brotherhood, and how Marines grow old, but trauma never fades away.

———-

Not every Marine I met felt defined by the battle of Hue. In north Michigan, in the snow and cold, I meet Joel Adkins, known to McCullin as “the thoughtful Marine” after the photographer took his portrait leaning against a door jamb, helmet removed, in a moment of deep contemplation.

1968: Joel Adkins, H&S Company, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, pictured in Hue aged 20   Don McCullin

2018: Adkins in Michigan this month   Anthony Loyd

Adkins was 20 years old and fought in Hue as one of the four-man crew of a 106mm recoilless rifle. His gentle voice combines with the softened sounds of the Michigan snowscape in a way that makes half a century feel what it is, and the war old and long gone.

Yet he has a clear recollection of the moment McCullin took his photograph.

“I was standing in a porch and Don come up and asked if he could take my picture,” he smiles. “And I thought, ‘Why is this guy running around without no weapons? This is another person we’ll have to take care of.’ ”

I ask Adkins if he knew what he had been thinking about at the time. Adkins mentions concluding “what a lousy war it was”.

It was not until 1996 that Adkins saw his portrait. Even then, it was an oil painting that his father had done of McCullin’s original that the Marine was shown, rather than the photograph itself. A family friend had seen the photograph in a magazine, and duly sent it to Adkins’ father, who painted it.

“It was not until 2014 that I saw the real photograph while I was looking online at some stuff about Hue,” Adkins laughs, as we sit in his dining room beneath his father’s oil version.

Towards the end of our second day together in Michigan, relaxed and easy in each other’s company, I connect a couple of casual remarks Adkins has made and ask what happened to the rest of his recoilless rifle crew. It transpires that they had been killed or maimed at the start of the battle when Adkins’ team was caught in an ambush near a canal. One man lost both arms in a rocket blast. After that Adkins had gone through the entire battle alone as the only crew member left, driving the weapon around on a four-wheel buggy, loading and firing it; performing the role of each of his fallen crew. “What a lousy war it was” was no brush-off line.

———-

There was never a pretender or claimant to be the shell-shocked Marine. No one was out there who years later said, “That’s me.” But many people wanted to be Richard Schlagel, the Marine with the octopus tucked into the band around his helmet, or thought that they might be the bandaged Marine he cradled in his arms aboard a tank.

I remember first noticing McCullin’s photograph of these two Marines when I was a teenager. Vietnam had always fascinated me and I had read the war’s essential bibles – Michael Herr’s Dispatches, Mark Baker’s Nam and Robert Mason’s Chickenhawk – with avid interest. The work of the war’s great photographers – Larry Burrows, Philip Jones Griffiths and Kyoichi Sawada among them – had enthralled me even more. It was the combined effect of these men that persuaded me later to become a war correspondent.

1968: Richard Schlagel, with the octopus in his helmet, tends to James Blaine, who died aged 18  Don McCullin

2018: Richard Schlagel earlier this month Anthony Loyd

The rubber octopus on Schlagel’s helmet, irreverent and cartoon-like, had always stuck in my mind, riffing off the desperation of the moment. What had become of him and the Marine he held? Now he sits before me and I am about to find out.

As so often, the conversation around the photograph begins much earlier, this time on Hill 110 in the Que Son Valley of South Vietnam in spring 1967. Many of the Marines I met spoke in similar sequence, starting the conversation months ahead of Hue, as if to lay the foundations for what had shaped them long before McCullin took his pictures.

“Hue was bad,” they seemed to be telling me. “But you wouldn’t believe the shit that happened before and after.”

On Hill 110, PFC Richard Schlagel, newly arrived in Vietnam, went on his first operation. It was a bloodbath. His unit, Charlie Company 1/5, ran into a larger force of NVA regulars. One by one, the Americans’ newly issued M-16 rifles began to jam as they advanced uphill under heavy fire. A mortar round landed in front of Schlagel. It threw a gunnery sergeant up into the air, killing him instantly.

“His body was smoking from the hot metal, and shaving foam squeezed out of his torn pack,” recalls Schlagel, who lay on his belly 15 yards below the body of the gunny. The same round critically injured a radio operator named Fred Tate, and Schlagel crawled over to him, giving him mouth-to-mouth to try to keep him alive. Next, responding to cries for water, Schlagel edged over to a nearby black Marine named Washington, who was sitting upright on the ground, and asked for his canteen. There was no response. He shook the sitting man. Washington was dead. When the fight ended Schlagel was shaking so much he couldn’t light a cigarette.

By the time the battle of Hue started ten months later, he was a veteran with only a little time left in-country, but the echoes of Hill 110 had stayed with him.

He remembers every moment aboard the tank in Hue, though nothing of the minutes before. But as he held the dying, bare-chested Marine in the foreground of McCullin’s image, memories of Fred Tate on Hill 110 came back.

“There were no signs of life,” he says of the wounded Marine on the tank. “I didn’t see any breathing or movement or anything. It was like I felt guilty because I lost Tate on Hill 110, and I really didn’t want to lose someone else that I was trying to help.”

The photograph became one of the best known among McCullin’s Hue pictures, and the figures aboard the tank received a double exposure of fame because the same vehicle was photographed minutes later, by which time more wounded had been loaded aboard, by photographer John Olson. McCullin concedes that Olson’s image, laden with desperate men in a way reminiscent of Théodore Géricault’s The Raft of the Medusa, is the stronger picture.

What is extraordinary about both pictures is the number of men claiming the identities of those aboard the tank. These claimants include Marines who were wounded at other locations on different days in Hue mistakenly believing they are in the photographs, and outright frauds who never served in Vietnam at all but are part of the “stolen valour” phenomenon, whereby men claim the war experience of servicemen as their own.

“I have had dozens of people over the years claiming to be the Marine in my arms,” Schlagel tells me. “I just say, whenever they contact me, ‘Great. I’m pleased you made it.’ ”

There is no doubting Schlagel’s identity. (He still has at home the octopus that appears in the photo, minus a couple of legs lost in the jungle, which was given to him by his brother in a Christmas package in December 1967.) But the main point of contention, exemplifying both the fog of war and the passage of time, concerns the dying young man in Schlagel’s arms.

The dispute over this man’s identity most recently resurrected last year on the publication of Mark Bowden’s outstanding study of the battle, Hue 1968, in which the author and John Olson both identified the casualty as a man named Alvin Grantham, who survived his wounds and lives today. Grantham is a respected Marine veteran who was indeed shot through the chest – the wound exiting out of his shoulder blade.

Yet the testimony of the Marines present on the scene that day with whom I speak, combined with unique access to McCullin’s contact sheet of his images taken from the scene in the minutes before his famous tank photograph, suggest beyond any reasonable doubt that there was no happy ending for the Marine cradled in Schlagel’s arms. His name was James Blaine, and he had received a terrible gunshot wound that entered his right upper torso, breaking his spine, before exiting his lower left back just below the belt line.

The documentation around the event was – once again – inconsistent and contradictory, affording no more focus than a probable 48-hour time bracket in which the photograph had been taken. Yet the overwhelming body of witness evidence determines it to be James Blaine. I speak with Blaine’s platoon sergeant, John Erskine; correspond with his squad leader, Walt Markowski; talk to wounded Marines Leon Dyes and Jim Rice, who were both put aboard the same tank as Schlagel.

Next, I manage to contact Naval Corpsman Octavie Glass, who saw James Blaine shot and bandaged his wounds. The two men knew each other because Glass had been attached to Blaine’s unit, Charlie Company, since the previous autumn. Glass talks me through the scene – without himself having been given access to McCullin’s contact sheet of photos, which I follow with my finger as he speaks. Glass describes, unprompted, the schoolhouse where the sniper shot Blaine, the desperate scramble to bandage his wounds, and confirms McCullin’s presence with Charlie Company that day (“He gave us some orange sweets and told us how American soldiers gave him chocolate in London during the Second World War”).

“I saw James buckle and go down,” Glass adds, as I stare at McCullin’s images of the scene he describes with such chilling precision. “The entry wound was in his chest; the exit was his lower back near the spine. For a while he could speak and said he was burning in his stomach. He couldn’t feel anything in his legs. By the time we got him on the tank he was in shock and did not speak again.”

Blaine died the same day. It was February 15, 1968. The shell-shocked Marine may have always been one step ahead of me. But in his footsteps other mysteries ended.

———-

Myron Harrington says the shell-shocked Marine never came back to Delta. Thoms tells me that he later heard the Marine had been sent to a psychiatric ward in a catatonic state. The personal medical records are not accessible. The trail went cold. I had walked through the valley of the shadow of Marines’ memories in search of him all the way from DC to Tennessee, from the Arizona sun and into the snows of Michigan – and I lost him.
Yet there was one more Marine that I found while looking for the frozen man, and I will leave you with his account, for every detail of this man’s story glowed with the wealth of a hard-fought internal peace. He was not alone in that. I found Marines who had made their own peace with Vietnam. But “Frenchie’s” words held particular resonance, and if I wished an epitaph for the shell-shocked Marine, it would be written in Frenchie’s final words to me.

His full name is Melvin “Frenchie” Bourgeois. He is from south Louisiana, and is the Marine in the centre of McCullin’s own favoured photograph from Hue.

I have not shed the memories. But I have shed some of the burden

Every story here involved pain, and Frenchie’s was no different. He was the Marine in the photo captioned “Crucifixion”, in which he is held, his arms over the shoulders of two comrades, his head leaning back in pain, an NVA bullet wound to his left hip.

(In the telling, as with every Marine, the greatest pain is grief, and Frenchie’s mellifluous southern drawl is at one moment rendered by a sob when he recalls the death of his platoon commander in Vietnam, a hugely respected officer named Lieutenant Jack Imlah.)

McCullin photographed Frenchie on February 17. They had met as Delta Company Marines edged further along the southern wall, clearing NVA spider holes as they did so. The wall here was about 30ft wide and the spider holes were essentially tiny bunkers dug into the top of it, often concealed and wide enough for just one or two North Vietnamese troops, who would engage the Americans as they moved along the wall.

Frenchie, 18 years old at the time, had already met McCullin and told him to stay close to the wall as his platoon advanced.

“I remember telling him, there’s a lot of action going on,” Frenchie says. “There’s a lot of shooting and it’s quite dangerous. I don’t know how many Marines we’d had wounded or killed by that time. I encouraged him to stay close to the wall. We weren’t focusing on him. We had a fight going on.”

>

2018: Melvin ‘Frenchie’ Bourgeois today    Anthony Loyd

Knowing an NVA fighter was hidden in a hole before them, Frenchie told his squad to lay down covering fire as he crawled up towards the spider hole with a hand grenade. At the final moment he lifted himself to a squat to hurl the grenade, which missed its target. Instead, the NVA soldier shot Frenchie in the groin. The bullet went into his left upper thigh and exited from his buttock. The Marine fell to the ground, certain that his own men had accidentally shot him in the arse, because the exit was where it hurt most.

“I told you not to f***ing shoot me,” he yelled at them.

Dragged to the cover of a wall, he was treated by two Marines and a medic. As they lifted Frenchie up, McCullin took his photo. But the connection did not end there.

Every Marine was needed for the fight, so McCullin offered to carry Frenchie down from the wall. Amid the crackle of gunfire he held the Marine over his back so that Frenchie’s arms were over his shoulders, his body and legs draped down.

At some point he stumbled and fell, a moment each recalls, as they negotiated the steps down from the wall to a “mule”, one of the low four-wheel utility buggies the Marines used to carry wounded and ammunition. It was the last time he ever saw McCullin. But just a week later, in a US naval hospital, writing to his mother and sister a letter to allay their fears, Frenchie described the incident.

“Hi Mom and Sis,” the letter begins as he reads it to me in Tennessee at the home of the lady who had introduced us. “We had been in the city about five days when I got hit. Our company had a photographer. He was the one who carried me back to the rear where it was safe when I was hit. To me, he was a very brave guy. Before I was shot he was taking pictures of me because I was trying to get one of those NVA out of a hole.”

Frenchie recovered and later returned to duty in Vietnam with Delta Company. A few months later, the man in front of him triggered a booby trap. Frenchie received a sucking chest wound.

“Well, if Don called me the subject of a crucifixion in that first photograph,” he tells me, laughing, “he should have seen me the second time I was hit: I looked like Christ being stabbed with a spear – I had blood and water spurting out of my chest.”

He recovered, and continued to serve in the Marine Corps until 1972. It was not until 2016 that he saw McCullin’s photograph.

“I have not shed the memories,” he says as we sit discussing the war together and day begins its fade. “But I have shed some of the weight, the burden that you pick up in war. The losing of friends – I haven’t forgotten them. I’ve just put it in a place where I can manage that, and live peacefully. I can still have those memories, but in such a way that I am at peace with that. I am OK with my past.”

I was unable to copy/paste the author’s 6.5 minute video with actual footage while the above TET photos were taken. I urge you to visit the article at watch it… https://www.thetimes.co.uk/past-six-days/2018-02-24/the-times-magazine/shell-shocked-anthony-loyd-goes-in-search-of-the-vietnam-war-veterans-photographed-by-don-mccullin-cz3dmmnng


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Trial by Fire – A Helicopter Pilot During the Vietnam War (Guest Blog)

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First Person by Captain Thomas A. Pienta, U.S. Army (ret.)

November 27, 1968. It was Thanksgiving Day back home in Ohio, but it wasn’t Thanksgiving in Vietnam. It would prove to be one of the most harrowing days of my life–a day in which I became a casualty of war.

I was a 21-year-old first lieutenant, a helicopter pilot assigned to the 187th Assault Helicopter Company, which was based near the Black Virgin Mountain not far from the city of Tay Ninh. Our two “Slick” lift platoons were known as the “Crusaders.” The troop-carrying UH-1 had earned the nickname Slick because it carried no externally mounted weapons, only two M-60 machine guns, one on the port side manned by the crew chief and the other on the starboard side manned by a volunteer infantry door gunner. The remainder of the back seat was thus available to transport six U.S. (or 10 Vietnamese) infantrymen on combat assault missions.

That day we had already logged three hours of combat assault time, and we were sitting on the ground on “strip alert” at a small airstrip on a rubber plantation at Dau Tieng in War Zone C, northwest of Saigon. After several hours on the ground, our flight leader received the call that was to summon us on that fateful mission.
The flight leader gave us the signal to crank, and we began our ritual. The door gunners and crew chiefs donned their protective vests and helmets. Although Huey pilots sat in armored seats, many were killed or wounded by ground fire coming up through the chin bubble, the Plexiglas just below the pilot’s feet, which was positioned on the anti-torque controls, the pedals that controlled the tail rotor.
I then put on my flak jacket and stepped up into the pilot’s seat. The Crusaders flew with the aircraft commander in the left front seat and the pilot in the right front seat. Before securing the shoulder harness and lap belt, I would put my “chicken plate” inside my flak jacket against my chest. The chicken plate was a 22-pound piece of chest-shaped armor worn inside the flak jacket as added protection for vital organs. Some pilots sat on theirs. You had that option. I then slid forward another piece of armor, which was attached to the side of the armored seat and designed to give side and head protection. Once that was done, it was almost impossible to close your own door. Our gunners would then close our doors for us after we cranked up the engines. The pilot would have great difficulty opening the door again if he needed to exit the aircraft in case of fire. Within the next hour, I would find this out firsthand.

After going through a combat-expedited check list, I cranked the Lycoming turbine engine. With the engine run-up procedures completed, we put on our “brain buckets,” our ballistic protection helmets. It was absolutely essential that we adhere to the rules governing the wearing of flight safety equipment. It is one of the reasons I am alive today–scarred from second- and third-degree burns over 45 percent of my body, but alive. Unlike the hot dogs you see in the movies, we buckled our helmets. Without the chin strap secured, the helmet comes right off your head in a crash, and hair and ears are the first to go in a fire. We pulled the helmet’s visor down to protect our eyes from shrapnel before making the final approach to the landing zone (LZ). We wore our sleeves rolled down and pulled our flight gloves up over the cuffs of our fatigues or NOMEX (fire retardant) flight suits, if we had them. We wore leather boots because the nylon in jungle boots would melt right into your feet during a fire.

Had I not been wearing my flak jacket, I am sure 90 percent of my body would have been burned, thus leaving no skin to use for the grafting procedures, a very torturous procedure to say the least. In my case, the flak jacket is what saved my life. With 45-percent burns, you suffered but usually lived if you were lucky. With 90 percent burns, you suffered and died, as I saw many fellow Vietnam vets do on the burn ward at Brooke Army Hospital in Texas.

That particular day I was not wearing my two-piece NOMEX flight suit because I had worn it about a week. It stood in the corner of my hootch, and even the rats stayed away from it. For all the money spent on that war, they still only issued us one set of NOMEX. I really don’t think the NOMEX would have helped, however. When fire reaches the kinds of temperatures we had that day in that helicopter, I believe NOMEX breaks down and disintegrates. My aircraft commander was wearing NOMEX flight gloves, and he almost lost his left hand. I believe years later he did lose it after more than 60 plastic surgery operations. I was wearing gray kidskin-leather gloves, and although my hands were still severely burned, I’m glad I had them on. Asbestos was the only thing that would have prevented injury, but pilots couldn’t dress like bomb-disposal experts.


My aircraft commander, Warrant Officer Bob Trezona (in the helicopter, experience took precedence over rank), told me to pick up the helicopter out of the sandbag revetment. Those revetments were built by the Army to provide some protection for the Hueys should we be hit with rockets or mortars while waiting strip alert. I glanced back at our crew chief, Specialist James Brady, who gave me thumbs up. We were on our way.


Although I had been in-country only seven weeks, I had logged 153 hours of flight time, most of which was combat assault time, and I was now addicted to the adrenaline flow. Trezona was just back from rest-and-recuperation leave, and I believe he requested that I be his pilot, since I had not been scheduled on the chalkboard the night before to fly that day. I felt proud that I had been accepted by the more experienced pilots in the unit. Trezona had been with the Crusaders more than eight months and was one of the unit’s finest pilots. He taught me a great deal about “air sense.” I loved flying with Trezona not only because of his skills but also because of his ability to convey a feeling of calmness in the cockpit. Brady and Trezona were both about 23 years old, had been in-country the same amount of time and were good friends. They had just been issued a brand-new Huey with about 110 total hours of flight time. Trezona felt the chopper wasn’t developing the power that it should have had, but he was still pretty happy with it.

Leaving Dau Tieng in the afternoon, our first platoon formed into an echelon left, and we headed for the pick-up zone to load up with soldiers from the 25th Infantry Division. During flight we switched to trail formation and landed at the designated area, where the infantrymen got aboard. Each time I glanced back at their faces it occurred to me that this war was being fought by the cream of America’s youth–18-, 19-, 20-year-old infantrymen carrying M-16s, grenade launchers, machine guns and various other weapons. These brave infantrymen will always have my utmost respect. I had been an infantry rifleman for almost two years before graduating from officer candidate school, and I knew these men not only fought the enemy but also faced the elements 24 hours a day. As aircrewmen we were constantly exposed to enemy fire, but at least we could take a shower most every night, drink some whiskey, and sleep in a bunk with a Colt .38 as a pillow.

Loaded with six “Electric Strawberries” (as the 25th Infantry Division troops were known), our Huey lifted off and headed for the designated rendezvous point (RP) to form up with the second Crusader lift platoon. As we orbited over the RP at 1,500 feet, we could see the LZ in the distance being pounded with artillery. We hoped that those 105mm and 155mm high-explosive rounds were finding their targets. Our command and control (C&C) ship then ordered us to fly into a trail formation, with the second platoon in the lead and the first platoon following.

As we flew into our assault formation, my mind raced back to two weeks earlier, when I had pulled bunker line officer duty for the perimeter of Tay Ninh base camp. In the command bunker with me that night on guard duty had been Jim Brady, the crew chief. We had talked about our mothers and fathers, our brothers and sisters, and our feelings about the war.

I felt very close to him after that night. We were young and brave, and we loved our country even though we knew that some American people, in their stupidity, were spitting on soldiers who were returning to San Francisco from Vietnam.

My mind switched back to business as we approached the LZ. I glanced back at Brady, who was manning the portside M-60, and he smiled–I think to reassure me that I was doing a decent job of flying his Huey. I thought what brave men these gunners were. They were completely exposed to hostile fire, since they rode in seats facing out the side of the Huey. They did not have an armored seat and had only their armored vests to protect them.


Ron Timberlake, flight lead for the first platoon, was flying Chalk Six and ordered us into a heavy echelon left. We made a sweeping left turn onto our final approach path as we heard our commander in the C&C ship say “last round on the ground,” meaning the artillery preparation was finished.

The formation was pretty strung out as I glanced at the airspeed indicator, which read 90 knots. I nosed it over with the cyclic (the control stick between the pilot’s legs). With my left hand I pulled some more collective pitch while gently adding some left pedal to control the yaw of the aircraft. As the helicopter reached about 110 knots, we closed up the formation. The fully loaded Huey shuddered and vibrated violently, but that was standard for combat assaults. Our unit flew in such tight formation on a short final approach that you could read the name tags of the men in the ship you were flying in formation with.

Flying on either side of the slick formation in oval race-track patterns, the “Rat Pack” gunship platoon laid in minigun fire and 2.75-inch rockets. We were flying into the midst of a battalion-size or larger North Vietnamese Army (NVA) unit, and all hell was breaking loose around us. We ordered our gunners to engage the enemy with full suppressive fire, left and right. My heart pounded furiously as I struggled to control the Huey. In the helicopter we monitored a VHF (very high frequency) radio used to talk to the gun platoon, a UHF (ultra high frequency) radio to talk to our C&C ship, and an FM radio to communicate between Hueys in the platoon. We also used an intercom to communicate among crew members within the helicopter. We were busy, to say the least.

Over the FM radio, the pilots of the first aircraft entering the LZ transmitted, “Chalk Three receiving fire.” “Chalk” was the term used to designate your position in the flight. You did not break formation. You just sucked it up and flew into the bowels of the Grim Reaper. The last transmission I heard was, “Chalk Four receiving fire.” The choppers were being wracked with intense machine-gun fire, 51mm anti-aircraft fire and rocket-propelled grenades. The “pucker factor” gauge was in the red and climbing. We continued our approach into the raging LZ in our trail helicopter. It was trail’s job to wait until every Huey made it out of the LZ and then radio that the LZ was clear. I was flying an H-model Huey, and because the LZ was filled with 10- to 15-foot-tall baby rubber trees, which were hard to see until I was right on top of them, I had to pick my spot and could not come directly to the ground as I normally did. Snaring a tail rotor in the trees could kill you just as easily as a machine-gun.

We were just coming out of translational lift–the point at which a helicopter stops flying and starts hovering–when a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) slammed into our Huey. It apparently hit in the left fuel cell just aft of Brady’s gun well. I believe he died instantly. A Pfc Hoppe, on the right door gun, was blown out of the ship.


Brady’s death still pains me deeply. He is now known on the Vietnam Veterans Memorial (“the Wall”) as James Gregory Brady 28jan48 27nov68 Sacramento Ca. panel 38W line 71. For 20 years I lived with the thought that all the infantry aboard had died. I was finally told years later that none of the 25th Infantry Division troops who were aboard the chopper had been killed.

We were completely engulfed in flames. The JP-4 fuel and magnesium combined to make a lethal fire. The cliché about not hearing the one that gets you was true in my case. I first thought that a fragmentation grenade had inadvertently been dropped in our ship by one of the infantrymen, but not so. It seemed as if there was a big whoosh, similar to the effect a Zippo lighter has after being freshly overfilled and lit, or the whoosh of a propane grill lighting after the gas has been left on too long before the igniter is applied. All the oxygen in the Huey was immediately sucked up by the flames, and we were on fire.

I stayed on the controls; the Huey fell about 15 feet to the ground and remained upright. I couldn’t see or breathe, but I knew I had to exit the aircraft. I unbuckled the shoulder harness and lap belt and stood up from the armored seat, knowing it would be impossible to exit through my door. As I stood up, the collapsing rotor system crashed into my helmet and knocked me sideways–at least I believe that’s what hit me. It smashed me to the left across the radio console into a sort of side-straddle position across the other pilot’s seat. That’s when I knew that Bob Trezona had made it out of the Huey.

Months later in the hospital, Trezona told me he stood up and fell straight forward out of the helicopter. It had pretty much disintegrated when the RPG hit. Lying across the aircraft commander’s armored seat, I truly thought I was going to die. I could no longer hold my breath and was sucking heat into my lungs; I had to try again to escape. This time I successfully stood up and went between the two pilot seats and out the cargo door just as we had been taught in flight school. As I broke free of the flames, all I could think of was that there was going to be another explosion. Survival instinct and training were controlling my body. The helicopter had done all the exploding it was ever going to do. It was just blazing out of control. I ran about 20 yards and rolled on the ground to extinguish the flames on my burning body.

I put my hands in a puddle of water to cool them off–the only severe pain I was feeling at the time was in my hands. My fingers were pencil thin after being cooked inside the leather gloves, but at least they were still there. The leather had burned itself onto my hands. My flak jacket was still burning, and I think I removed it. The foam padding on the chin strap and the neck strap of my flight helmet was burning my face and neck; I did feel that pain and I flipped off the helmet.

By now, my arms and legs didn’t want to do a whole lot of bending, and the pain was gone because third-degree burns kill the nerve endings–until they start cutting the dead skin off in the hospital; then the pain is tortuous. I ran farther from the burning wreckage and, unknowingly, was running closer to the NVA gun positions. Fortunately, the billowing black smoke from the Huey must have momentarily prevented the NVA from finishing us off with small-arms fire. They were still shooting, but they couldn’t pinpoint a target. Or maybe they wanted to wait and capture us.


Our gunships then laid down the last of their minigun ammunition and rockets. Years later, I talked to Warrant Officer Jim Rohde, who was flying the gunship that expended its ammunition seemingly at my feet. He told me they couldn’t see anything around our helicopter because of the smoke, but they had an idea where we might be. He could have been no more than 30 feet off the deck. I saw him bank abruptly to the left as he passed over me about 20 yards to my left. In my dreams I can still hear the deafening roar of his minigun as he expended the rest of his ammunition while I stumbled around on the ground.
I thank Rohde with all my heart for what he did next. He stayed on station, continuing his gun runs as if he had more ammunition, while the other gunships returned to the closest place to rearm. I firmly believe that by making those unarmed gun runs Rohde kept the enemy soldiers’ heads down and prevented the NVA from venturing out to capture us. Only because of the expertise and bravery of the “Rat Pack” pilots was I not killed by friendly fire.

I now knew which way to run, back toward my helicopter. But now I realized that my arms and legs were burnt black. Everything now seemed to happen in slow motion, as if I could see each and every frame of a projected film. I guess I was now in the proverbial “bubble,” where sound no longer seems to exist and the will to live requires your body to continue the struggle for survival. I came upon a group of wounded and dead infantry soldiers, some of whom may have been in my helicopter, and told them to remove my .38 from my holster and use it if necessary, because my hands were useless. I remember them just staring at me as though I was a monster who had emerged from the smoke.  I glanced to my left, and the next frame of the film was Trezona stumbling, his face burnt black and his helmet still on his head. I screamed his name and saw that he was working his way toward a Huey waiting on the ground. It was Chalk Six. Nineteen-year-old Warrant Officer Ron Timberlake was the aircraft commander of that helicopter. Timberlake, flight lead for the first platoon, was Trezona’s hooch-mate. I don’t know who his pilot was but wish I did, so that I could thank him for his bravery. Timberlake did not hear us call that the LZ was clear, and saw a ship burning on the ground. Nothing was going to stop him from coming back into the jaws of death to attempt to rescue us. Chalk Six’s pilot came in 90 degrees off our original approach axis, landed and faced the enemy battalions. Timberlake and his crew sat on the ground waiting as no less than 10 wounded Americans piled into his helicopter. The NVA fired RPG after RPG at Chalk Six and us during that time as well as intense small-arms fire. Timberlake noticed the RPG gunner up in a tree about 75 yards away at his 2 o’clock–with his assistant on the ground handing him up rockets. Timberlake told his gunner Nelson to kill them. Nelson’s M-60 riddled them, and they got what they deserved. Timberlake told me about that years later, and I have to say it made me feel better to know that the guys who had probably killed Brady and maimed Bob Trezona and me were dead.

I saw Trezona on the rescue helicopter and piled on top of the group already aboard. I think I was about the last aboard. I could see Timberlake’s instrument panel glowing red and knew the Huey was undergoing major damage. He then lifted that fragile but oh-so-strong-and-beautiful Huey out of the LZ while we were again racked with machine-gun fire.

The chopper had flown a short distance when I noticed Timberlake’s exhaust gas temperature rapidly decrease, and his engine quit. Timberlake began autorotation–the much-practiced, intricate maneuver to land a helicopter without an engine. I can tell you that what he was doing is very difficult under any circumstances. His autorotation and landing was the greatest power-off maneuver I have ever witnessed, especially since this was a low-level autorotation, which gives you no time at all to think about what you are doing.


He flew his bird to a velvety-soft landing in a rice paddy with more than 14 Americans aboard. We then set up a perimeter around his Huey, and before the rotor blades stopped turning, another Slick swooped in to pick us up. Warrant Officer Jack Flukinger was the aircraft commander, and his pilot was Lieutenant Al Barret. After Flukinger’s Huey landed, his gunners helped me slosh through some muddy rice paddies to his helicopter. I was pretty deep in shock, I guess, but still functioning pretty well.
I remember being in the back of the third helicopter I had been in that day and looking at Flukinger and Barret and shaking my head in disbelief. My thoughts were of my parents and how upset they were going to be to find out I had been burned, and I felt sad for them.

The whole time at Tay Ninh I had been writing home telling them how safe it was flying and about all the safety equipment we wore to keep us alive. I was mad because I knew my flying days were over and I had only been in Vietnam a short time. But to hell with ambition, I was alive!

As we flew toward Tay Ninh and the field hospital, my vision became very hazy, and everything appeared to be smoky. I knew I was seriously burned, but I did not know how bad my condition was. We landed at Tay Ninh medevac pad and were met by medics and nurses. I elected to walk into the field hospital myself and did so escorted by medical personnel. I lay down on a cot and heard Trezona ask the doctor if we were going to die, and then I became very concerned.

I remember some pilots from our unit coming in to talk to us and telling us not to worry, because the Viet Cong had ambushed the convoy bringing us turkeys, and no one was going to have a happy Thanksgiving anyway. The last thing I remember for a month, except for short periods of pain and consciousness, was the doctors cutting off my flight gloves and watching the flesh on my hands being removed with them. They cut off my officer candidate school ring and my watch, and that was the last I saw of them. I then told the doctors I couldn’t see anymore, and they put patches over my eyes. By then I really was scared. “Please God, don’t let me be blind,” I prayed. Sweet morphine then took me away to the land of hallucinations. My war with the Grim Reaper had just begun.

A member of the Vietnam Helicopter Pilots Association, Thomas A. Pienta now works for the U.S. Postal Service in Florida. Suggestions for further reading: Low Level Hell, by Hugh L. Mills, Jr. (Presidio); Hunter-Killer Squadron, edited by Michael Brennan (Pocket Books); and Apache Sunrise, by Jerome M. Boyle (Ivy Books).

THE AFTERMATH FOR TOM PIENTA
First Person by Captain Thomas A. Pienta, U.S. Army (ret.)  I was medevaced by helicopter to Saigon, then to Japan by Air Force jet, and then to Brooke General Hospital at Fort Sam Houston in San Antonio, Texas. I was hospitalized for 18 months, a tour and a half. To date, I have undergone 14 major operations involving skin grafting and internal surgery.

I was later told that the battle at the landing zone raged on into the night and the next day, with many more members of the 187th Assault Helicopter Company “Crusaders” killed or wounded. A Huey flying a night flare mission over the landing zone where I was shot down was hit by enemy fire at about 1,000 feet, igniting all the flares in the back; it was said they went straight in from about 700 feet, and all were killed. Warrant Officer Allen Duneman was the aircraft commander, and 1st Lt. August Ritzau was the pilot. Ritzau had already been wounded once that day when he took an AK47 round in the hand on the same insertion in which I was shot down. He elected to fly that night anyway.

Ron Timberlake was awarded the Silver Star and his pilot was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross for their actions. I was never told of the gallantry awards that were given to the chiefs and gunners. I was awarded the Purple Heart. As far as I’m concerned, Timberlake and his crew should be awarded the Medal of Honor for their gallantry. Timberlake finished his tour of duty with the Crusaders and returned in 1972 as a AH-1G Cobra gunship pilot with the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), which just so happened to be operating in the Tay Ninh province. I believe he returned to avenge those Crusaders who had been killed and wounded. Knowing Timberlake, I am sure he hunted Communists in his Cobra with the ferocity of the warrior he was and still is. He retired in the mid-1980s as a major.

I eventually returned to duty and flight status. I needed to fly those beautiful Hueys again to prove something to myself.

After making the rank of captain, I said goodbye to my Army career and returned to civilian life with a VA disability retirement.

The following picture was taken in May, 2013 outside of St. Pete’s Beach when I met Tomy Pienta for the first time.  My friend, Ken Tennis is on the left, me in the middle and Tomy on the right.

image (1)

 


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Why won’t Americans forget about the Vietnam War?

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“…we killed 26 times more than they did and we still lost.”

This is a question that Mr.G. William Davenport, former Administrative Law Judge (1994-2015), chose to answer on Quora. Here’s what he had to say:

You ask why America is obsessed with the Viet Nam War.

Everyone who is reading this lost someone in Viet Nam. War is about personal loss more than it is about statistics. Joseph Stalin actually defined it well — “The death of one man is a tragedy, the death of a million is a statistic.”

Each American loss was personal — to a wife, a child, a brother/sister, a parent, a cousin, a friend. We cannot get over the personal loss.

And why did we lose these young men? The Government lied to the American people, over and over, about why we were in Viet Nam. What our goals were. And also about one other key point.

Did you know that America never had a plan to “win” the war? It’s true. Look up any news magazine of the period and read about our strategic plan, which was merely to prevent the enemy from winning. Our method? Tit for tat killing, a life for a life… blah, blah, blah, on and on, forever, world without end, amen. You see, we were so brilliant (cue file footage of Defense Secretary McNamara) that we would make the idea of war itself obsolete. NO ONE could ever win. Not them (we would prevent it) and not us (we weren’t even trying). Once that was realized, the enemy would stop fighting, since it was useless, and peace would break out (cue file footage of My Little Pony characters, playing on screen).

Seriously, dear readers, I cannot make this up. None of my students in American Government Class (when I teach that in local colleges) ever can believe this. Yet it is totally true, and right there in the popular press from back in the day. Please do look it up on the Internet.

You are now quite ahead of me, readers. You realize that America was asking a generation of young Americans to flush their lives down the toilet in return for…. nothing at all. We weren’t even trying to win a stupid war, supporting a bunch of non communist crooks, against a bunch of communist thugs, fought in a backwater country in the back of beyond.

The miracle is, these young men loved their country so much that, even when they had no objective reason in the world to go, nearly all of those who were drafted did go, did serve, did fight, and did either get horribly wounded or killed.

It’s no wonder Americans cannot forget Viet Nam.

Mr. Davenport

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Here is another opinion from Paul Hosse, Editor/Publisher (2005-present)

There are so many reasons Tom; perhaps too many to even mention here. So, I will touch on just a few reasons. First, America had just become a “superpower” following WWII. We fought a very bitter war with North Korea (with the support of Russia and China) to a draw. We were now engaged in a ideological, economic, political, and surrogate war with Communist Russia and China, which became known as the Cold War, for what many claimed was a war for global democracy and freedom.

Then too, we blundered badly in our attempts to remove Castro form Cuba during the Bay of Pigs invasion. We had come close to a nuclear Armageddon during those seven days in October known as the Cuban Missile Crisis. Then we (and the world) witnesses the murder of a president live right there in our living rooms. I think that was simply a precursor of what we would be seeing nightly. We also had a growing social movement, the Civil Rights Movement, which made some of us to begin asking how can we be fighting for freedom and democracy elsewhere when we don’t have it here?

We got involved in Vietnam after France, its colonial overlord, had been soundly defeated, and on the advise on the CIA and State Department. As with most things, it started small-as advisers-then as instructors to operate the equipment we were now sending, and then light support, and then, following the Gulf of Tonkin incident, we started putting boots on the ground-lots of them. I think that at this point, we were still fighting for an ideal; spreading American style democracy. We were also told that the Vietnamese wanted us there; that this would be a quick little war and be over (never mind that the Vietnamese had fought the Chinese, the French, the Japanese, and the French again).

Of course, that never happened. The war dragged on and on. We were provided with body counts by the Army as proof we were winning (we weren’t). Most of the numbers, as we soon learned, were faked). Then came the Tet Offensive. While a strategic loss for Hanoi, it was a brilliant PR piece. The North wasn’t as weak and teetering on collapse as were told. So, we bombed and bombed and bombed some more with little change in the result.

Meanwhile, resistance to the war grew into a national social movement. Like the Civil War, it was tearing families apart. This same movement had its own music, lifestyle, values, culture-which includes its own clothing and hair styles! Through this, our political system began to fracture as well. Parties broke off into various wings hawks, doves, and so forth. We had pro-war and anti-war politicians and candidates. We witnessed again the murders of Martin Luther King and then jut a few weeks latter, the brother of the slain president, Bobby Kennedy, who many had hoped could end the war and bridge this expanding gulf. We saw the corruption of politics unfold in Chicago in 1968, and the police riots. We saw the Ohio National Guard murder students at Kent State.

Finally, and perhaps most damning of all, was the nightly news reports which brought us daily images in living color of the fighting in Vietnam, and now too in Cambodia and Laos. Instead of reading censored print news reports like we did in WWII, we could now watch the carnage from the comfort of our living rooms and kitchens. Of course, things continued to escalate thanks to the Black Panthers, the Weathermen, the SLA, Hippies, Yippies, Woodstock, and so much more.

We watched as one president, Lyndon Johnson, leave the White House in disgrace and a new one, Richard Nixon, enter. He was an unlikely savior of America. Despite his words to the contrary, he was a very conservative war hawk, and although he promised to end the war quickly, he thought he could bring about victory by quickly expanding it. He was wrong. Ultimately, the war did end, but now we faced corruption all the way up to the Oval Office in what became known as the Watergate Hearings. We would see first a Vice President leave office in disgrace, and then for the first time ever, a president resign.

Vietnam represents so much to Americans. It was our first military defeat, thanks mainly to a lack of political will and an inability of commanders to adapt. Those who came home from the war were treated like lepers, or worse. They were completely ignored. It divided the country into countless pieces. It revealed numerous lies by the military and government. It revealed a level of corruption we all knew existed but never imagined how widespread it was. The war even created two cultures mainstream and a counterculture. It showed the hypocrisy of fighting for an ideal overseas which didn’t exist at home. It shook America to the core, and in many ways, it still shakes us to this day.

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Here is a third comment taken in part: As for the Vietnam War” America indeed inflicted disproportionate casualties on the enemy and never lost a real stand up fight. HOWEVER, America’s political and strategic goal in the war was to “maintain an Independent South Vietnam”. South Vietnam was eventually overran by the North so America lost.

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Do you agree with any of these responses? Or, are you of the opinion that Americans should forget the war already?  I’ve heard comments from my peers:

“The war’s over, It’s been fifty years.”

“Let it go and move on.”

“Nothing you do today will change what happened back then.”

Comments?

If you are interested in adding a response to this question on Quora, then go here:  https://www.quora.com/Why-won’t-Americans-forget-about-the-Vietnam-War-We-killed-26-times-the-amount-we-lost


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My Lai: ‘A Stain on the Army’

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My friend, Joe Galloway, found this article by Nancy Montgomery in a current edition of Stars and Stripes and posted it on his Facebook page. It’s long article on the My Lai anniversary. Ia Drang veteran Col. (ret) Tony Nadal is quoted, along with Brig. Gen. John Johns, an old friend of his. It’s hard to read even fifty years later:

Capt. Tony Nadal survived three days and three nights of vicious fighting at Landing Zone X-Ray, the first major battle of the Vietnam War. When it was over, 79 American soldiers, including some of Nadal’s closest friends, were dead.

While clearing a village on another mission, Nadal and his soldiers tossed a grenade into a tunnel that they suspected concealed enemy fighters. After the explosion they found the bodies of only a mother and her two small children, too frightened to come out when called.

“I’ve never gotten over that. I have tears in my eyes just telling you about it,” Nadal said in an interview a half century later. “But that was an act of war. In my view, it was a legitimate assumption that they were a threat.”

No casualties of war prepared Nadal for what he saw when he opened the Dec. 5, 1969, issue of Life magazine.

The glossy pages contained the first view for most Americans of an atrocity committed by U.S. soldiers 18 months before: photographs of scores of dead women, children and babies sprawled in a ditch at My Lai. Photos of terrified, huddled women holding babies, and grandmothers crying just before their murders.

Nadal was by then an instructor at the U.S. Military Academy. “I told the cadets how ashamed I was,” he said.

“I was ashamed for the Army. I was ashamed soldiers had done this and I was ashamed that nobody had stopped it.

Soldier burning a Vietnamese dwelling at My Lai, March 16, 1968. Ronald L. Haeberle/U.S. Army

“My Lai is a stain on the Army,” said Nadal, 82, a retired colonel. “It’s a stain on the judicial system of the U.S. military.”

The My Lai massacre — pronounced “mee leye” — is considered the nadir in modern Army history. More than 500 Vietnamese civilians were raped, tortured, stabbed and shot to death March 16, 1968, by three platoons of the boys next door.

A cover-up started that day would be dismantled bit by bit, leading to courts-martial and reprimands for a handful of officers.

But why it happened and who should be held responsible remained in dispute.

Should soldiers who said they were following orders be blamed or the superior officers in command? Was how America waged war in Vietnam responsible? Or was it something, however horrifying, that happens in all wars?

Fifty years and three U.S. wars later, there’s still no clear consensus. Rather than serving as a lasting warning for servicemembers, My Lai has been all but forgotten in the ranks of today’s armed forces.

Nadal blames the chain of command. Company C of the 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment, 11th Infantry Brigade (Light) of the 23rd (Americal) Division, he said, like other Army units in 1968, had officers unequipped for command, men not among the best and the brightest.

“Harvard wouldn’t fight,” Nadal said.

Badly trained, “shake-and-bake” non-commissioned officers added to the problem.

“Any NCO in that unit could have said, ‘This is bullshit,’ and stopped it,” Nadal said. “Not one of them had the intellect, courage, character or discipline to say, ‘Stop.’ ”

Atrocities have occurred in all wars, he said, but not in units commanded by competent leaders who troops respect and know will come down hard on abuse.

“It’s easy to stop atrocities from happening,” Nadal said. “If it happens in a unit, it happens because the chain of command blew it.”

Retired Brig. Gen. John Johns, who served on a Pentagon task force created after My Lai that found 320 other atrocities substantiated by military investigators, disagreed.

“I don’t believe it is preventable in these kinds of counterinsurgency wars,” Johns said. “There will be atrocities regardless of how well the troops are trained and led. The frustration from seeing one’s comrades led into ambushes … can eat at discipline. And it goes back to the human instinct to demonize those outside our tribe,” Johns said.

“I blame the national leaders who put troops in situations that they have no business being in.”

Contributing factors

The first comprehensive review of how and why My Lai and its cover-up occurred was done by Lt. Gen. William Peers. He had been assigned the task in November 1969 by then-Army Chief of Staff Gen. William Westmoreland, just as news of the atrocity was breaking nationwide. At first, officials wondered whether the company had “an unusual number of men of inferior quality,” Peers wrote. They pulled the soldiers’ personnel files and test scores and found that the men of Charlie Company “were about average as compared with he other units of the Army.”

The Peers Inquiry listed 13 contributing factors.

Among them were lack of proper training, lack of discipline, racist attitudes toward Vietnamese people, the ambiguity between combatants and civilians and a poor command climate from the company to the division levels.

Leadership lapses continued long after the massacre, the report said.

“Within the Americal Division, at every command level from company to division, actions were taken or omitted which together effectively concealed the … incident. Efforts … deliberately to withhold information continue to this day,” the report said.

Historian Howard Jones, whose book “My Lai, Vietnam, 1968, and the Descent into Darkness” was published in June, said it was more than bad leadership in one division.

“Life is plentiful, life is cheap in the Orient,” Westmoreland had said, and Jones said the U.S. military seemed to take that to heart in prosecuting a brutal war of attrition.

Massive bombing indiscriminately killed Vietnamese civilians.

“Body counts, free-fire zones, search-and-destroy missions,” said Jones, a professor at the University of Alabama. “This is just a recipe for disaster.”

As Johns’ task force found, first reported by Deborah Nelson and Nick Turse in the Los Angeles Times in 2006, war crimes occurred throughout Vietnam.

Nelson and Turse, who gained access to the Vietnam War Crimes Working Group files gathering dust in the National Archives, reported that among the substantiated cases in the archive were:

• Seven massacres from 1967 through 1971 in which at least 137 civilians died.

• 78 other attacks on noncombatants in which at least 57 were killed, 56 wounded and 15 sexually assaulted.

• 141 instances in which U.S. soldiers tortured civilian detainees or prisoners of war with fists, sticks, bats, water or electric shock.

The files contained 500 other alleged atrocities that Army investigators could not prove or that they discounted, Nelson and Turse reported.

Peers stressed that before My Lai, “there had been instances of mistreatment, rape and some unnecessary killings in Task Force Barker.”

Some troops engaged in contests of raping women, Jones said, with “extra points for killing them.”

Very few were prosecuted and almost none served jail time. “It helped form a pattern of behavior,” Jones said.

A sort of slide into evil wasn’t difficult in Vietnam, Philip Caputo wrote in his 1977 book, “A Rumor of War.”

“Everything rotted and corroded there: bodies, boot leather, canvas, metal, morals. Scorched by the sun, wracked by the wind and rain of the monsoon, fighting in alien swamps and jungles, our humanity rubbed off of us as the protective bluing rubbed off the barrels of our rifles.”

Helicopter pilot Warrant Officer Hugh Thompson speaks with reporters at the Pentagon on Dec. 4, 1969, after testifying before a board looking into the original investigation of the My Lai massacre in South Vietnam. AP

‘Flawed intelligence’

When Tony Nadal went to Vietnam in 1965, as the war’s escalation and the anti-war movement were just getting started, more than 60 percent of Americans supported sending troops to the country.

Three years later, support had plummeted.

During a supposed truce in observation of Tet, the Vietnamese lunar New Year, on Jan. 30, North Vietnam troops launched a huge surprise assault that took 10 U.S. battalions nearly a month to beat back.

After that, only a third of Americans agreed that progress was being made. Nearly half said the U.S. should never have intervened in Vietnam.

On Feb. 27, CBS News anchor Walter Cronkite, considered the nation’s most trusted newscaster, told his millions of viewers that the war could not be won.

Two weeks later, on March 16, Capt. Ernest Medina led Charlie Company, part of Task Force Barker, into the hamlet of My Lai.

The unit had lost 28 soldiers from snipers, landmines and booby traps, and hadn’t once seen the enemy, Jones said. The area was considered rife with Viet Cong fighters and civilian sympathizers.

“You’ve got all this fear and frustration. And then they got flawed intelligence, that up to 300 or 400 Viet Cong would be implanted in My Lai,” Jones said.

That there were no Viet Cong fighters became clear early in the mission. No shots were fired at the troops, no weapons were found.

Platoon leader Lt. William Calley and his men nonetheless went to work, burning huts, raping women and girls, and killing with knives, grenades and machine guns.

Some soldiers testified later that they’d understood their orders were to lay waste to the village and kill everyone there because they were Viet Cong sympathizers. Officers denied it; no such written orders were ever found, although it was acknowledged that the troops were ordered to kill the livestock, burn the huts and poison the wells, and that there was no order as there should have been addressing the safeguarding of civilians.

One soldier shot himself in the foot to avoid his orders, turning the quintessential action of a coward into something almost self-sacrificing. He, like the rest of the soldiers, kept quiet about what they’d seen and done.

“I just started killing any kind of way I could kill. It just came, I didn’t know I had it in me,” Varnardo Simpson said in a 1982 TV interview, 15 years before he killed himself. “From shooting them to cutting their throats to scalping them to cutting off their hands and cutting out their tongue. I did that. And I wasn’t the only one that did it, a lot of other people did it.”

EVERYTHING ROTTED AND CORRODED THERE: BODIES, BOOT LEATHER, CANVAS, METAL, MORALS. SCORCHED BY THE SUN, WRACKED BY THE WIND AND RAIN OF THE MONSOON, FIGHTING IN ALIEN SWAMPS AND JUNGLES, OUR HUMANITY RUBBED OFF OF US AS THE PROTECTIVE BLUING RUBBED OFF THE BARRELS OF OUR RIFLES.”

— PHILIP CAPUTO, IN HIS 1977 BOOK “A RUMOR OF WAR

The exception was Warrant Officer Hugh Thompson and his two-gunner helicopter crew. “Something ain’t right about this,” Thompson said over his radio as he flew overhead. “There’s bodies everywhere. There’s a ditch full of bodies that we saw.”

View of My Lai from overhead helicopter

Thompson landed his helicopter repeatedly to confront and defy higher-ranking officers. He coaxed out a dozen villagers hiding in a bunker Calley and his solders were about to kill with grenades, and called in a gunship to evacuate them. “Y’all cover me,” Thompson told his gunners, Larry Colburn and Glenn Andreotta, as he faced off against the U.S. infantrymen.

“If those bastards open up on me or these people, you open up on them.”

Thompson officially reported the slaughter up the chain of command, which called off the rest of the operation and buried the report.

Battalion commander Lt. Col. Frank Barker called the operation in My Lai “well planned, well executed and successful” in his after-action report. He reported 128 “enemy” killed in action.

Brigade commander Col. Oran Henderson, informed by Thompson of all he’d seen, reported 20 noncombatants inadvertently killed in a crossfire between U.S. and Viet Cong forces.

Maj. Gen. Samuel Koster, Americal Division commander, insisted later to investigators that he’d reviewed and believed Henderson’s report, which, unfortunately had somehow gone missing.

But the truth would come out.

Undeniable evidence

Ron Ridenhour, a former gunner in another unit, sent registered letters to some 30 lawmakers and officials in March 1969, telling them what other soldiers had told him.

“I asked ‘Butch’ several times if all the people were killed. He said that he thought they were — men, women and children,” Ridenhour’s letter said. “He recalled seeing a small boy, about 3 or 4 years old, standing by the trail with a gunshot wound in one arm. … He just stood there with big eyes staring around like he didn’t understand. … Then the captain’s RTO (radio operator) put a burst of 16 (M-16 rifle) fire into him.”

The public didn’t hear about it for another eight months until journalist Seymour Hersh, who’d gotten wind of Calley’s upcoming court-martial, broke the story. The Army photographer who’d been on the My Lai mission, Sgt. Ronald Haeberle, provided the photos to the Cleveland Plain Dealer, which was the first to publish them. Haeberle then sold his photographs to Life magazine.

About 30 men were charged with crimes connected to the massacre or the cover-up. About half of them were officers, most of them charged with dereliction of duty.

But charges were dropped or military juries acquitted. Only Calley, against whom there was overwhelming evidence, was convicted of a crime. In 1971 he was sentenced to life in prison for the murder, although he served only three years under house arrest before being freed.

Many of those who were at My Lai had left the service by the time the story broke. At the time, federal law provided no widely accepted way to prosecute former enlisted soldiers for crimes committed overseas while in uniform, although the Army’s general counsel, Robert E. Jordan III, recommended in 1969 that the My Lai participants be tried before a special war crimes tribunal.

Eighty percent of Americans objected to Calley’s prosecution, according to a contemporary Gallup poll.

Twenty percent said Calley was executing his superiors’ lawful orders on the battlefield.

Jimmy Carter, then Georgia governor, urged constituents to “honor the flag” as Calley had done, and to leave their headlights on to show their support. A song lauding him played on the radio.

Others considered Calley a scapegoat.

“We only want this country to realize that it cannot try a Calley for something which generals and Presidents and our way of life encouraged him to do,” Vietnam vet and future Secretary of State John Kerry said at an anti-war protest.

“And if you try him, then at the same time you must try all those generals and Presidents and soldiers who have part of the responsibility. You must in fact try this country.”

“If you were against the war, Calley was a war criminal writ large — but a dupe,” said Ted Thomas, who served in Vietnam and teaches a class on the war at the Army Command and Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth, Kan. “If you were on the right, he was just a soldier doing the best he could.”

Vietnamese women and children in My Lai before being killed in the massacre, March 16, 1968. According to court testimony, they were killed seconds after the photo was taken. The woman on the right is adjusting her blouse buttons following a sexual assault that happened before the massacre. Ronald L. Haeberle/U.S. Army”

Setting standards

The Hague Conventions in the early 1900s set out the laws of war that required safeguarding the fundamental human rights of prisoners of war, wounded troops and civilians.

Later, the Nuremberg Principles stated that a soldier “just following orders,’’ as numerous Nazi war criminals had claimed, was not an excuse: Illegal orders must not be obeyed.

Likewise “command responsibility” — the idea that higher-ranking officers are responsible for atrocities committed by their troops — has been codified since the American Civil War.

After the execution of Japanese Gen. Tomoyuki Yamashita for war crimes committed by troops in the Philippines in 1944 — despite there being no evidence that he approved or even knew of them — the doctrine was refined and given his name: the “Yamashita standard.”

It said that officers who knew about — or should have known about — atrocities and failed either to prevent or stop them could be criminally prosecuted.

My Lai resulted in another standard: the “Medina standard,” named for Capt. Ernest Medina, which clarified U.S. law to make command responsibility applicable not only to foreign officers but U.S. officers.

Calley testified he’d been following Medina’s orders, and other witnesses testified to seeing Medina kill a woman lying injured. The Peers Inquiry found he’d possibly killed three people and that although aware of the massacre had done nothing to stop it.

Medina was acquitted of all charges.

“At least they tried,” said Stjepan Mestrovich, a war crimes expert and sociology professor at Texas A&M University in College Station.

Since then, the Army has failed to even attempt to hold officers accountable for war crimes, he said, instead, scapegoating low-ranking troops.

The sexual humiliation and physical abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib in Iraq, for instance, was an “isolated incident” caused by “a few bad apples,” then-Defense Sec. Donald Rumsfeld said in 2004.

But in fact, harsh treatment and torture of detainees had been sanctioned at the highest government levels and occurred at a number of military prisons and “black sites.’’

“It’s not just a bunch of bad apples. It’s a whole orchard,” Mestrovich said. “The Army protects high-ranking officers, it’s that simple.”

Lessons forgotten?

Historians say My Lai damaged military morale and increased revulsion to the war at home.

The “lessons of My Lai” also provided a model for future soldiers of what not to do.

Yet most enlisted troops have never heard of it, Nadal said.

Even West Point graduates, considered among the Army’s best and brightest, struggle to recall it.

“It was an atrocity. … It was a unit that was taking casualties, and they took it out on the village and committed atrocities,” answered a lieutenant colonel recently asked what he knew about My Lai.

My Lai had been discussed in his philosophy class at West Point about just and unjust war, he said. But that was a couple of decades ago. His memory was hazy.

“I can’t remember the name of the platoon leader,” he said.

*****

montgomery.nancy@stripes.com
Twitter: @montgomerynance

I you want to read more about U.S. atrocities, here’s a link to an article written by Mr. Nick Turse in the December 8, 2008 edition of “The Nation” titled, “A My Lai a month”. In it, they talk about Operation Speedy Express, and new evidence of civilian slaughter and cover-up in the Delta during the Vietnam War.

https://www.thenation.com/article/my-lai-month/


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Tragedy at Dong Ha (Guest Post)

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Jim Van Straten is a retired Army guy, almost 85 years old, and the most memorable year of his life was spent in I Corps where he served as the Senior Medical Advisor to the ARVN. He was there early in the war, July 1966 through June 1967, when I Corps was known as “Marine Country.” General Lewis Walt, USMC, became one of his heroes. As you probably know, in addition to serving as the Commander of the Third Marine Amphibious Force, General Walt also served as the Senior Advisor to the ARVN I Corps Commander, LTG Hoang Xuan Lam. It was in his advisory capacity that he got to know and admire General Walt.

After his service in Vietnam, Van Straten went on to serve a full thirty year career in the Army, retiring with the rank of colonel in 1986. Among his significant assignments were Director of Health Manpower Programs in the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs; Deputy Commandant of the Medical Field Service School; Chief of Staff of Seventh Medical Command in Heidelberg, Germany, and Director of a Department of the Army study aimed at improving the command and control of the Army Medical Department.

After retirement from the military, he was selected to serve initially as the dean of the Division of Professional Studies at Incarnate Word College and later as dean of the School of Allied Health Sciences at the University of Texas Health Science Center in San Antonio. A recognition that Van Straten cherishes is the Four Chaplains Award for service to peoples of all races and creeds.

Jim has written a book about his experiences in Vietnam titled, A Different Face of War. The book has been acclaimed by a number of historians for two reasons:

  1. It focuses considerable attention on the ancient Vietnamese culture, their religions and traditions than do most books written on the war, and
  2. It is very comprehensive. Three historians have written telling him that it is perhaps the most comprehensive look at one man’s tour of duty in Vietnam ever published.

Presented here is a slightly revised extract from his book. It describes an event that remains vividly in his mind after all these years, more than a half century. As you read this piece, please stop to consider how many brave men and women who served in Vietnam were touched in one way or another by those who served as medics. I think you’ll find it to be a very poignant story.

“…On the morning of Wednesday 5 October 1966, I arrived at my office at about 0515 hours. Lying on the middle of my desk was a handwritten note that read, “See the staff duty officer immediately.” I hurried up to the command suite and the staff duty officer said, “Major Van Straten, an ARVN Airborne Task Force, operating above Dong Ha in Quang Tri Province, got caught in the open last night during heavy monsoon rains and was cut to ribbons by NVA or VC mortars. The mortars rained down on them for several hours and after that there was a ground attack. The ARVN task force apparently has been decimated. Casualties are expected to be very high. As of now, none have been evacuated from the battlefield because of the weather.”

I hurried back to my office and tried to call Captain Bob Helton in Hue, the medical adviser to the ARVN 1st Infantry Division that was headquartered in Hue. His advisory responsibilities extended throughout Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces. Captain Helton was unavailable. I was told that he was on his way to the airport to catch a ride to Dong Ha.

I then went over to my counterpart’s office. Major Tu had not yet arrived. While waiting for him I made several calls to try and get more definitive information about the number of casualties. Casualty estimates were still not available. All that was known for certain was that the Airborne Task Force was not dug in for the night, as they should have been. The enemy had been relentless in dropping mortars on the ARVN paratroopers as they writhed around in the mud trying to escape the shrapnel from the repeated mortar explosions. When the mortars ceased the VC or NVA followed up with an immediate ground attack, essentially destroying the Airborne Task Force. The torrential rains continued, making the battlefield a quagmire.

I then started making calls to inquire about the availability of air transport, should the number of casualties overwhelm the system in Quang Tri province. It didn’t look good. All the C-130s seemed to be committed to hauling ammunition, other supplies and shuttling troops into the embattled area.

When Major Tu arrived at his office I passed on the fragmentary information that I had. He and I then went up to the operations center and received an update from the G-3. It was known that casualties were very high, but there were still no firm estimates regarding numbers. It was decided that I would go to Dong Ha and Major Tu would remain in Da Nang to assist in the coordination of the flow of casualties.

At about 1030 hours I departed Da Nang on a C-130 re-supply aircraft headed for Dong Ha. Upon arrival I was greeted by a scene that could have been taken from “Apocalypse Now.” The airstrip was absolute bedlam. I found Captain Helton at the landing zone (LZ) marked by a huge, fabric red cross staked to the ground. The red cross enabled the pilots of approaching helicopters, carrying the dead and wounded, to pick out the casualty reception LZ as they prepared to land.

 ARVN soldiers in a staging area ready to be airlifted into battle. Courtesy Jim Van Straten

Captain Helton gave me a quick rundown on the situation, telling me that he still did not have a good casualty estimate. The process of clearing the battlefield, delayed because of torrential rains, had begun but was going very slowly. U.S. Marine H-37 helicopters were the primary aircraft being used to evacuate casualties.

USMC H-46 — taken through the Plexiglas window of a following helicopter. Credit: COL Dave McSorley, USMC Retired.

Occasionally a larger H-46 cargo helicopter was made available to fly a mission. The ARVN 1st Infantry Division, to which the ill-fated Airborne Task Force was attached, had only six or eight H-34 helicopters in its total inventory and all were being used for troop shuttle and re-supply missions. It was decided that none could be made available for the evacuation of casualties. This decision caused Captain Helton great consternation. He expressed his dissatisfaction openly and repeatedly to ARVN officers who had made the decision.

USMC H-37 credit: Sikorsky Archives 

As Captain Helton and I were talking a U.S. Marine H-37 helicopter landed on the LZ, the doors opened and the ARVN medics on the ground started off-loading the dead and the wounded. The dead were wrapped in their ponchos and the wounded were either lying on a poncho or on the floor of the helicopter. There were no stretchers. As I recall there were nine or ten dead and ten or eleven seriously wounded ARVN soldiers in the helicopter.

USMC H-37–This is a photo of the model helicopter used for medical evacuation on that day at Dong Ha. Credit: The Sikorsky Archives.  

The U.S. Marine pilot must have identified me by the MACV patch and medical caduceus I was wearing and signaled for me to come over to the window of the cockpit. To save precious time the helicopter was not totally powered down, the rotor was still spinning and there was considerable noise. The pilot was fuming mad. He screamed at me, “I’ll not go back onto that battlefield one more time unless you can get those stupid bastards to give priority to the wounded. I’ve been out there three times and each time I end up transporting as many corpses as wounded soldiers. I’ll be damned if I’ll put my ass on the line to transport the dead off a hot LZ and let the wounded lie in the rain on the battlefield. The wounded yes, I’ll go back for them. The dead–no way. Nobody can help them. They can wait. Goddammit, do something about it. You advise the ARVN, don’t you? Do something about it.” I could appreciate his comments for the H-37 was terribly slow and difficult to maneuver, especially when operating on a hot LZ. By this time the process of off-loading the dead and the wounded was over and the pilot was given a signal to take off.

I turned my attention back to Captain Helton and it was his turn to be fuming mad. The number of reporters, camera crews, civilians from the nearby village of Dong Ha and ARVN and U.S. military officers and non-commissioned officers surrounding the LZ was so great that the helicopters were having difficulty landing. Because of the crush of humanity, ground ambulances couldn’t get to the LZ to transport the casualties from the helicopters to the triage and stabilization area. Captain Helton was screaming at the people to get out of the way. He and I actually joined hands and pushed our way through the crowd to clear a path for departing ground ambulances. At one point it became so bad that Captain Helton recommended to the ARVN medical company commander that he place an armed guard at the entrance point to the LZ and not let anyone in who was not authorized. The ARVN officer accepted this recommendation and an armed guard, with a round chambered, was posted at the entrance to the LZ. Despite the armed guard, Captain Helton and I continued to fight a losing battle of crowd control for much of the afternoon. The number of people attempting to observe the offloading and movement of the dead and wounded was so great that lives were being jeopardized.

Captain Helton angrily referred to the large numbers of military officers and non-commissioned officers crowding the LZ as “Saigon Cowboys.” He expressed his feelings that many were “desk jockeys” who flew to Dong Ha from Saigon and Da Nang when reports of the battle started reaching those cities. He said they wanted to “feel as if they were a part of the action.”

RVN soldier discovers the body of a close friend lost in the battle

It then became apparent that many lives were going to be lost unless we could transport large numbers of casualties requiring surgery from Dong Ha to the ARVN hospitals in Hue and Da Nang by a means other than ground ambulance. The distances were too great, the road too dangerous and the injuries too severe to consider using ground ambulances. We needed air transport support to move the casualties. My counterpart back in Da Nang, Major Tu, and I spent at least an hour on the phone trying to convince South Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) and/or USAF officials of the criticality of C-130 support. We eventually got a commitment that three C-130s would be made available. Bob Helton and I then shifted our attention to coordinating projected flight arrival times with getting the casualties to the loading point on the tarmac. Major Tu was coordinating projected arrival times at the Hue and Da Nang landing points to ensure that the planes could be rapidly off loaded and the casualties placed in ground ambulances for transport to Tri Phoung Station Hospital in Hue or Duy Tan General Hospital in Da Nang.

RVN Airborne Soldier credit: COL Dave McSorley, USMC Retired.

I was most thankful that an officer of Captain Helton’s ability was on the scene at Dong Ha. Without him I am convinced the loss of life would have been much greater than it was. He was superb in advising and assisting the ARVN medical authorities and in helping to coordinate the movement of casualties resulting from that tragic event.

At about 2145 hours that night I boarded a C-130 carrying the last group of casualties to Da Nang. When we landed I disembarked the aircraft, assured myself that there were adequate personnel and ambulances to transport the casualties to Duy Tan Hospital’s operating rooms and wards and then drove to my quarters. Though bone weary, sleep would not come. At about 0200 in the morning I got out of bed and ate a candy bar, suddenly realizing that it was the first food I had eaten in about 18 hours.

I subsequently discussed with several ARVN officers the tendency of the Vietnamese to evacuate the dead before the wounded. Respect for the dead and ancestry worship, they explained, were deeply ingrained in the Vietnamese culture and especially in those adhering to the Buddhist faith. While the pleas for help from the wounded were heard, the culturally imposed mandate regarding the dead trumped the requirement to remove the wounded from the battlefield.

ARVN Casualty taken in the triage area. Credit Jim Van Straten

Early the next morning I drove to Duy Tan Hospital to assess the situation with Doctors Tu and Phat. There was still a backlog of wounded soldiers awaiting surgery. Several had died while being transported from Dong Ha to Da Nang and several more were in critical condition in the hospital’s intensive care unit following surgery. Fortunately, it appeared as if the tactical situation would not generate additional casualties over the weekend. We could all breathe a little easier.

During the I Corps staff meeting the following Saturday morning, an after-action briefing was presented to LTG Lewis Walt, USMC, the senior American officer in I Corps and to his ARVN counterpart the I Corps Commander, LTG Hoang Xuan Lam. It was revealed that three NVA regular battalions had rained mortars on the ARVN Airborne Task Force for three or four consecutive hours. The monsoon rains rapidly turned the battlefield into a quagmire. All the exposed soldiers could do to try and escape the deadly shrapnel from the mortar rounds was wallow in the mud. In the first hour of the battle it was estimated that there were 200-250 ARVN casualties. Help could not be gotten to the unit because of the intensity of the rains and winds.

On Sunday morning, 9 October, it was still raining. I had never in my lifetime seen it rain so hard for such a prolonged period. It had rained for at least seven to ten hours during each of the past ten days.

++++

Thank you sir for allowing me to share part of your story. Thank you, too, for your sacrifice and Welcome Home!

If interested in purchasing a copy of his book, please click on this Amazon link:  https://www.amazon.com/Different-Face-War-Memories-Biography-ebook/dp/B01944VY3E/

Note:  the publisher of this book, the University of North Texas Press, has given me permission to publish the extract on this website.


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The Day I Met Charley (Guest Post)

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David Ramsey wrote the following as a comment after one of my earlier posts on May 13, 2013. I laughed while reading it and thought you’d all like to laugh too. During the war, many basecamp residents kept monkeys as pets during their time in Vietnam and learning more about them as time went on…dogs were also plentiful and groups adopted them too, letting them roam free and not keeping them locked in a pen. Soldiers always fed them so they stayed within the company area and became everyone’s pet. This is one such story about a monkey that wasn’t in the mood. I added photos from the internet – not actual photos – just for fun. I hope you enjoy Dave’s short story…

At this time, I can’t remember the entire where to and whereas of the mission on that hot summer day. We must have had over a hundred UH34 helicopters lined up on the grass to transport a bunch of Vietnamese troops out of Danang that morning. You could see the fear in the eyes of those young men, as they waited to mount up and fly to some embattled area.

For some reason I wasn’t scheduled to go out that day. I don’t remember why. At my present age, my mind is like a book with a lot of pages missing, like my hair. The young troops had brought everything they could for this mission; it looked like a huge flea market with all the stuff they were taking. It didn’t take long for the pilots to see this mess and I was drafted to be the trash collector that morning.

They were only allowed to take issued gear but I found everything from umbrellas to full racks of bananas. They sure didn’t expecting to get hungry on that mission. I sure made some enemies as I walked down that line, taking away all those comforts of home. Looking back I could have charged a baggage fee like air lines, and could have returned home rich and well hated. As I made my way down the line an officer was laughing as he held a rope, and at the end was a large gray monkey; his arms were wrapped around the legs of this Vietnamese warrior. I was handed the rope. I had no idea what I would do with an angry old monkey that had to say goodbye to his better half. The monkey was mad and so was his owner.

What had I just separated, man I don’t even want to know? I was afraid to get close enough to loosen the rope and I didn’t want the poor thing dragging that heavy rope tied around his neck. Luckily he followed me back to my tent without chewing my arm off. I don’t think he ever forgot his former soul mate, even though we fed him tons of delicious gourmet C-rations. For some reason we named the monkey Charley. Everyday Charley would sit with his back toward us, lonely staring into space. Something was missing in his poor life and finally we figured it out, or we thought so. Down the runway, a few hundred yards, the Army had a squadron of Huey Helicopters. Someone said they had a smaller red female monkey as a mascot. There it was, we all agreed, Charley was going to meet a new girl friend.

That afternoon we walked down with Charley and asked the squadron CO if he would allow his monkey to date our monkey. He was totally lost for words, asking us to repeat ourselves. We then explained the situation as his men started to gather around looking at Charley. After a few head scratches he finally approved.

Slowly we walked Charley over, with some bread in his hand, an offering to his new lover, or so we thought. All of a sudden the little red female monkey went ballistic. First she made a running attack on Charley; she jumped on his butt, biting as she screamed. Charley’s eyes were bigger than a silver dollar. Yanking the rope out of my hand he started running for his life with Red hot on his tail. Nearby was a flag pole and it only took him a second to climb to the top. Red sat on the ground, bouncing up and down, screaming and showing her teeth.

An hour or so passed and Charley was still sitting on his perch, not daring to come down. We soon realized Charley hated the Marine Corp, the Army and his unwilling date, Little Red. Finally the CO told one of his men to get a broom handle and a red flare. They taped the red flare to the end of the broom. The CO cranked up his chopper telling me to get the broom and climb in his Huey. For some reason Charley didn’t get spooked with the chopper coming toward him with me hanging out the door with broom and attached flare in hand. As soon as the spray hit him, he instantly went from gray to a brilliant red. I’m sure this was the second worst day of his life, his separation from his master being number one. Charley slid down that pole, hit the ground running, dragging that heavy rope, he never looked back.

After we regained our composure we all pretty much agreed, match making would never be in our future. I sure hope Charley found a better life, and a more passionate lover. Charley never came back to visit, at least he got a new hair color to brag about, rest well old friend.

C David Ramsey


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Friendly Fire during the Vietnam War

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How many casualties occurred because of friendly fire during the Vietnam war?

Nobody knows for sure. No one was keeping count, not all incidents were reported or even recognized as friendly fire, and the military did not want this to get out.  Friendly fire is an attack by a military force on non-enemy, own, allied or neutral, forces while attempting to attack the enemy, either by misidentifying the target as hostile, or due to errors or inaccuracy.

It’s estimated that there may be as many as 8,000 friendly fire incidents in the Vietnam War caused by mistakes, negligence, exhaustion, panic, horseplay, dim lighting, dense vegetation, inattentiveness, faulty equipment, poor training, foolishness, ill fortune or some combination of the above. There doesn’t appear to be any agreement of a firm percentage attributed to FF during the war, I’ve seen estimates ranging from 2.4% – 39% of all combined casualties. How were individuals categorized? The military refers to Friendly Fire as “misadventure” – correct me if I’m wrong, but I think this is the worst use of words, ever.

How does one differentiate the difference on the battle field? Are autopsies performed and fragments / bullets removed and identified? In the annals of warfare, deaths at the hand of the enemy are often valorized, while those at the hand of friendly forces may be cast in shame. Moreover, because public relations and morale are important, especially in modern warfare, the military may be inclined to under-report incidents of friendly-fire, especially when in charge of both investigations and press releases: is the tendency by military commanders to sweep such tragedies under the rug? It’s part of a larger pattern: the temptation among generals and politicians to control how the press portrays their military campaigns, which all too often leads them to misrepresent the truth in order to bolster public support for the war of the moment. The death of a soldier from friendly fire has been described as “. . . the most ghastly type of casualty you can anticipate.” The emotional impact of friendly fire casualties may be more destructive to a unit’s morale and fighting capacity than enemy fire. Each incident can cause a gradual degradation of combat power by lowering morale and confidence in supporting arms, a factor so vital to combined arms operations.

Here’s a list of potential causes of Friendly Fire:

  • Use of the term “friendly” in a military context for allied personnel or materiel dates from the First World War, often for shells falling short; errors of position occur when fire aimed at enemy forces may accidentally end up hitting one’s own.
  • Errors of identification happen when friendly troops, neutral forces or civilians are mistakenly attacked in the belief that they are the enemy.
  • Difficult terrain and visibility were major factors. Soldiers fighting on unfamiliar ground can become disoriented more easily than on familiar terrain. The direction from which enemy fire comes may not be easy to identify, and poor weather conditions and combat stress may add to the confusion, especially if fire is exchanged. Accurate navigation and fire discipline are vital. In high-risk situations, leaders need to ensure units are properly informed of the location of friendly units and must issue clear, unambiguous orders, but they must also react correctly to responses from soldiers who are capable of using their own judgement.
  • Miscommunication can be deadly. Radios, field telephones, and signaling systems can be used to address the problem, but when these systems are used to co-ordinate multiple forces such as ground troops and aircraft, their breakdown can dramatically increase the risk of friendly fire. When allied troops are operating the situation is even more complex, especially with language barriers to overcome.

Here are some examples of recorded incidents:

19 November 1967, a U.S. Marine Corps. F4 Phantom aircraft dropped a 500 lb (230 kg) bomb on the command post of the 2nd Battalion (Airborne) 503d Infantry, 173d Airborne Brigade while they were in heavy contact with a numerically superior NVA force. At least 45 paratroopers were killed and another 45 wounded. Also killed was the Battalion Chaplain Major Charles J. Watters, who was subsequently awarded the Medal of Honor.

16 March 1968 at FB Birmingham Marine F-4s dropped bombs on the base killing 16 and wounding 48 men of the 101st Airborne.

18 March 1968, around 10 Marines were killed by MACV-SOG operators mistaking them for enemy forces, when such operators were trying to ambush the supposed enemies. The incident was result of stress and a bad intel, as their commander said that the area was in enemy control.

5 February 1969, Sgt. Tony Lee Griffith, of H Co. 75th Infantry (Ranger), led his five-man long-range reconnaissance team through thick fog and dense, short brush between An Loc and the Cambodian border. Hearing wood being chopped not far off a trail they were assigned to surveil, he had his team set an ambush. But members of the North Vietnamese Army had also detected the team. At dawn several enemy soldiers stole through the fog and flung a grenade into the middle of the team, who were spread along the trail, in sight of each other. The grenade exploded next to the front scout, Cpl. Richard E. Wilkie, showering him with shrapnel. As the enemy opened fire, the two team members on Wilkie’s left panicked and fired in the direction of the grenade’s blast. Caught in an intense crossfire, Wilkie, a Special Forces veteran, was shot five times––once by the enemy, twice by his team, and twice by bullets that passed through him. Miraculously, he survived. So, too, did the assistant team leader, Lewis D. Davidson, who was hit twice in the leg. Tony Griffith’s luck, however, ended that morning, when he was hit by multiple gunshots to the chest.

11 May 1969, during the Battle of Hamburger Hill, Lt. Col. Weldon Honeycutt directed helicopter gunships, from an Aerial Rocket Artillery (ARA) battery, to support an infantry assault. In the heavy jungle, the helicopters mistook the command post of the 3/187th battalion for a Vietnamese unit and attacked, killing two and wounding thirty-five, including Honeycutt. This incident disrupted battalion command and control and forced 3/187th to withdraw into night defensive positions.

1 May 1970, on military operations in Phước Tuy Province a burst of machine gun fire followed by a calls for the Medic split the night, an Australian machine gunner opened fire on soldiers of the 8th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment without warning, killing two and wounded two other soldiers.

20 July 1970, patrol units of ‘D’ Company 8th Battalion, 1st Australian Task Force outside the wire at Nui Dat called in a New Zealand battery fire mission as part of a training exercise. However, there was confusion at the gun position about the fire corrections issued by the inexperienced Australian officer with the patrol. The result was two rounds fell upon the patrol, killing two and wounding several others.

24 July 1970, New Zealand artillery guns accidentally shelled an Australian platoon, 1 Australian Reinforcement Unit, (1 ARU), killing two and wounding another four soldiers.

10 May 1972, a VPAF MiG-21 was shot down in error by a North Vietnamese surface-to-air missile near Tuyen Quang, killing a pilot.

2 June 1972, a VPAF MiG-19 was shot down in error by a North Vietnamese surface-to-air missile near Kep Province, killing a pilot.

24 December 1970, Co. A 1/327, 101st airborne infantry on when Artillery was misdirected by the officer platoon leader and 2 High Explosive artillery rounds landed in the NDP of 2nd platoon killing 12 and leaving the remaining members of the platoon in the jungle all night without support until the next day when the rest of the company could get to them to clean up the mess.

October 1970, my platoon was involved in a friendly fire incident. We had a new lieutenant while out on a mission and prior to setting up for the night, he requested a spotter round to burst roughly 250 meters away to confirm the location of our NDP. However, when picking the coordinates, he did not take into account the gun trajectory path from the firebase and the coordinates he chose were in the air between our position and the guns. His spotter round confirmed the coordinates and then, everyone heard the spent canister approaching – whoop, whoop, whoop as the empty tube continued on its trajectory. We only had seconds to find cover. The canister landed just outside of our perimeter, bounced and then summersaulted across our NDP like a runaway wagon wheel. It stopped suddenly after crashing into a 2-man position and severely wounding the two surprised soldiers.

The movie about Ron Kovak Born on the 4th of July depicted him being shot in the back by a member of his own platoon while reconnoitering in front of the perimeter. He survived, but was paralyzed for life.

The movie, ‘We were soldiers’ showed an incident when napalm was dropped on US lines and killed several American soldiers.

  • This incident occurred while a US infantry company was establishing a night defensive perimeter. In firing their planned defensive fires outside of the perimeter, the initial 81mm mortar round fell short and only traveled 35 meters from the tube, wounding three US soldiers (one later died of wounds). The platoon sergeant, located in an adjacent gun pit, saw the round flutter and drop. He immediately yelled, “Short round”, but the enlisted man who died of wounds started running rather than taking cover
    • Following this incident and after troops were cleared from the immediate area, an additional round was fired using the same data and ammunition lot number. This second round functioned normally and landed in the planned impact area.
    • The cause of this incident was attributed to ammunition malfunction and not human error on the part of the gun crew.

  • A US infantry platoon conducted a mounted combat patrol and established an ambush position in the vicinity of a district headquarters compound. During the evening, US troops engaged an enemy force. A Light Fire Team (LFT) was requested and within a few minutes arrived on station. The sub-sector advisor directed the LFT commander to engage the wood line north and west of the compound. On the first firing pass, the LFT’s fires impacted in the vicinity of the friendly troops. The battalion commander requested that fire be shifted to the west. The LFT was informed but almost immediately the battalion commander reported that the gunships had again fired on the US troops. The advisor gave a cease fire and released the LFT. This incident resulted in the death of one US soldier and injury to nine others.
    • The primary cause of this incident was the employment of a LFT too close to friendly troops at night without clearance from or communications with the ground commander. The primary factor contributing to the incident was a misunderstanding between the subsector advisor and the LFT as to the exact location of friendly troops. The advisor failed to give specific coordinates of friendly troop dispositions and US military units in the immediate area were not monitoring the advisor’s net which controlled the LFT.

  • This incident occurred when a Forward Observer (FO) with an infantry company requested a 100 meter shift away from a previously fired Defensive Concentration (DEFCON). The DEFCON had been fired during darkness, in thick growth, and apparently was much closer to the battalion’s perimeter than estimated. The observer’s target description misrepresented the criticality of the situation and caused the Fire Direction Center (FDC) to fire the DEFCON as a contact mission not requiring safe fire adjustment of the battery. This action resulted in the death of three US soldiers and injury to nineteen others.
    • Causes of this incident were a misrepresentation of the nature of the target in a fire mission and failure to comply with established policies for the conduct of non-contact missions close to friendly perimeters.
  • This Incident occurred when a 105mm artillery battery fired an unobserved “trail runner” mission. When fired, due to a misunderstanding on area clearance, six rounds impacted in the proximity of friendly personnel resulting in the injury of one ARVN soldier and three Vietnamese civilians. The mission was passed from one artillery battalion to another due to a boundary change in two brigade Areas of Operations (A0s). When questioned, the original firing battalion Fire Direction Officer (FDO) indicated that the areas to be fired were cleared. The FDO of the receiving battery then assumed that all required area clearances had been obtained but in reality targets had been cleared only within the AO of the old firing battalion. All gunnery data and procedures were found to be correct.
    • This incident was caused by the failure to clarify exactly what clearance had been obtained and the statement that the areas were cleared should have been amplified as had been the practice on previous occasions to indicate what clearances had been granted.

  • One tube of a 4.2 inch mortar platoon fired with a 200 mil discrepancy in deflection while firing a registering round in support of the defense of a battalion perimeter. One round impacted in a company sector and four US soldiers were killed and ten wounded.
    • The cause of this incident was determined to be a failure on the part of the gunner to refer his sight as directed and was compounded by the failure of the squad leader to make the required safety checks.
  • This incident occurred while a US squad was conducting patrol activities in the vicinity of a fire support base. The squad leader saw a Viet Cong with a weapon and decided to call for artillery support. He sent his fire command to the artillery reconnaissance sergeant on the company internal radio net. The reconnaissance sergeant determined that the range to the target was 350 meters, verified this with the observer and inserted ‘Danger Close, 250 meters’ into the fire request. This was transmitted to the artillery liaison section in the infantry battalion Tactical Operations Centre (TOC), cleared, sent to the supporting artillery battalion and further assigned to a firing battery who processed the fire command and a smoke round was fired. This round was spotted in a rice paddy about 300 meters to the right flank of the observer, who then adjusted with ‘Left 150, repeat smoke’. This second round impacted again to the right flank of the observer who then erroneously repeated ‘Left 150’. The reconnaissance sergeant, monitoring the mission, asked the observer if he desired Shell, HE, Fuze Quick. The observer replied that he did and was warned to get his troops down because of the close proximity of the adjustments. The round was fired and impacted in the vicinity of the squad, injuring three personnel.
    • The squad leader became disoriented during the adjustment of the mission. He unconsciously faced the second round as it impacted, estimated the distance to the target as being 150 meters, and gave a correction of ‘Left 150’ instead of ‘Add 150’. The FDC had no way of knowing that the observer had changed his Observer – Target (OT) azimuth by 1600 mils and accepted the “Left 150’ as the desired shift. The cause of this incident was the incorrect adjustment of artillery fire by an inexperienced observer.

  • This firing incident resulted from a change of coordinates during clearance for fire procedures between the operations center of an artillery battalion and the TOC of the infantry division artillery. In the telephonic transmission of the fire request, the grid coordinates were transposed from XT6324 to XT6423. This error resulted in one killed for the requesting infantry unit.
    • The cause of this incident can be attributed to a lack of double check procedures on fire requests by each element in the clearance chain.
  • The FO with an infantry battalion called the FDC of the supporting artillery battalion and gave target coordinates for an adjust fire mission and indicated a platoon or larger size enemy force. The mission was passed to a firing battery and was followed by the artillery battalion FDC. After adjustment had been completed, the FO called for fire for effect on the same target. Since the battery had only four guns available at the time, it was directed to fire a battery six rounds. Due to a breech-lock malfunction, the number four howitzer was called out of action and the number five howitzer was directed to fire three additional rounds in order to complete the fire mission. Shortly thereafter the FO with the infantry unit notified the artillery battalion FDC that several rounds had landed in the vicinity of the unit’s perimeter and that one gun appeared to be firing out of lay. This incident resulted in two US soldiers being wounded.
    • The cause of this incident was attributed to a 100 mil deflection error by a howitzer section of the firing battery.

  • A battery of US artillery fired fifteen 105mm rounds which detonated near a bridge being secured by US and Vietnamese Popular Force (PF) soldiers. This fire mission resulted in the wounding of one US and one PF soldier.
    • The fire mission was called in by a PF soldier and relayed through the district chief and the US liaison representative at district headquarters. US target clearance was obtained from the appropriate US artillery battalion liaison officer who was unaware that a US armored personnel carrier was positioned at the bridge. The target was mis-plotted 1000 meters by the ARVN district chief and the observer target direction was also incorrectly given as 3200 mils instead of 320 degrees.
    • The first round in adjustment was fired and the correction given was ‘Drop 300’. The second round was fired and a correction of ‘Right 300, Fire for effect’ was requested. At this time the firing battery FDO informed the Vietnamese that the “fire for effect” plot was within 200 meters of the bridge. The Vietnamese confirmed the request and the FDO then requested that personnel at the bridge be warned to take cover. A battery of three rounds was fired which resulted in the two casualties.
    • The cause of this incident was the error in the determination of the target. The PF at the bridge either disregarded or did not receive the warning of the close proximity of the fire for effect rounds. As a result, the US personnel were not aware of the danger although they had observed the round adjustments prior to the fire for effect.
  • A FO with a US infantry company was firing a destruction mission with one gun of the supporting artillery battalion on a well fortified B-40 rocket position 30 to 40 meters north of the company location. Adjustment was difficult due to terrain and proximity of the enemy rocket position to friendly forces. The FO had to adjust by sound and could only observe those rounds which became air bursts after hitting trees. The FO’s last correction, as sensed from the previous round, was correctly computed by the FDC, checked by the section chief and fired. Because of the uneven terrain and the probable error of the range fired (9,920 meters), the round impacted outside the company perimeter, resulting in the death of one and the injury to a second member of the infantry unit.
    • The two personnel involved in this incident were outside the unit perimeter. This was a direct violation of the unit commander’s order that all personnel would stay under overhead cover until the fire mission was completed.
    • Cause of this incident was a violation of orders to remain under protective overhead cover while artillery was being used for close-in support. A contributing factor was the proximity of friendly troops to the target.
  • Friendly casualties were caused when an unknown number of 105mm rounds impacted on their position during a contact mission.
    • Cause of this incident was that the mission was started by a ground FO, however, he was unable to observe the rounds. The mission was then taken over by an airborne observer who made shifts along the gun-target (GT) line, while the FDC was plotting the shift along the OT line.

13 January 1967, A Battery, 8th Battalion 6th Artillery apparently transposed the last two numbers of the coordinates and fired approximately 18 rounds that landed on A Company, 1st Battalion, 28th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division. Nine men were killed and more than 40 wounded. The units were taking part in Operation Cedar Falls in the Iron Triangle. It’s believed the battery commander was Capt. John Seely and the battalion commander was Lt. Col. Ben Safar.

USCGC Point Welcome was attacked by USAF aircraft, with two deaths resulting.

17 June 1968, USS Boston, USS Edson, USCGC Point Dume, HMAS Hobart and two U.S. Swift Boats, PCF-12 and PCF-19 are attacked by US aircraft. Several sailors were killed and PCF-19 was sunk.

Even in todays war, the former NFL star, turned Army Ranger, Pat Tillman was shot by his own troops in Afghanistan…covered up at first. Why?

Did you know that a soldier who is wounded or killed by friendly fire or other accidental means did not qualify for a Purple Heart? Could this be one of the main reasons to cover up many other FF instances?

Nothing compares to the stress, confusion, and emotion of combat. People make decisions that are irreversible, and other people may die as a result. The death of a soldier is always tragic, but never more so than when he is inadvertently killed by his own comrades.

It’s a tragedy for any war but then the Vietnam war had it’s own unique form of friendly fire deaths. There were some who were killed intentionally by those individuals who would take things into their own hands. A 2nd Lt. fresh out of OCS might find himself with an M16 round in his back should he be deemed hazardous to his platoon or worse on the receiving end of a frag grenade. There are no statistics to show how many were killed on purpose but it happened. I can imagine and only hope that the ones responsible are eventually held responsible if by no one then their own conscience.

The second classification is “murder” where friendly fire incidents are premeditated. During the Vietnam War, some officers who overtly risked the lives of their soldiers were murdered by those men in incidents known as “fragging.”

Here is some data compiled by William F. Abbott from figures obtained shortly after the construction of the Vietnam War Memorial:

Cause Of Casualty Hostile & Non-hostile (Percentage):

Gun shot or small arms fire —- 31.8

Drowning and burns ———- 3.0

Misadventure (Friendly fire) — 2.3

Vehicle crashes ———— 2.0

Multiple frag wounds grenades, mines, bombs, booby traps — 27.4

Aircraft crashes ———- 14.7

Illness, also malaria, hepatitis, heart attack, stroke — 1.6

Arty or rocket fire ——– 8.4

Suicide —————- 0.7

Accidental self-destruction, intentional homicide, accidental
homicide, other accidents. — 5.8

Other, unknown, not reported — 2.0

How many actual deaths by friendly fire were just lumped into one of the above categories based on the situation they were in?

The problem of friendly fire will never be completely eliminated because the “fog of war”, human error, and material failure inevitably will make some Instances of friendly fire impossible to avoid. Our duty is to take all reasonable measures to minimize its tragic occurrence.

Any VNVets out there ever witness a “Friendly Fire” incident?

*****

Information for this article was obtained from Wikipedia, , NY Times, vietvet.org, Defense Manpower Data Center

http://www.answers.com

https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32492.pdf

http://www.americanwarlibrary.com/ff/ffv.htm

https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1992/WBG.htm

If anyone is interested in reading my earlier article about “Fragging” click here: https://wp.me/pRiEw-2Sf


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Claymore Alley (Guest blog)

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The following story was written by [Jeff Drake] before his investigation into U.S. friendly fire involvement in Vietnam. It affected him deeply, and he has only recently come to terms with the experience and can now look at the events as they occurred without the emotional filters which tainted his perception for so many years. It is the story of his first combat experience.  NOTE: all photos added by administrator of this website.

Sunlight shatters on the jungle canopy above and falls, fragmented, on the ground around me. The effect imparts an intermittent glow to the jungle greenery, giving substance to the impression that I am walking in a dream. The humid rain forest air has become a second skin, hugging me, moist and sticky. In the past hour my entire world has diminished. Now, there is only the trail behind me and the trail ahead, a muddy reddish-brown streak that remains hidden except for sudden surprise appearances. Jagged and twisting, it winds its dangerous way through the dense jungle of the Vietnamese Central Highlands.

The past quickly disappears over my shoulder, a distant, fading memory, while ahead of me lurks the all too uncertain future. Nothing matters more to me now than finishing this reconnaissance mission and getting back to my base, Pr’Line Mountain, alive and in one piece. My ammo vest feels good and snug this morning, the magazines of M-16 ammunition lay against my body like a shield, giving me a temporary feeling of security.

Somewhere ahead and behind me, the others are walking stealthily, crouched and pensive. Except for an occasional glimpse, I would not know they are there. Gone is the laughter that filled our throats the night before. In its place today are the hushed, muffled tones of labored breathing. Out here, being silent may give you just the edge you need to beat Charlie to the trigger. Taped down to make them as quiet as possible, the trappings of war we each carry rub caressingly against our combat fatigues. Like wind, the soft noise blends easily into the jungle sounds around us. Still playing tricks with my eyes, the eerie jungle lighting creates further illusions. Ebony black shadows against a brilliant green background present my senses with a surreal 3-D image. I can’t shake the feeling that I am advancing, frame by frame, through a scene in a View Master.

Sergeant Joe Frasier is several yards ahead of us, walking the point. He signals back to me that we are going to stop and take a break. I pass it on to the men behind me. Time to have a smoke. As I light my cigarette, I notice Dave Fry moving up to my position. He whispers that he wants to take my place so he can be near his buddy, the sergeant.

I struggle with the decision. Dave shouldn’t be out here at all. He’s a truck mechanic, not a grunt. But no, Dave just couldn’t leave Vietnam without a taste of what it was like to be on patrol in the jungle. He and Joe somehow convinced the captain that this was going to be a “safe” reconnaissance. Still, Joe shouldn’t have let him come. There is nothing safe in this god-forsaken jungle. But what do you expect when you are on a patrol led by your company clerk? Apparently Joe Frasier’s own inexperience was overridden by the fact that he’s the only one in our company who’s trained to replace the batteries in the electronic listening devices used by the army to track enemy troop movement.

When we were given a mission to find several electronic devices that had been placed out on a nearby ridge a year ago, replace the batteries, and return to our mountain, our captain made Joe the leader even though he was the company clerk. Supposedly he got the training instead of someone in our security platoon, because the captain thought his college degree made him smarter than the rest of us.

Knowing all of this makes me hesitate. I don’t see how having these two guys leading our patrol will increase our chances of survival, but Joe is signaling to me that I should do it. Reluctantly, I change places with Dave.

Stretching out the last few hits of my cigarette, I think about this trail we are on. The main road between Da Lat and our site, Pr’Line Mountain, cuts right through it. At that point the banks are steep as cliffs, and the trail continues on either side. In 1968, some Viet Cong walked this same path. I wonder what was on their minds as they waited for the approaching American convoy. As the sounds of truck wheels on the pitted mountain road got closer, did they have any second thoughts? Did they have any regrets as they depressed the detonators to their Claymore mines? Probably not. Many young American men died that day, never knowing what hit them. From then on, that pass would be known to both Americans and Vietnamese alike as… Claymore Alley.

Time to move again, deeper and deeper into the jungle. All we have is a rudimentary map of where the sensing devices are supposed to be. The odds are high that we will never find them, which makes some of us angry. Disgruntled feelings are forgotten, however, as an odd silence blankets the area. Usually there are noises in the jungle around us – birds, monkeys, or other unseen forest creatures. Together, they fill the background with the same kind of sounds you hear in old Tarzan movies. But these sounds have suddenly disappeared. Sensing danger, my skin begins to crawl.

We move forward, cautious and silent. Those of us who have been out here before are nervous because something definitely isn’t right. Joe signals for us to stop. Has he seen some movement ahead? He vanishes into the brush ahead of us, and Dave follows him. I wish I could see better, but the jungle is just too thick. I crouch behind a lush plant, trying to make myself look invisible.

An explosion! My brain is rattling in my head. My ears are ringing. I am laying flat on the ground, but I don’t have any idea how I got there. My mind reels as I try and figure out what is happening. It was so damn loud, yet the noise was quite distinctive. It sounded just like a Claymore mine. A million thoughts race through my mind, but only one pushes to the front… Ambush!

I expect the sound of gunfire. Can anybody see the bastards? Where are they? Why aren’t they shooting at us? How much time has gone by since the explosion? Seconds? Minutes? Time is stretched to the point of distortion. My heart is pounding so hard. Why isn’t anyone shooting at them? I can’t see anything! Can’t anybody else see where they are?

What’s that? Screaming. A man is yelling something. My God, he’s screaming for his mother. Who is it? Where is he? He’s screaming in English, so he must be one of us! Which one? Goddamn it, why is no one shooting? Can’t anyone see the fucking gooks? No gunfire. Shit. Shit! This can mean only one thing. Lou, the man to my rear, has moved up next to me. We exchange a look that tells both of us that we have reached the same conclusion. We were now facing that which G.I.’s feared most of all in Vietnam. More than the NVA, more than the Viet Cong, more than anything… we feared the boobytrap.

Seconds tick by. Lou and I are closest to the screams, but the source is still 30 to 50 yards ahead of us. It must be either Dave or Joe. Shit! How did he get that far from us? Were they crazy? If Joe thought he saw movement, why were they walking on the trail? You never walk a trail that Charlie might be using! Why didn’t Joe let us know what was going on? Defer the questions. Whoever is out there is still screaming, “Mama, Mama!”

God, he sounds just like a little kid – in tremendous pain. I can’t stand it. I fight back the urge to throw up. Lou crawls ahead. He motions for me to follow. I can’t. I’m frozen in place. All I can think of is the hidden mechanical deathtraps around me which I could set off with the slightest movement.

Time to pull myself together. The screams are getting louder. How much time has passed? An eternity? Lou beckons me again. This time I move. Together we cross the distance between us and the source of the screams. It is the longest distance I have ever traveled in my life. With every movement, Lou and I expect one of us to set off another mine. There is the strong taste of metal in the back of my throat.

So strange. No more explosions. No gunfire. Did they only set one trap? Very unusual, and lucky.

We made it! However, our elation at having gone the distance without getting killed is dampened immediately by the strange sight of Dave laying there on the ground. He’s more than a mess. Both his knees are bent 90 degrees in the wrong directions and his fatigues appear to have hundreds of holes in them. Through the holes, blood is spurting everywhere. He must have severed arteries, because the blood acts like it’s being pumped. I had no idea people could bleed like that. His screams have turned to moans, and I feel like I’m going to pass out as the others gather around us.

Recovering from my stupor, I start ripping off the numerous battle dressings I carry and begin applying them to his wounds. Someone else pulls out a Morphine ampoule and injects it into Dave’s leg. My hands and clothing are now covered with his blood. Bones are sticking out of both his pant legs, and the ends look jagged and sharp. We radio for a Medevac.

I must be dreaming. I feel so strange, so unreal. The morphine Dave received has taken effect, and he is actually cracking jokes with the Southerner we call Pappy. Somehow, the scene defies belief. Dave must be dying, he’s lost so much blood. I feel sick to my stomach. Dazed, I take a position on our perimeter, while the others try and comfort him.

What’s that? There is something not quite right about those trees. Is there someone there? Again, time is distorted. I’m going to die. No, it can’t be! My thoughts are interrupted by a small shirtless man jumping out of the brush with arms raised, yelling, “Don’t shoot! Don’t shoot! ARVN! ARVN!”.

Chaos. I felt dreamy before, but now the last shreds of reason and logic have left me. I no longer belong to this world. The jungle around us is spitting up South Vietnamese soldiers. There must be ten or twelve of them. Someone orders them to come out and put down their guns. Two or three do, but the rest are refusing.

It is all starting to make a sick kind of sense. The reason there was no shooting, and the mine didn’t completely blow Dave apart, was that the mine belonged to them. This must have been their mechanical ambush! ARVNs were known for using the C-4 plastic explosive used in Claymore mines to light their fires during the rainy season, thus rendering the mines powerless in some cases. In this particular case, there was enough explosive left in the mine to tear Dave up without killing him outright.

Yes, they admit that the mine was theirs. A trip-wire had been strung across the trail at its lowest point. They apparently had been waiting just up the hill. They had to have seen us! Saying nothing, they must have watched Dave walk right into it. Reality is setting in. We have been ambushed by the ARVNs, the South Vietnamese, our allies. Why?

There is a queasy feeling in my stomach. It’s so strange to feel something, after being so numb. I can’t identify it, but it is working it’s way up my throat and into my head. My intestines turn to fire as I try to cope with the situation.

People are yelling. We demand that the ARVNs come out and put down their weapons. Some ARVNs are yelling back that they won’t. I am watching another ARVN. He’s young, just a boy really; and he is separated from his weapon which is leaning against a nearby tree. He looks into my eyes and slowly starts inching his way toward his weapon. I train my M-16 on him, smile, and nod toward his gun. “Go ahead,” I say. “Get it.” He takes a step. Deliberately exaggerating my movements, I make a point of reaching down and turning the switch on my M-16 from single-fire to full-automatic. He freezes when he hears the ominous click. Again, I tell him to get the gun. He refuses. I want to kill him so badly I can taste it. I fantasize that the fire from my M-16 splits his body in half. It’s odd that I should feel I need more reason to kill one of them. After all, if I hadn’t changed places with Dave, that could be me on the ground screaming.

I sense a movement off in the brush. I turn and notice that there is another ARVN hidden there with an M-60 machine gun pointed right at me. The man behind the gunsight looks very frightened. I know I should feel lucky that I didn’t kill the young ARVN, for I certainly would have died on the spot from that machine gun. But I don’t. All I feel is rage.

Finally, we get them all out of the woods and disarm them. How much time has gone by? The chopper is on its way. We keep asking them why they didn’t yell something at us to prevent this from happening. They tell us that they have been on ambush in this area for two weeks and that we shouldn’t be here. Yet, no one can give us a reason why they didn’t stop us. Tempers are starting to flare on both sides.

We debate on what we should do with them. Several of us, myself included, suggest killing them all. This clearly agitates the ARVNs who understand English, which was our intention. I am not thinking clearly, but in my anger, I wonder who could blame us? One of us is worth ten of them any time.

Our arguments are disturbed by someone running down the trail toward us. A  G.I.. The patch on his arm tells us that he is with MACV, a liaison detachment between the US Army and the South Vietnamese ARVNs. He looks really worried as he sizes up the situation. He tells us to move off down the trail and cool off. There is no more time to argue. The Medevac is near, and we have to get Dave to a spot where the chopper can reach the ground. Around us the jungle growth is so thick and high that we are invisible from the air.

We make a stretcher for Dave out of shirts and sticks. Two men carry the ends, while I and another try to hold Dave’s shattered legs together. The leg I am holding is broken in at least four or five places. We have to run and the sudden movements cause Dave to scream again. We have no choice but to keep moving fast, for Dave is in deep shock; and the morphine is wearing off.

We finally reach a point on the trail where we can see the sky, barely. The chopper hovers overhead, its Red Cross blazing in the reflected light above the trees. I have never seen anything look quite so good. Slowly descending, its giant blades chop the ends off the branches overhead, showering us with leaves and twigs. The pilot can get no closer to the ground, so they lower a litter. We strap Dave into it, and he is gone, pulled up into the tree tops. I never saw him again.

Our mountain base contacts us by radio. We are told that one of our armored personnel carriers is on its way to pick us up at the trailhead. We trot down the trail, our muffled footsteps punctuated only with curses from some of the men. I feel completely empty, drained.

The ride back to our mountain is pure Twilight Zone. We pass through villages on the way that must, by now, know what happened. The streets are lined with tiny, silent, hate-filled faces. They stare silently at us, and we stare back. Some of our men yell obscenities and point their guns at them. Oddly enough, I cannot, for I realize that my anger is not with them. They did not mine the trail, although I’m sure the majority of them wished we had all breathed our last in Claymore Alley. Our so-called “friends” and “allies” did it, the ones we cannot trust to have at our backs, the ones who can’t fight their own damn war. Who’s war is this anyway? Where is the sense in all of this? The logic? The goddamn meaning? What the hell am I doing here?

When we reach our mountain, the others head off to the small building we call the EM (Enlisted Men) Club to drink and recount the story. Not up to it, I jump off the armored personnel carrier and walk quickly up the road to my hooch. Along the way, I pass several of the Vietnamese civilians living with the ARVNs that share our mountain. They look at me and run away. They appear to be scared to death. I wonder what they see.

Alone in the safety of my room, I sit on my bed, stunned. Hated by both the North and the South Vietnamese, I realize that we are doomed to lose this war and have no business being here. Dave was injured for absolutely nothing! What a terrible, terrible waste! I decide that I must do whatever I have to, to survive. Yet, inside me, the feeling that I will never leave this god-forsaken country takes seed and starts to grow. I start to shake uncontrollably; there are tears streaming down my face, but I am not crying. In fact, there is no emotion left in me at all. It is as if I have somehow been removed from my body. My mind is detached and separate, watching while my spirit mourns its loss. For Dave and I both lost something in Claymore Alley: he, his legs; and I, my innocence.

For years I felt incredible anger at the South Vietnamese. I believed that they let us walk into their ambush because they wanted to see us killed. I realize now that this was not an accurate depiction but one born out of my own desire to understand how it happened, based on my own prejudice. The truth is, these ARVNs were scared to death, just like we Americans were, every time we set up an ambush. A moment of indecision on their part, due to their surprise at finding Americans walking down a trail when they were expecting Vietcong, was more than enough to allow Dave to trip the wire on that claymore mine. Afterwards, they waited, just like we did, for the proverbial “shit” to “hit the fan.” I now feel nothing but relief, that we did not act on our anger that day.

Thank you brother for an interesting article. Thank you for your sacrifice and welcome home!

Copyright 1994 By Jeff Drake. All rights reserved.
Jeff Drake can be reached via the Internet at: jdrake@dragon.msr.hp.com


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In search of Calumet’s lost soldier

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The remains of U.S. Army Staff Sgt. Marshall F. Kipina of Calumet, Michigan have been recovered and identified on April 6, 2018. Staff Sgt. Kipina went missing on a night surveillance mission in mid-July 1966 over Attapu Province in Laos during the Vietnam War.

Susan Ager, a columnist for the Detroit Free Press, wrote about Staff Sgt. Kipina in a 9-03-2006 column about a Ferndale, Michigan woman who wore Kipina’s POW/MIA bracelet and her (Ager’s) visit to Calumet in search of more information about Kipina.

A journey to the UP reveals the life behind the name on an MIA bracelet worn for 2 decades By SUSAN AGER Free Press Columnist.

On her right wrist she wears a stainless steel bracelet. She takes it off only at airport security checks, where some agents, too young to remember the Vietnam war, ask what it is. They read it, then gently hand it back.

Otherwise, she wears it sleeping, working, washing dishes, showering, swimming, painting her house. She has worn it every day for a quarter century, long after many people have forgotten its purpose.

“It’s part of my arm now,” she says. “I can’t just throw it in a drawer,” because etched on it is the name of a man she never knew but does not want to forget.

She’s done research on her own family history. She knows: To be remembered is to stay alive.

She is Lorraine Garcia-McGlynn, 54 years old, a business analyst for EDS who lives in Ferndale.

He is Marshall Frederick Kipina (KIP-in-uh) of Calumet, who was 21 years old, an Army soldier, when he was lost flying a reconnaissance mission over Laos.

He and the plane’s pilot vanished 40 years ago this summer.

Lorraine wrote me in an e-mail: “I don’t mean to stir up old hurts for any remaining family, but I’ve often wondered what this young man looked like, and what he was like. I wrote the local paper years ago, hoping their archives had a picture or article about him, but never received an answer.

“On the off chance you stop in Calumet on your travels this summer,” she wrote, “tell whomever that I haven’t forgotten.”
I am astonished that anyone still wears a bracelet for a stranger in a war so many wars ago

From the Wall One evening after work, Lorraine and I sit together on her back deck, overlooking a small yard with a pool covered in a blue tarp. She grew up four blocks away, but has traveled in 47 states and Europe. She’s nervous, publicity-shy. This isn’t about her, she says, but about Marshall.

Like me, she wore a POW or MIA bracelet in high school, then discarded it for a prettier bracelet bought by a boyfriend. She feels guilty about that. She doesn’t remember the boyfriend’s name, or the soldier’s.

That, she thinks, is why she never removes Marshall’s bracelet.

She slides it off her wrist, though, to show me. It is so badly nicked and scratched that its words are barely visible: SSGT Marshall F. Kipina USA 07-14-66 Laos.

It has been her companion since 1982, when she visited the Vietnam War Memorial in Washington, D.C., just after its dedication. At what’s now known as the Wall, seven years after the war’s end, she listened to activists angry that our government had done so little to find POWs and MIAs.

She signed a petition and gave them some money, maybe $10. They invited her to reach into a wooden barrel -“like a big old beer keg”- and pick out a bracelet commemorating one of those men. Each bracelet rested in a Ziploc baggie a little bigger than an index card, with a yellow sheet of paper, folded three times then three times again, holding details of the loss of that soldier.

That she pulled one out for a man from Michigan, her home state, stunned her. He was shot down two weeks before her 14th birthday.
She says: “It was 1966, and he was a kid, and I was a kid.”

Vietnam was not a war that tore her heart out. She didn’t lose anyone she loved in it. But she feels bound to her bracelet, and to Marshall.
She stores the yellow paper, folded and refolded many times, in the same baggie, in a metal lockbox that holds her birth certificate, her will, a piece of her son’s artwork as a child, and all the most important papers of her life.

Ferndale, where Lorraine lives, is a tight-knit old suburb of Detroit, lively with bungalows, eateries and coffee shops, population 22,000.

Almost 600 miles north, over the Mackinac Bridge and west to the UP’s Keewenaw Peninsula, Calumet is a town hanging tight to its vivid, tough past.

A century ago, when copper mining was huge, 100,000 people lived here. Decades after the last mine closed, only about 800 remain. In the desolate neighborhoods that surround Calumet, where Marshall Kipina grew up, streets are still lined with small, stocky homes built by the mining companies.

I knock on the front door of one of those homes, hoping to meet someone who remembers. Phone calls I made from downstate, to Kipinas in the area, suggested everyone who knew Marshall was dead, except one guy.

The woman who answers the door is scowling, her arms folded over her chest. I talk fast. Then Carl Bessolo comes to the door, steps outside onto the porch and says yes, yes, he knew Marshall. Marshall was his cousin.

Carl’s face is wizened. He wears a cap, always. He looks toward the ground and shakes his head.

“The Army said he was missing in action. The CIA said he was a POW. Follow me. My brother-in-law knows more.”

As we pull away, I see the woman inside, on the phone, alerting relatives that a reporter is curious about Marshall.

We follow Carl for a handful of blocks, pulling behind him onto the skimpy lawn of a gray-painted duplex. Inside, two people are waiting with big manila envelopes in their arms, packed thick with memories that do not make them smile.

It takes me a while to figure out the complex family tree, and the tangled tale of Marshall’s life.

We are in the living room of Bob and Cecilia Nardi. The Cartoon Channel is on in the background, because their grandkids are visiting. Cecilia is Carl’s younger sister, a younger cousin of Marshall’s, a slim blond woman with stress showing on her face. Her husband, Bob, was a pal of Marshall’s, a former Marine who went to Vietnam, too.

When we first sit down, the three empty the manila envelopes in a hurry, passing each paper around: photos, letters, official documents, newspaper clippings. They talk among themselves in a rush, as if they had just discovered this trove of insight into Marshall’s life.
A rocky start Marshall, I learn, was a mistake.

His father, Fritz, met a woman during World War II while stationed with the Coast Guard in Maine. He later told Carl he knew Irene just two weeks.

When Fritz came home to Calumet, to work in the mines, Irene tracked him down. One cold winter night, when cousin Carl was about 8, “we heard a noise outside, and looked out on the porch, and there was a baby, crying, covered with sores and no shirt on, just a diaper full of you know what.”

It was the second time she had dumped Marshall on the porch, Carl said. The first time, she came back to pick up the baby. This time, she would not.

Irene settled just 15 miles way, in Houghton. But the boy never saw his mother. He was raised by his grandmother, his father and a shifting collection of uncles and aunts and nearby cousins.

Carl frowns to remember Fritz’s doubts about the boy. “More than once he said he didn’t think Marshall was his kid. Marshall’s skin was so dark. And my dad always complained how hard it was to cut Marshall’s wiry hair.”

But he grew up embraced, they say, and happy. He loved to fish and play cards. Shy with girls as a teenager, he won a bit of attention by playing an electric guitar on the sidewalk outside the bowling alley on Saturday nights. He was a stand-up guy, loyal, dependable. He joined ROTC as a freshman. He played football for the school team.

He joined the Army right after graduation in 1964 because that’s what every young man did back then. Says Bob, who joined the Marines: “We were believers.”

Cecilia can barely speak of Marshall without tears in her eyes. He was her dear older cousin, who taught her to play cribbage. She remembers him laughing like crazy when they watched “The Three Stooges” on TV on Saturday mornings. He treated her like a peer, even though she was 7 years younger.

“When he was in the Army I wrote to him, little girl things, like my favorite rock groups, and ‘I really like Ringo Starr.’ But he wrote back to me.”

She was 14 years old the day her mother got the first call, the one that said Marshall was dead. She ran sobbing to the meadow where she and her friends had been playing baseball, and the other kids, she remembers, threw down their bats and gloves and joined her in tears.

But when the town funeral director made phone calls about Marshall’s body, the news changed.

There would be no body.

There would be no funeral.

There would never be a service for Marshall.

MIA or POW? For 12 years the Army sent monthly checks, a portion of Marshall’s pay, to another cousin, raised by the same grandmother, whom he had named as a beneficiary. For many years she put each check into a bank account, in case he should come back.

In 1978, though, 12 years after his plane vanished, the Army declared Marshall Kipina dead. Carl and Cecilia’s mother, who helped raise Marshall after his grandma died, got $20,000 from his life insurance policy, and used it all to put a new roof, siding, porch and garage on her house.

It’s the house Carl lives in now.

Their hurt might have scarred over and healed, except for a man from Indiana, a zealous MIA researcher. Almost 20 years after Marshall disappeared, the man sent the family CIA documents he’d discovered that say Marshall lived in a POW camp for at least three years after his plane went down.

The Daily Mining Journal, the Houghton newspaper, wrote a three-part series that year about the UP’s only Vietnam POW.
The revelation infuriated some of Marshall’s relatives, including the aunt who helped raise him. She thought it cruel for anyone to drag him back from the dead and hated to think of him tortured.

Cecilia remembers her mother saying, over and over: “Oh, that poor little boy.”

Neither Carl nor his brother-in law Bob believes Marshall is alive. But Cecilia takes some small comfort imagining him imprisoned in China, eventually freed to marry a nice Chinese girl and bear children and never return to what would have been a bleak future on the Keewenaw Peninsula.

“I like to hope,” she says, “that he has 13 little Chinese grandchildren.”

He would be 61 now. Cecilia, at 54, helps run a gas station and has 11 grandchildren of her own.

Bob concedes, “He didn’t have a lot to come back to.” Even the mines, by then, were gone.

‘Thank you for remembering’ I’m surprised to learn that Bob, like Lorraine in Ferndale, keeps all the Marshall memorabilia in a metal lockbox in his bedroom.

Among the keepsakes are three bracelets with Marshall’s name, returned to them by distant relatives and a stranger, a woman in Arizona. In 2002 she sent it back, wrapped in a small American flag, secured with a white ribbon.

Another treasured piece of paper is a pencil rubbing of Marshall’s name from the Wall in Washington. Bob and Cecilia’s oldest son made it, before such rubbings were forbidden. He also took a photo of his great-uncle’s name on the Wall, although even with a magnifying glass it’s hard to distinguish from the names around it.

The Wall holds 58,249 names of men and women killed in Vietnam, including 1,200 who, like Marshall, are still missing.
At Arlington National Cemetery, the family was told, Marshall has a stone, although no one has seen it.

Closer to home, two miles away at the Lake View Cemetery outside town, another stone was placed a few years ago, in the veterans’ section. Carl had to approve it, and sign papers for it.

“I figured even if he ain’t there, what the heck.”

It reads much like the bracelets do — his name, rank, birthdate and the day he vanished. But it also says, because nobody’s quite sure, “POW MIA.”

Every week, someone from the family stops at the black granite stone. Carl sweeps it clean with a paintbrush. It is far from the Kipina plot, which includes the graves of Marshall’s uncles, aunts, grandparents and his father, who died at 43 after a life in the mines and the bars.
His mother, who bore no other children, is gone, too, the family says.

Before sundown, we all visit Marshall’s stone. Bob and Carl wander among the nearby graves, talking about the many dead they know, men killed in Vietnam or who came home from that war maimed in body or spirit or both.

Bob himself, at 60, is 100% disabled from lung and hip damage in Vietnam.

Cecilia kneels to tug out the weeds that, left to creep, would cover over Marshall’s name. Her husband had told me that usually she cries or curses when she talks about Marshall, but tonight she is quiet.

“I found a four-leaf clover,” she tells me. “Would you believe it? So I stuck it down in the dirt by his flag. That’s for him.”

Then she stands, in the cooling air, ready to leave the past that I’ve dragged her back to. She stares down at the stone.

“There’s nothing here,” she says. “If you want to feel like you’re with the person, this is it. This is all we’ve got.”

Her husband speaks up. “This isn’t about us, though. It’s about Marshall. And that woman with the bracelet.”

Her brother says, “Tell her we say thank you. A lot of people just threw their bracelets away, and wouldn’t think of him no more.
“Tell her thank you for remembering.”

This is a portion of an article published in the Daily Mining Gazette on April 23, 2018:

Kipina’s remains were located in the country of Laos. Kipina, who graduated from Calumet High School in 1964, was killed in 1966, one of his classmates said in a telephone conversation. The classmate, who did not want his name disclosed, said he knew Kipina all of his life and remembered him as a close friend.

Marshall Frederick Kipina was born on Dec. 18, 1944, and enlisted in the United States Army shortly after he graduated from high school. According to the DPAA, Kipina was assigned to the 1st Aviation Brigade, 14th Aviation Battalion, 12th Aviation Group, 131st Aviation Company.

He was assigned as an observer aboard a Grumman OV-1C Mohawk aircraft on July 13, 1966. The next night, Kipina and the pilot, Capt. Robert G. Nopp, flew out of Phu Bai Airfield over Attapu Province, Laos People’s Democratic Republic on a classified mission.

The plane deployed infrared detection equipment and a forward-aimed camera, making it valuable as night surveillance plane, able to detect enemy movement and designate and confirm targets.

Visibility was poor due to heavy thunderstorms. Radar and radio contact were lost with the aircraft, which was not uncommon due to the mountainous terrain in that part of Laos, according to the DPAA.

When the aircraft did not return as scheduled, search efforts were made, but no crash site was found. Kipina and Nopp were listed as missing in action.

Army Lt. Col. Robert G. Nopp, missing from the Vietnam War, has now been accounted for. See below in the comment section for story links.  

Thanks to: John Scribner Replacement bracelets are available through www.herobracelets.org for a small fee.

*****

To all who never forgot Marshall, thank you and God bless you. He was finally recovered and the announcement was made on April 6, 2018. Almost 52 years have gone by. I am glad he will be home! I will request a new bracelet that says KIA rather than MIA. I feel so bad that so many family members have gone on since 1966.

*****

POW-MIA BRACELET HISTORY Vietnam POW and MIA bracelets were conceived in 1970 by Carol Bates Brown, a California college student. She took inspiration from a simple metal cuff given to an antiwar activist by hill tribesmen in Vietnam.

She estimates her organization, Voices in a Vital America (VIVA), sold about 5 million before VIVA folded in 1976, a year after the war’s end. By then, she has written, “The American public was tired of hearing about Vietnam and showed no interest in the POW-MIA issue.”

The first 1,200 bracelets were produced, she said, with donated brass and copper, engraved free by a Santa Monica company. They sold for $3 to adults and $2.50 to students, a price chosen because it equaled a movie ticket.

Bracelets were subsequently made, by VIVA and others, in brass, copper, stainless steel, silver and even gold. At one point VIVA took orders for 12,000 bracelets daily.

Some efforts exist to return bracelets to family members: Click on “bracelet exchange” at http://www.thewall-usa.com


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Why So Many Vets Are Angry At Jane Fonda (Guest Post)

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Jane Fonda’s Broadcasts on Radio Hanoi
Co-authors: Dr. Roger Canfield, R.J. Del Vecchio

From July 8 – 22, 1972, the American actress Jane Fonda visited North Vietnam at the invitation of the “Vietnamese Committee of Solidarity with the American People.” During this period, she recorded at least 19 propaganda interviews that were broadcast by Radio Hanoi. Twelve of the speeches focused on American servicemen as their primary target. Fonda’s key themes included: demands to halt U.S. bombing of North Vietnam, allegations that the Nixon Administration was “lying” about the war, endorsements of the Viet Cong “7 Point Peace Plan,” claims that the U.S. military was violating international law and committing “genocide” in Vietnam, and statements of confidence in North Vietnam’s continued resistance and ultimate victory over America.

Listed below are all available transcripts of Jane Fonda’s Hanoi broadcasts, as recorded by the CIA’s Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). Slightly redacted versions of several broadcasts also appear in the Congressional Record for Sept. 19-25, 1972, “Hearings Regarding H.R. 16742: Restraints on Travel to Hostile Areas.” The transcripts are listed by the dates on which they were originally broadcast by Radio Hanoi.

July 10, 1972: Fonda to American POWs
“Brave heroes of the war would come back from Indochina and I was told that it is we who committed crimes, it is we who burned villages and massacred civilian people and raped the Vietnamese women. It is we who did it and we are sorry, and we want the American people to know what is being done in their names.”

July 13, 1972: Jane Fonda condemns U.S. bombings
“They seemed to be asking themselves what kind of people can Americans be who would drop these kinds of bombs so callously on their innocent heads, destroying their villages and endangering the lives of these millions of people.”

July 17, 1972: Fonda to American pilots and airmen
“I don’t know what your officers tell you, you are loading, those of you who load the bombs on the planes. But, one thing that you should know is that these weapons are illegal and that’s not, that’s not just rhetoric. They were outlawed, these kind of weapons, by several conventions of which the United States was a signatory — two Hague conventions. And the use of these bombs or the condoning the use of these bombs makes one a war criminal.”

“The men who are ordering you to use these weapons are war criminals according to international law, and in, in the past, in Germany and in Japan, men who were guilty of these kind of crimes were tried and executed.”

July 19, 1972: Fonda on visit to Nam Dihn
“I went to the dike, the dike system of the city of Nam Dinh. Just this morning at 4 o’clock, it was bombed again, and I was told that an hour after we left the city, planes came back and rebombed Nam Dinh. The dike in many places has been cut in half and there are huge fissures running across the top of it.”

July 20, 1972: Fonda on Geneva Accords anniversary
“There is an invasion taking place. It’s taking place from the 7th Fleet, from the aircraft carriers, from Thailand, from Guam, but essentially from the Pentagon and from the White House.”

“You men, it is not your fault. It is in fact tragic to think how you are being so cynically used because the time is coming very soon, it is already half-way there, when people are admitting openly that this is one of the most horrible crimes ever committed by one nation against another.”

July 20, 1972: Fonda press conference

“I’’ve met with students, with peasants, with workers and with American pilots – who are in extremely good health, I might add and will I hope be soon returned to the United States, and when they are returned, I think and they think that they will go back better citizens than when they left.”

July 20, 1972: Fonda press conference Q & A
“I would like to accuse Richard Nixon of betraying everything that is human and just in the world today. I would like to accuse him as being a new Hitler.”

“I will be working with all of those other people, ah, to that end -– to end the war according to the demands made in the Seven-Point Peace proposal of the Provisional Revolutionary Government.”

July 21, 1972: Fonda to American pilots
“The people back home are crying for you. We are afraid of what, what must be happening to you as human beings. For it isn’t possible to destroy, to receive salary for pushing buttons and pulling levers that are dropping illegal bombs on innocent people, without having that damage your own souls.”

“I know that if you saw and if you knew the Vietnamese under peaceful conditions, you would hate the men who are sending you on bombing missions.”

July 22, 1972: Fonda to U.S. pilots and airmen
“Should you then allow these same people and same liars to define for you who your enemy is? Shouldn’t we then, shouldn’t we all examine the reasons that have been given to us to justify the murder that you are being paid to commit?”

“If they told you the truth, you wouldn’t fight, you wouldn’t kill. You were not born and brought up by your mothers to be killers. So you have been -– you have been told lies so that it would be possible for you to kill.”

July 22, 1972: Fonda to U.S. pilots and airmen
“And I think, I –- I think that -– well, the other day, for example, someone told me that one of the pilots that was recent -– recently shot down, uh, near Hanoi, as he was, uh, driven across the river, uh, uh, he was, he was, uh, being being rescued by, uh, the people and he was shown a bridge and the people said, uh, that bridge was, uh, bombed, uh, recently. And he said: Well, my parents are rich. Uh, we can buy you a new bridge, we can afford to build you a new bridge after the war. And the people said to him in Vietnamese and it was then translated by the interpreter, they said, but can your parents replace our, our children, our mothers, our wives who have been killed by your bombs? And the soldier hung his head and he said: I didn’t think of that.”

July 25, 1972: Fonda to U.S. pilots and airmen
“Every time you drop your bombs on the heads of these peasants it becomes clearer to them — to them who the enemy is. How could they possibly by asking for help from a country which is destroying their land, their crops, killing their people, mutilating their babies? How can we continue to rain this kind of terror on these people who want nothing more than to live in peace and freedom and independence?”

July 26, 1972: Fonda to South Vietnamese students
“We have understood that we have a common enemy -– U.S. imperialism. We have understood that we have a common struggle and that your victory will be the victory of the American people and all peace-loving people around the world.”

“Recently in the United States we’ve been doing a lot of political propaganda work among the students and the soldiers with your Vietnamese comrades.”

July 28, 1972: Fonda to U.S. servicemen on bombing dikes
“There is only on way to stop Richard Nixon from committing mass genocide in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and that is for a mass protest all around the world of all peace-loving people to expose his crimes, to prevent him from fooling the people of the world into thinking that if there are floods this year it would be a natural disaster.”

July 29, 1972: Fonda to South Vietnamese soldiers
“Many people in the United States deplore what is being done to you. We understand that Nixon’s aggression against Vietnam is a racist aggression, that the American war in Vietnam is a racist war, a white man’s war…”

“We deplore that you are being used as cannon fodder for U.S. imperialism. We’ve seen photographs of American bombs and antipersonnel weapons being dropped, wantonly, accidentally perhaps, on your heads, on the heads of your comrades.”

July 30, 1972: Fonda to American servicemen in South Vietnam
“They believed in the army, but when they were here, when they discovered that their officers were incompetent, usually drunk, when they discovered that the Vietnamese people had a fight that they believed in, that the Vietnamese people were fighting for much the same reason that we fought in the beginning of our own country, they began to ask themselves questions.”

“I heard horrifying stories about the treatment of women in the U.S. military. So many women said to me that one of the first things that happens to them when they enter the service is that they are taken to see the company psychiatrist and they are given a little lecture which is made very clear to them that they are there to service the men.”

August 7, 1972: Fonda on Quang Tri and Patrick Henry
“So that now, when the People’s Liberation Armed Forces arrived in Quang Tri and joined together with the peasants to liberate the province of Quang Tri, the people have risen up, in the words of a journalist who just came from -– from Quang Tri -– like birds who have been freed from their cages.”

“We should be able to understand this very well as Americans. One of our revolutionary slogans, called out by Patrick Henry, was ‘Give Me Liberty or Give Me Death.’ And this is not so different than Ho Chi Minh’s slogan ‘Nothing is more precious than freedom and independence.’”

August 9, 1972: Fonda on “Democracy”
“Like tens of thousands of other Americans, I’m extremely concerned these days about the betrayal of everything that my country stands for –- about the betrayal of our flag, about the betrayal of the very precepts upon which our country was founded: equality for all people, liberty, and freedom.”
“Richard Nixon, history will one day report you as the new Hitler… It is no wonder that you are so cynically manipulating the American public into believing that you are striving for peace, when you are in fact committing the most heinous crimes against the innocent civilians of Vietnam.”

August 15, 1972: Fonda on meeting with American POWs
“I had the opportunity of meeting seven U.S. pilots. Some of them were shot down as long ago as 1968 and some of them had been shot down very recently. They are all in good health. We had a very long talk, a very open and casual talk. We exchanged ideas freely. They asked me to bring back to the American people their sense of disgust of the war and their shame for what they have been asked to do.”

“They asked me to bring messages back home to their loved ones and friends, telling them to please be as actively involved in the peace movement as possible, to renew their efforts to end the war.”

Jane Fonda will forever be a traitor to many of us who served our country. Some say we should forgive and forget, that Fonda has apologized for her behavior.

Here is a statement from a fellow vet:
For what it is worth, Ms. Fonda has never spoken the kind of direct apology for her activities during the war, the statement that she made a huge mistake in allowing her picture to be taken at the AA gun is not exactly what most vets would accept as a heartfelt apology. She has always been consistent in belief that she was doing the right thing in all she did there. Below are transcripts of the things she broadcast to US servicemen from Hanoi. They qualify in the minds of most of us as treason.

Keep in mind that when the POWs returned and spoke of their being tortured, she made these comments very publicly.

Jane Fonda said, POWs “implied they were forced into seeing [antiwar visitors]…that’s laughable. They are hypocrites and liars ….” At UCLA, “We have no reason to believe [they]…tell the truth. They are professional killers.” She wrote the Los Angeles Times, “It is a lie, an orchestrated lie… that the… policy… was torture.”

“Jane Fonda Claims POWs Not Tortured,” Pasadena Star News, April 1, 1973; Also: San Francisco Chronicle, April 1, 1973, 4.

So, it’s very difficult for those of us who know this, and in my case, know POWs and heard in person their accounts of torture, to just write it off as in the past and not worth thinking about anymore.

Jane does not deserve, and has not earned, our forgiveness.

This article was originally posted on the blog for Vietnam Veterans for Factual History. Here is a direct link to their website: https://www.vvfh.org/

Now that you’ve read the transcripts of her broadcasts, do you have a better understanding of our why Vietnam Vets hate her?


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U.S. Ship Rescued South Vietnam’s Navy after Saigon Fell

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The USS Kirk carried out one of the most significant humanitarian missions in U.S. military history. Yet the story went untold for 35 years. Correspondent Joseph Shapiro and producer Sandra Bartlett of NPR’s Investigative Unit interviewed more than 20 American and Vietnamese eyewitnesses and participants in the events of late April and early May 1975. They studied hundreds of documents, photographs and other records, many never made public before — including cassette tapes recorded at the time by the ship’s chief engineer.

Shapiro first learned of the Kirk from Jan Herman, historian of the U.S. Navy Medical Department, who says the Kirk’s heroics got lost because, as the Vietnam War ended, Americans were bitterly divided over the war’s course and cost. There was little interest in celebrating a mission that saved the lives of 20,000 to 30,000 refugees. Herman is working on a book documenting the story and a film documentary, which was shown when the Kirk crew met for a reunion in Springfield, Va., in July.

*****

On April 30, 1975, North Vietnamese troops entered the deserted streets of Saigon. Tanks crashed through the gates of the presidential palace and soldiers hoisted the yellow and red flag of the Viet Cong.

Just hours before, the last Americans had been evacuated, rescued and flown on Marine helicopters to U.S. Navy aircraft carriers waiting off the coast.

The Vietnam War was officially over. Now those Navy ships were steaming away from Vietnam.

There was one exception. That night, the captain of a small destroyer escort, the USS Kirk, got a mysterious order to head back to Vietnam.

South Vietnamese Navy: ‘We Forgot ‘Em’

Paul Jacobs, the captain, received the directive from Adm. Donald Whitmire, commander of the evacuation mission — Operation Frequent Wind. He was aboard the USS Blue Ridge, the lead ship of the Navy’s 7th Fleet.

The Kirk reached Con Son Island, off the southern coast of Vietnam, on May 1, 1975. There, it was met by 30 South Vietnamese navy ships and dozens of fishing boats and cargo ships — and as many as 30,000 Vietnamese refugees. Hugh Doyle

Jacobs recalls Whitmire’s surprise message: “He says, ‘We’re going to have to send you back to rescue the Vietnamese navy. We forgot ’em. And if we don’t get them or any part of them, they’re all probably going to be killed.'”

The Kirk was being sent to an island off the Vietnamese mainland — by itself. And there was one more odd thing, the admiral told Jacobs: He’d be taking orders from a civilian.

Richard Armitage came aboard the Kirk late at night, wearing a borrowed sport coat. Years later, Armitage would become second in command to Colin Powell in the Bush administration’s State Department. But on that last day of April 1975, he was on a special assignment from the secretary of defense. He’d just turned 30 that week.

Armitage recalls coming aboard the ship and quickly being escorted to the officer’s mess where he met with Jacobs and Commodore Donald Roane, commander of the flotilla of Navy destroyers.

“Commodore Roane said something like, ‘Young man, I’m not used to having strange civilians come aboard my ship in the middle of the night and give me orders,’ ” Armitage recalls. “I said, ‘I am equally unaccustomed, sir, to coming aboard strange ships in the middle of the night and giving you orders. But steam to Con Son.’ And so they did.”

Secret Plan To Rescue More Than Just Ships

The Kirk and its crew of about 260 officers and men were ordered to Con Son Island, about 50 miles off the coast of South Vietnam and not yet occupied by the North Vietnamese. Con Son was the site of a notorious prison. Now, its harbors were the hiding place for the remnants of the South Vietnamese navy.

Armitage had come up with the plan for them to gather there.

Armitage, a graduate of Annapolis, had been a Navy intelligence officer, assigned to Vietnamese units. He gained respect for the South Vietnamese as he worked alongside them and became fluent in the language. Then he resigned his commission and left the Navy in protest when the Nixon administration signed the Paris peace accords. That 1973 agreement between all warring parties in Vietnam ended direct U.S. military involvement in the war. Armitage felt the U.S. had sold out the South Vietnamese.

But as it became clear that the South Vietnam government was about to fall, a Pentagon official asked Armitage to fly back to Vietnam with a dangerous mission. His assignment: to remove or destroy naval vessels and technology so they wouldn’t fall into the hands of the Communists.

In 1975, Richard Armitage was a 30-year-old civilian charged with a dangerous mission: to remove or destroy South Vietnamese naval vessels and technology so they wouldn’t fall into the hands of the Communists. Later, Armitage would serve as deputy secretary of state from 2001 to 2005, under Secretary of State Colin Powell in the administration of George W. Bush.  Courtesy Richard Armitage

A few weeks before Saigon fell, Armitage had shown up at the office of an old friend, Capt. Kiem Do, deputy chief of staff for the South Vietnamese navy. Together, they came up with the secret plan to rescue the Vietnamese ships when — as was becoming clear would happen — the South Vietnamese government surrendered.

Do remembers warning Armitage that they’d be saving more than ships.

“I told him, I said, ‘Well, our crew would not leave Saigon without their family, so therefore there will be a lot of people,’ ” Do recalls.

He says Armitage remained silent. “He didn’t say yes; didn’t say no. So I just take it as an acknowledgement,” Do says.

Armitage didn’t tell his bosses at the Pentagon there would be refugees on those ships. He feared the American authorities wouldn’t want them.

Neither Do nor Armitage, though, could predict how many refugees would turn up in Con Son.

Chaos At Con Son Island

The Kirk steamed through the night to Con Son and reached the island just as the sun came up on May 1. There were 30 South Vietnamese navy ships, and dozens of fishing boats and cargo ships. All of them were packed with refugees, desperate to get out of Vietnam.

A boat brings Vietnamese refugees to the Kirk near Con Son Island. The U.S. ship undertook one of the greatest humanitarian missions in the history of the U.S. military.  Hugh Doyle

The ships “were crammed full of people,” says Kent Chipman, who in 1975 was a 21-year-old machinist’s mate in the ship’s engine room and today works at a water purification plant in Texas. “I couldn’t see below deck, but above deck the people were just as tight as you could get, side by side.”

There was no exact count of how many people were on those ships. Some historical records say there were 20,000 people. Other records suggest it was as many as 30,000. Jan Herman, a historian with the U.S. Navy Medical Department, who is documenting the story of the Kirk, uses the higher number.

“They were rusty, ugly, beat up,” says Chipman. “Some of them wouldn’t even get under way; they were towing each other. And some of them were actually taking on water and we took our guys over and got the ones under way that would run.”

One cargo ship was so heavy it was sinking. People below deck were bailing out the water with their shoes.

Stephen Burwinkel, the Kirk’s medic — in the Navy known as a hospital corpsman — boarded that ship to check on the sick and injured. He saw a Vietnamese army lieutenant helping passengers leave the sinking ship, crossing to another ship, over a narrow wooden plank. As people pushed to get off the sinking ship, one man knocked a woman who stopped in front of him. She fell off the plank and into the ocean.

The woman was quickly rescued. But Burwinkel worried that the others on the ship would panic. He says the lieutenant acted quickly.

“This Vietnamese lieutenant did not hesitate, he went right up the back of that guy, took his gun out and shot him in the head, killed him, kicked him over the side. Stopped all the trouble right then and there,” Burwinkel recalls. The shooting was shocking, he says, but it very likely prevented a riot.

Leading The Way Toward The Philippines

After fixing what could be fixed on the seaworthy vessels and transferring people from the ships that would be left behind, the Kirk led the flotilla of naval ships, fishing boats and cargo ships toward the Philippines.

The USS Cook, another destroyer escort, like the Kirk, helped out as the ships were leaving Con Son. The Cook’s crew provided rice, and its corpsman helped Burwinkel and his assistant from the Kirk attend to the sick and injured, too.

As the flotilla headed out to sea, on the way to the Philippines, other Navy ships came in and out of the escort, according to Herman. Among those other ships were the USS Mobile, USS Tuscaloosa, USS Barbour County, USS Deliver and USS Abnaki.

But it’s clear from the daily logs from the Kirk and the other ships that the crew of the Kirk took the lead.

“For me, the Kirk was ideal,” says Armitage, who moved from the Kirk to the Vietnamese navy’s flagship. “It could communicate with the rest of the U.S. fleet. They would go with us across to the Philippines and would be able to rescue any of the folks who might be in harm’s way. Some had been wounded. Some were pregnant. All were sick after a while. And we needed a way to take care of those folks.”

The Kirk’s sailors kept busy providing food, water and medicine to people on the South Vietnamese ships.

The South Vietnamese fleet follows the USS Kirk to Subic Bay in the Philippines. The Kirk’s final mission at the end of the Vietnam War was to bring the remnants of the South’s navy to safety in the Philippines.  Hugh Doyle

Burwinkel spent his time moving from ship to ship treating the sick and injured. With thousands of people — many of them babies and children — he had to work almost nonstop.

“When they gave me the meritorious service medal over all this, I quite frankly referred to it as my ‘no-sleep’ medal,” says Burwinkel, who made a career in the Navy and is now retired and living in Pensacola, Fla. “I would go out there and do my thing and at dark we would come back to the Kirk and try to get a little bit to eat and make some rounds — gather my wits about me, resupply myself and get ready for the next day.”

Last Sovereign Territory Of The Republic Of Vietnam’

Of the some 30,000 refugees on vessels escorted by the Kirk over six days, only three died.

But as the flotilla approached the Philippines, the Kirk’s captain got some bad news. The presence of South Vietnamese vessels in a Philippine port would present the government in Manila with a diplomatic predicament.

The Philippine government wasn’t going to allow us in, period, because these ships belonged to the North Vietnamese now and they didn’t want to offend the new country,” Jacobs, the captain, recalls.

The government of Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos was one of the first to recognize the Communist rulers now in control of a single Vietnam, and Jacobs was told the ships should go back.

Armitage and his South Vietnamese friend, Capt. Do, came up with a solution that Marcos had to accept.

Do recalls the plan: “We will raise the American flag and lower the Vietnamese flag as a sign of transfer [of] the ship back to the United States, because during the war those ships are given to the Vietnamese government as a loan, if you want, from the United States, to fight the Communists. Now the war is over, we turn them back to the United States.”

There was a frantic search to find 30 American flags. Two officers from the Kirk were sent aboard each Vietnamese ship to take command after a formal flag ceremony.

Rick Sautter was one of the Kirk officers who took command of a Vietnamese ship.

“That was the last vestige of South Vietnam. And when those flags came down and the American flags went up, that was it. Because a Navy ship is sovereign territory and so that was the last sovereign territory of the Republic of Vietnam,” he says.

“Thousands and thousands of people on the boats start to sing the [South Vietnamese] national anthem. When they lower the flag, they cry, cry, cry,” Do remembers.

‘High Point Of My Career’

On May 7, the ships flying American flags were allowed into Subic Bay.

For the refugees, it was just the beginning of their long journey, which took them to Guam and then resettlement in the United States.

For the sailors of the Kirk, ending the Vietnam War by rescuing 20,000 to 30,000 people was very satisfying.

“This was the high point of my career and I’m very proud of what we did, what we accomplished, how we did it,” Jacobs says. “I felt like we handled it truly professionally and that was kind of a dark time.”

Armitage says he “envied” the officers and men of the USS Kirk. The ship had not seen combat on its tour to Vietnam. But it ended with the rescue of tens of thousands of refugees, one of the humanitarian missions in the history of the U.S. military.hisays Armitage: “They weren’t burdened with the former misadventure of Vietnam.”

Rick Becker, from the FB group: Viet Nam Vets, posted this YouTube video link about this rescue on his group page. Thank you, bro.

This article originally appeared on NPR.org, September 1, 2010 by Joseph Shapiro & Sandra Bartlett.  Here’s the original link to this story: 


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SOG/NVA Meet For First Time since the War

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By John Stryker Meyer 01.29.2018

The most elite warriors of the secret war during the Vietnam War, Green Berets and the North Vietnamese Army’s highly-trained killer teams met in Southeast Asia last week, in a meeting – naturally, cloaked in secrecy, SOFREP has learned.

For combatants on both sides of the deadly secret war, this meeting not only was one of unique historic significance for the soldiers, but it will also aid efforts by both governments’ pursuit of locating and identifying thousands of missing soldiers in Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. As of Jan. 28, there are 1,601 Americans missing in SEA from the Vietnam War.

For SOFREP readers, imagine being a Green Beret fighting for several years in an eight-year secret war during the Vietnam War – so secret you can tell no one about it outside of the chain of command in the Military Assistance Group Vietnam – Studies and Observations Group, or simply SOG.

Imagine being a Green Beret fighting in the triple-canopy jungles of Laos knowing that the enemy, the North Vietnamese Army had specially trained sapper teams with the primary mission to hunt, find and kill SOG recon teams – including your team.

Imagine being an NVA soldier trained to serve on the NVA SOG-killer teams coming up against America’s elite troops, the highly trained Green Berets.

Fast forward to January 2018:

Imagine being Green Beret Mike Taylor who served with Special Forces during the Vietnam War from 1968 until 1972, meeting for the first time NVA soldiers who served with the SOG-killer teams. This NVA unit had the simple title of C-75. Stated plainly, SOG met C-75.

This historic meeting occurred between the most elite warriors who served in the eight-year secret war during the Vietnam War, a war that was hidden from Congress, the media, the public and family members in the U.S.

Communist leadership hid its involvement in the secret war from the world also. From its inception in 1964 through 1972, very little information about the secret war that raged in Laos, Cambodia and N. Vietnam, ever reached the public eye.

From a personal level, I entered the secret war in May 1968 at FOB 1 in Phu Bai, where small Green Beret-led six-to-eight man reconnaissance teams ran missions across the fence into Laos, Cambodia and N. Vietnam. By that time, five months into May, the NVA had wiped out or inflicted severe casualties on nearly a dozen SOG recon teams. When I arrived there, Recon Team Idaho was wiped out in Laos in May 1968 on a secret mission. The two Green Berets from that fateful mission, Glen Lane and Robert Owen, remain among the 50 Green Berets who fought in the secret war in Laos and remain listed as missing in action today, along with approximately 200 Army, Marine and Air Force aviators.

By 1968, the NVA and its communist allies had escalated its covert efforts against U.S. forces to unprecedented levels: Russian advisors, including thousands of aviation, anti-aircraft missile and artillery trained specialists were in Hanoi, Laos and Cambodia, along with Cuban and Chinese advisors. In August 1968, after more than 18 months of planning, NVA and Viet Cong sappers launched an early-morning attack at the SOG base in Da Nang, dubbed FOB 4, killing 17 Green Berets and dozens of loyal, fearless, indigenous forces – that single-day loss of Green Berets, remains a tragic record in that elite unit’s history.

After the August attack, during our pre-mission briefings in 1968, for targets in Laos, Cambodia and the DMZ, S-2 officers told us about intelligence reports warning of NVA sapper teams being trained to hunt and destroy SOG recon teams in those Areas of Operations. On New Year’s Day 1969, an NVA sapper team hit RT Diamondback, killing all three Americans. While the attack was quick and deadly, it also had a twisted psychological impact on SOG men because the sappers didn’t kill the indigenous members of the team.

When the survivors were interviewed, among the first questions asked was how they survived the attack while the Americans were killed. The surviving team members passed lie-detector interrogations. NVA sapper teams struck elsewhere in SOG that year which ultimately led to SOG having the highest casualty rate during the Vietnam War, exceeding 100 percent for Green Berets killed in action, wounded in action or missing in action. For example, SFC Robert Howard who received the MOH for a SOG mission in 1968, received eight Purple Hearts for wounds inflicted on SOG missions. He declined three additions nominations for Purple Hearts.

Thus, last week, when Taylor met with those prior enemy combatants, the meeting was cloaked in secrecy. Exact details about how it came about will be disclosed later. As this story went to press, Taylor was returning to CONUS after a 16-hour layover in Korea. Taylor is chairman of the joint Special Operations Association/Special Forces Association POW/MIA Committee.

Since being appointed to the committee chairmanship in 2014, Taylor and both Green Beret associations have pioneered membership letter writing campaigns to support the Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency’s budget requests, supported the nominations of retired Air Force MG Kelly McKeague – who was appointed DPAA director Sept. 5, and worked closely with the National League of POW/MIA Families and its CEO and Chairman of the Board of Directors Ann Mills-Griffiths, an MIA sister, and League Senior Policy Advisor and Director of Asian Affairs, Richard T. Childress. He served eight years during the Reagan administration on the National Security Council where his primary focus was POW/MIA issues – an issue Childress has dedicated his life to.

Taylor’s trip to Southeast Asia with his wife began earlier this month as a parallel delegation to SEA with the National League of POW/MIA Families delegation, which included Mills-Griffiths, Childress and League BOD Director Cindy Stonebraker. Taylor and his wife traveled to many of the same locations League officials visited but didn’t attend closed-door meetings between government and League officials. In addition they traveled to Hanoi where League officials met with DPAA staff, Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis, U.S. Embassy staff, Stony Beach staff from DIA and U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam David J.  Kritenbrink. Taylor met with many of the same officials, but there has been no press release on whom he met.

On a Facebook posting Sunday, Taylor confirmed meeting with Vietnamese veterans from C-75 that worked in the tri-border area of SEA. He described the first meeting as “VERY interesting…”  He will be filing follow-up reports to his respective BODs in the weeks ahead.

DPAA Director Kelly McKeague, after attending a DPAA family briefing in San Diego, told SOFREP that seeing the increased public attention to the POW/MIA mission in SEA by President Trump, Mattis and the League, will mesh with Vietnam’s publicly announced intents to increase cooperation with DPAA officials for recovery efforts. He also added that having the SOA/SFA committee meeting Vietnamese soldiers and officials enhances the overall POW/MIA issue.

Mike Taylor, chairman of the joint SOA/SFA POW/MIA Committee presents a shadowbox of SOG challenge coins to the company commander of the NVA’s C-75 SOG Hunter unit. Photos courtesy of Mike Taylor.

John Stryker Meyer Born Jan. 19, 1946, John Stryker Meyer entered the Army Dec. 1, 1966, completed basic training at Ft. Dix, N.J., advanced infantry training at Ft. Gordon, Ga., jump school at Ft. Benning, Ga., and graduated from the Special Forces Qualification Course in Dec. 1967. He arrived at FOB 1 Phu Bai in May 1968, where he joined Spike Team Idaho, which transferred to Command & Control North, CCN in Da Nang, January 1969. In October 1969 he rejoined RT Idaho at CCN. That tour of duty ended suddenly in April 1970. Today he is a program director at the Veterans Affordable Housing Program, based in Orange, CA and joined the SOFREP team of correspondents in March 2015. He has written two non-fiction books on SOG secret wars: Across The Fence: The Secret War in Vietnam – Expanded Edition, and Co-Authored On The Ground: The Secret War in Vietnam with John E. Peters, a member of RT Rhode Island. Meyer’s website is: http://www.sogchronicles.com.

Here’s the link to the original article: https://sofrep.com/98929/sofrep-exclusive-sog-nva-meet-for-first-time/


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History and Meaning of Military Rifle Salutes (Guest Post)

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by John Hages as it appeared in the Vietnam Veterans of America Chapter 154 – Boo Coo News, January, 2018.

U.S. military salutes are steeped in tradition, some dating back hundreds of years. However, there are misconceptions about military salutes — understandable, considering the number of salutes that exist for various occasions. Some have even changed over the years, sometimes through acts of Congress. All of them, however, are intended to demonstrate great honor to those for whom they are conducted. This includes fallen members of the military, presidents, heads of state and even the nation.

VVA Chapter 154 Color Guard rendering 3 volleys on Veterans Day, 2017

Three-Volley Salute Calling the shots fired at a military funeral a 21-gun salute is incorrect. Even if there are seven soldiers firing three rounds each, this is not considered a 21-gun salute. The shots fired during a military funeral are called the firing of three volleys in honor of the fallen.
The firing of three volleys dates back to the custom of ceasing hostilities to remove the dead from the battlefield. Once finished, both sides would fire three volleys to signal that they were ready to resume the battle.

During the firing of three volleys, the rifles are fired three times simultaneously by the honor guard. Any service member who died on active duty, as well as honorably discharged veterans and military retirees, can receive a military funeral, which includes the three volleys, the sounding of “”Taps,” along with a United States flag presented to the next of kin. Three spent cases are usually inserted into the folded flag, one representing each volley fired.

The 21-Gun Salute hails from naval tradition where a warship would fire its cannons, rendering them unloaded, to signify its lack of hostile intentions. Ships would typically fire seven shots. Whether this is because that was the traditional number of guns on a British warship or because it is of biblical significance is unknown. Forts, having more ammunition, would fire three shots for every shot by a ship. Of course, this wasn’t set in stone, and the number of shots fired differed greatly depending on the country.

Today, the 21-Gun Salute is fired by artillery batteries in honor of the U.S. President, former presidents, the President-elect and heads of foreign states upon their arrival and departure of a military installation. “Hail to the Chief” or the national anthem of the visiting dignitary is also played. The salute is also fired at noon on the day of a funeral of the President, former presidents and the President-elect, as well as Memorial Day in honor of America’s fallen, and on Washington’s Birthday.

Naval Base Ventura County, Point Mugu, Calif. (June 9, 2004) – U.S. Marine Corps Ceremonial Guard Company render a 21-Gun Salute in honor of former President Ronald Reagan, the 40th President of the United States, before his body is flown to Washington, D.C. where it will lie in state in the Capitol Rotunda. A state funeral will be conducted late Friday morning at the Washington National Cathedral, where President Bush will give the eulogy. On Friday, June 11, President Reagan’s body will return to Calif., for a private burial service. U.S. Navy photo by Photographer’s Mate 1st Class Jon D. Gesch (RELEASED)

In addition, a 19-Gun Salute is fired in honor of other dignitaries such as the vice president, the speaker of the House, president pro tempore of the Senate, chief justice of the United States, state governors, chiefs of staff and 5-Star generals. There is a ranking system for salutes to lower-ranking generals and other dignitaries consisting of dropping two guns for each flag rank junior to a 5-Star general.

Salute to the Nation The practice of firing one shot for each state was officially established in 1810, which at the time was only 17 guns. This tradition continued until 1841 when it was established as 21 guns. Current tradition has the Salute to the Nation as 50 shots by capable military bases, one for each state in the union, fired at noon on Independence Day, with naval vessels firing a 21-gun salute.

Copy of VA annual Veterans Day poster for 2017

Veterans Day While there isn’t a gun salute dedicated to veterans, November 11 is a day when the U.S. and many World War I allied countries commemorate the sacrifices made by the men and women who served in the armed forces. Veterans Day is often confused with Memorial Day, or thought to be the same in their intent. Memorial Day is when we honor those who have fallen in service of our country. Veterans Day celebrates all living military service members.

Veterans Day was first created as Armistice Day by President Woodrow Wilson in 1919 to mark the end of World War I. In 1938, Congress made November 11 a national holiday. Then, on June 1, 1954, President Eisenhower signed legislation that changed the name to Veterans Day to celebrate all military veterans. The exact day of celebration changed a couple more times over the years before being permanently established as November 11 due to popular sentiment.

The following was posted after one of my articles on FB by Shannon Australia Vilandre:


Have you ever noticed that the honor guard pays meticulous attention to correctly folding the United States of America Flag 13 times? You probably thought it was to symbolize the original 13 colonies, but we learn something new every day! The 1st fold of the flag is a symbol of life. The 2nd fold is a symbol of the belief in eternal life.

The 3rd fold is made in honor and remembrance of the veterans departing the ranks who gave a portion of their lives for the defense of the country to attain peace throughout the world.

The 4th fold represents the weaker nature, for as American citizens trusting in God, it is to Him we turn in times of peace as well as in time of war for His divine guidance.

The 5th fold is a tribute to the country, for in the words of Stephen Decatur, ‘Our Country, in dealing with other countries, may she always be right; but it is still our country, right or wrong.’

The 6th fold is for where people’s hearts lie. It is with their heart that they pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America , and the Republic for which it stands, one Nation under God, indivisible, with Liberty and Justice for all.

The 7th fold is a tribute to its Armed Forces, for it is through the Armed Forces that they protect their country and their flag against all her enemies, whether they be found within or without the boundaries of their republic..

The 8th fold is a tribute to the one who entered into the valley of the shadow of death, that we might see the light of day.

The 9th fold is a tribute to womanhood, and Mothers. For it has been through their faith, their love, loyalty and devotion that the character of the men and women who have made this country great has been molded.

The 10th fold is a tribute to the father, for he, too, has given his sons and daughters for the defense of their country since they were first born.

The 11th fold represents the lower portion of the seal of King David and King Solomon and glorifies in the Hebrews eyes, the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob.

The 12th fold represents an emblem of eternity and glorifies, in the Christians eyes, God the Father, the Son and Holy Spirit.

The 13th fold, or when the flag is completely folded, the stars are uppermost reminding them of their Nations motto, ‘In God We Trust.’

After the flag is completely folded and tucked in, it takes on the appearance of a cocked hat, ever reminding us of the soldiers who served under General George Washington, and the Sailors and Marines who served under Captain John Paul Jones, who were followed by their comrades and shipmates in the Armed Forces of the United States, preserving for them the rights, privileges and freedoms they enjoy today.

There are some traditions and ways of doing things that have deep meaning. In the future, you’ll see flags folded and now you will know why.


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HUMINT: A Continuing Crisis? (Guest Post)

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W. R. Baker wrote this extraordinary article about his “Human Intelligence” Group in I-Corps during the later part of the Vietnam War.  After the failure of Operation Lam Son 719 in Laos, the South Vietnamese Army was licking their wounds and reorganizing units. During that time, intel reports cited enemy buildups and routes of travel through I-Corps with warnings to the brass of a potential large enemy offensive in the works. Easter was just around the corner and only a few commanders of the Allied forces had read the Intel Reports. The Easter Offensive begins and the Allied forces are ill-equipped or prepared for the invasion…if only the brass had heeded the warnings in the intel reports. Here’s the author’s take on it:

Before Vietnam completely fades from memory and its lessons learned gather even more dust, it might be worth exploring a few issues that will likely resurface again.

During the latter months of the Vietnam War (1971-72), the United States was actively sending units home, turning facilities and functions over to the South Vietnamese and to U.S. forces located elsewhere before the 29 March 1973 deadline for all U.S. forces to be out of the country. In January 72, President Nixon announced that 70,000 troops would be withdrawn by 1 May 72, reducing the troop level in Vietnam to 69,000.

Beginnings

I was assigned in 1971 to the 571st Military Intelligence Detachment in Da Nang, the unit primarily ran Human Intelligence (HUMINT) operations throughout I Corps in northern South Vietnam. I was quickly exposed to Viet Cong (VC), North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and friendly forces’ activity in our area of interest. As such it was evident that South Vietnamese forces that had taken part in Lam Son 719 in Laos were licking their wounds – even the much touted 1st Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) Division, garrisoned in Hue had been severely crippled in this failed campaign in 1971.

We also dealt with other foreign country units, i.e., South Korean, who left I Corps a few months after I arrived, in addition to ARVN commanders and secret police officials.

As we ran Unilateral and Bilateral agent networks, remaining U.S. units in I Corps and MACV, USARV, USPACFLT, 7th AF, 7th PSYOPS, and our headquarters (the 525 Military Intelligence Group in Saigon) all received copies of our Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs), as they applied to their Areas of Operations and Interest. Unit 101 was an ARVN intelligence unit that also received selected reports. Being responsible for the distribution of all these IIRs allowed me to know the status of the remaining units, which would aid me later during the Easter Offensive of 1972.

Shortly after arriving at my unit, it became clear that it had been content to operate without understanding the tactical and strategic situation in I Corps (the identifier that most soldiers continued to use after it switched into the newer term, which I will continue to use in this article), relying on XXIV Corps, which soon became the First Regional Assistance Command (FRAC), for area knowledge when it became necessary. “The advisory command, recalled Major General Kroesen (the FRAC commander), was ‘heavily weighted to provide administrative assistance and logistical advice’ with only a token intelligence and operations section.  It was neither manned nor equipped to monitor the combat actively or to provide tactical guidance.”[1] The general and his staff failed to mention these “little” points to our intelligence organization. The rub, though, is that we were the only functioning intelligence unit in all of I Corps/FRAC during the Easter Offensive of 1972 and we didn’t know it!

I was very fortunate to work for an organization that didn’t inhibit new ideas – actually, this was not uncommon for intelligence units then and for the next few years after Vietnam ended. Trained as an Intelligence/Order of Battle Analyst, I began creating topical files on enemy units and equipment (the “old” Composition, Disposition, Strength, etc, of FM 30-5 that was drilled into us in intelligence school), while obtaining 1:50,000 scale UTM maps, which took up considerable wall space. Our unit was lucky to also have helicopter support from the 358th Aviation Detachment for 2-3 weeks every month for “ass and trash” missions. I would occasionally fill in for sick door gunners and visit our teams in Quang Tri, Hue, Chu Lai, Tam Ky and Quang Ngai, making notes on the physical features I saw to make changes to our maps, highlighting such things as avenues of approach, military crests, new physical features, friendly military positions, etc. This type of reconnaissance was supplemented by occasional trips by jeep, as well.

The maps were an immediate “hit” with our unit, as we and any visitors would be able to view and comment on where enemy units were positioned and other loci made while using the maps. The maps were obviously a tremendous asset during the Easter Offensive, especially since they were manually and accurately updated. Unexpectedly, an event occurred that made use of them beforehand.

As U.S. units left, so our presence would eventually follow and so would the amount of money that could be expended on our agents. So it fell to me to go through each agent’s reports and each net that we ran. I protested at first, but I was told simply that there was no one else qualified to do it because I knew the military situation in I Corps and had created topical files for each area and unit.

Well aware that this “paring down” of agents was a huge responsibility and what the consequences meant, I took 3-4 months’ worth of IIRs for each agent, my topical files and the appropriate maps and carefully waded through them all. What I found was eye-opening. Some of the agents had been reporting virtually the same events over and over, making little changes. Some agents rarely reported anything, while others sometimes described units located well outside their operational area. Some agents were mediocre and a few were exceptionally good – these reports were always valuable.

The next step was to rate all the agents, each net, and to justify the reasons for each rating. Having my recommendations affirmed by the area specialists and our leadership was gratifying. Little did we know that this was to become more of a plus in our accuracy and information reliability during the Easter Offensive.

The NVA/VC were “expected” to make trouble during TET (mid-February) 1972. Because nothing happened, the press took the intelligence and various other command organizations to task for not having any idea of what was going on and of being mere sycophants of the upper echelons. Events were to prove that the press weren’t too far off

Because we were such a small unit that was HUMINT-oriented, we were never asked for our opinion or intelligence. We had received virtually nothing about TET from anyone, but early the next month (March), we started getting various indicators from our own agents. It is important to understand that we never received intel from 7th Air Force, MACV, DIA or CIA: our information always went up but NOTHING came down – we were disregarded, just as HUMINT was and generally is today.

Hostilities Begin

Soldiers manning a perimeter on a hilltop looking into the A Shau Valley

The 324B NVA Division moved into the A Shau Valley in early-March, heading for its usual AO to the west of Hue to keep the 1st ARVN Division occupied. The 324B was a Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue (MRTTH) unit. As it moved through the A Shau, it linked up with the 5th and 6th Independent Infantry Regiments, also of the MRTTH. As time progressed, it was obvious that at least two regiments were moving northeasterly and could act as a blocking force along QL-1 (the main north-south highway in country), while the other two regiments confined 1st ARVN to Firebases Bastogne and Birmingham. There wasn’t as much as a single ARVN battalion able to defend Hue as the 324B engaged ARVN.

We started to receive information from across I Corps on targets and unit activity. Though we were generally a strategic unit and our IIRs were often not timely enough to act on, it was necessary to make or strengthen contacts to respond to the targets that were rapidly presenting themselves, which could just as rapidly move away. There had been no usual way for us to provide targets to air or ground forces before. We had gone out with 23rd (Americal) Infantry Division units to confirm some of our IIRs, but time was always critical as units and weapon caches moved, etc.

We had been coordinating with the local Special Forces unit when we received information on the “Salt and Pepper” VC propaganda team operating to the west of Chu Lai. I knew they had an on-call capability, so I would feed them information on newly developed targets, as well. I also had a friend that worked ARCLIGHT (i.e., B-52) targets in Saigon and would make sure the 196th Light Infantry Brigade would get infiltration and unit reports for their AO.

In early March, we had information concerning the forthcoming Offensive of major importance. “Moreover, among the reduced number of enemy documents that were exploited were detailed orders of battle and COSVN plans for the spring offensive”[2] contained in our IIRs. Even this information wasn’t enough to convince other intelligence agencies, nor command elements, that a major event was going to take place.

Throughout March 1972, the pace of incoming information quickened to the point that it was obvious that a major offensive was going to take place, but this time (and unlike TET 1968) it would involve main-force units, to include tanks – something the NVA had never done before! “One example of the close-mindedness of some senior military commanders was the total disregard (MG) Kroesen and (Gen) Westmoreland among others showed toward intelligence predictions of an enemy frontal assault along the Demilitarized Zone.”[3]

“John M. Oseth, who was then serving as the G-2 adviser to the 3rd ARVN Division, acknowledged that although there might have been isolated agent reports of an impending invasion, the general consensus, at least at the division level, was that the threat of enemy attack though present, was not great.”[4]

“The most prevalent problem in this regard was an unwillingness on the part of commanders to heed warnings of massed armor and heavy artillery.”[5]

“…and in spite of at least four separate human resources who claimed that there would be a ‘great offensive’ in the near future, American military personnel for the most part were dubious about any impending large-scale attack. Information from theses human sources proved to be both detailed and factually accurate as the Offensive took its course.”[6] Undoubtedly, this was our northernmost network of agents.

As the IIRs arrived, it was obvious that we needed to report our compiled information in an expeditious manner. Again, I was asked how best to do this and we went with an Intelligence Summary (INTSUM) format, which allowed us to report virtually everything with a minimum of format. There had never been an INTSUM used by the 525 MI Group before, undoubtedly because there had never been a tactical situation arise before like the Easter Offensive of 1972. An INTSUM was later imposed by the Group on all its detachments, twice a day.

Just prior to the Offensive, many of the major NVA units crossing the DMZ, their commanders and their probable avenues of approach and initial objectives were developed and reported in our INTSUM.

Though not specifically cited, South Vietnam’s Joint General Staff was said to have issued an alert for the end of March based on intelligence reporting. This implies that our INTSUMs were used by at least one organization, though it was not an American one!

In fact, even the ARVN had little idea of the I Corps situation for days afterwards and the U.S. FRAC commander was caught dumfounded. LTG Ngo Quang Truong, ARVN I Corps Commander (beginning 3 May 1972) wrote, “Although there was general agreement in the intelligence community – Vietnamese as well as American – that an offensive in early 1972 was highly probable, some observers of the Vietnam scene, perhaps those not as well informed as those of us privy (my emphasis) to the most reliable estimates, were influenced more by what seemed to them to be the illogic of a major North Vietnamese attack at this time.”[7]

Our reporting was ignored until after the offensive began on the morning of 30 March 1972.  The exact time the Easter Offensive started depended on where you were located. One thing is certain, the NVA had acquired the M46 130mm Field Gun from the Soviets and they used it throughout the morning and very accurately.

In the first few hours of the Offensive, the first two Americans died. Both were US Army Security Agency soldiers assigned to the 407th Radio Research Detachment/8th RR Field Station. Bruce A. Crosby, Jr., and Gary P. Westcott were both working atop FSB Sarge when a rocket apparently blew up their bunker, killing them both.

As it was, the MACV commander, the U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam, the MACV J-2 and others were visiting their wives out of country. The Secretary of Defense was headed for Puerto Rico to play golf and the Senior Advisor of Team 155 to 3rd ARVN was also headed out the same morning that the Offensive began. The South Vietnamese warning was obviously not believed or didn’t make it into the U.S. command elements anywhere in the country.

Just below the DMZ, the newly organized 3rd ARVN Division occupied the northern and western firebases. The 2nd ARVN Regiment was taken whole from the 1st ARVN Division, while the 56th and 57th ARVN Regiments were entirely new 3rd ARVN Division units, composed of deserters and malcontents from within South Vietnam.

In an odd twist of fate (or design), 3rd ARVN’s 56th and 2nd Regiments were coincidently turning off their comms and swapping firebases when the NVA began their extensive artillery preparation of the battlefield, which began the invasion. The problem-plagued 56th Regiment was to occupy the western and northwesterly facing firebases to lessen the effects of something called “firebase syndrome,” after having only spent a few months in one of the northern firebases! Both regiments were on the road when the shelling began – well exposed in the open to NVA artillery.

Eventually, elements of the 56th ARVN reached Camp Carroll, the lynchpin of the western firebases and the major artillery support location in northern South Vietnam.

We were the only unit providing current intelligence for the first few weeks of the Offensive – primarily due to the bad weather across northern I Corps keeping winged-aircraft away and because FRAC was no longer in the intel business. Knowing that the USN destroyers were providing gunfire support in the waters off the DMZ (e.g., the USS Buchanan, DDG 14, in its resolute support of Captain Ripley and the Dong Ha Bridge), we tried to provide them with our INTSUMs (via the FRAC and NILO, who also supported the local SEALs). We also knew the destroyers would be in contact with PACFLT, who would also converse with MACV about the current situation.

The first day of the Offensive quickly became a Friday and a Saturday heralding the beginning of April and there was proverbially no rest for the weary. By Saturday, every ARVN firebase north of the Cam Lo River had fallen, from where the 57th ARVN had already been routed. But the first Sunday of the month (2 April 1972) was to be the most memorable.

Three key events were to occur within 1 ½ hours of each other on this Easter Sunday afternoon of 1972.

The first major incident occurred at 1520 when the LTC Phan Van Dinh surrendered all of his 56th ARVN Regiment at Camp Carroll to the 24th NVA Infantry Regiment/304th NVA Infantry Division and a tank company. The exploits of LTC Camper and MAJ Brown, who tried to convince LTC Dinh not to surrender are well-known. Dinh’s cowardice didn’t end with his surrender of Camp Carroll, as the next day he broadcast on Radio Hanoi to the military in South Vietnam to lay down their arms because the NVA was sure to win. The fall of Camp Carroll compelled the firebase at Mai Loc to be evacuated minutes later as the 66th NVA Infantry Regiment pressed their attack. The whole western defense line crumbled.

On the U.S. Army side, MG Kroesen wrote several statements in Quang Tri: The Lost Province that directly bear on this particular event. “The surrender (of Camp Carroll) has never been explained” and “…unidentified personnel of the regiment made radio contact with the enemy to arrange surrender terms.” LTC Dinh was the traitor who made the call and the arrangements. Another Kroesen error also mentions that the 56th lost two of its battalions and three artillery batteries, while “a third battalion refused to surrender and fought its way to Dong Ha.”[8] This statement directly contradicts Camper and Brown’s MFR, as well as any other known documents and makes one wonder where this information originated. Not one battalion even attempted to fight its way out and there was a report that most of the 56th had been executed in the vicinity of the Rockpile, northwest of Camp Carroll.

The Rockpile near Camp Carroll

Ironically, sometimes the press knew more than the generals. For instance, the Stars and Stripes had this to say about the fall of Camp Carroll. “The most crushing blow to the South Vietnamese Sunday was the fall of Camp Carroll, which had been pounded with hundreds of artillery, rocket and mortar shells since last Thursday. ‘Field reports said some government troops may have escaped and those left ran up a white flag of surrender. ‘All American advisors had been evacuated from Carroll by helicopter just before it fell, sources said. ‘It was not immediately known whether the four long-range 175mm artillery guns at Carroll were destroyed or fell into Communist hands.”[9] A battery of four 175mm guns, a 155mm Howitzer battery, two 105mm batteries and numerous quad-50s and twin-40s were lost to the enemy. In their haste to surrender, none of these weapons were rendered useless.

One of the 175mm guns remains on display in Hanoi. The forfeiture of all the artillery in Camp Carroll without a fight represented the almost complete loss of all indirect fire assets in northern South Vietnam, with the exception of U.S. naval gunfire off the coast.

Even more outrageously, Kroesen wrote that the surrender of Camp Carroll “had not shaken the morale or confidence of the other defending forces to any noticeable degree.” The reverberations of a surrender of a whole regiment were quickly and keenly felt across the country. American advisors assigned to II and III Corps have written of the instances of cowardice and of turncoats after the Camp Carroll surrender occurred in their areas.

The bridge at Dong-Ha

The second major incident was the Bridge at Dong Ha, which was blown at 1630, after various contradictory orders. The ARVN leadership didn’t want the bridge blown in order to use it for a counterattack, but the 3rd ARVN was not up to the task with NVA tanks attempting to cross the bridge.

Painting depicting Marine Capt. Ripley blowing up the Dong-Ha bridge during the 1972 Easter offensive.

Marine Captain Ripley and Army Major Smock ended up blowing the bridge after great difficulty, with the assistance of the USS Buchanan which was laying close in-shore supporting them. The Buchanan is credited with destroying at least four PT-76 tanks. Though Team 155 Senior Advisor and a South Vietnamese I Corps commander (who was not assigned to I Corps at the time) all credit ARVN for blowing up the bridge, it is obvious that Ripley and Smock brought the span down under the eyes of the Buchanan.

Iceal (Gene) Hambleton – Bat-21.  His escape was portrayed in a film by the same name with Gene Hackman and Danny Glover

The final major event of that Easter occurred some 20 minutes later, at 1650, when an EB-66, call sign Bat-21, was shot down south of the DMZ by SA-2/Guidelines located SOUTH of the DMZ in South Vietnam. Only one of the crew made it out of the aircraft, parachuting right into the attacking 308th NVA Division’s area. An immediate 27km no-fire zone was automatically imposed around the crewman (an Air Force lieutenant colonel). As Dong Ha Bridge was just blown, the invading NVA were forced to move west to the Cam Lo Bridge to cross or ford the Mieu Giang River, adding to the number of enemy troops in the area.

Though the no-fire zone was reduced, many enemy troops, trucks and tanks were able to cross the bridge at Cam Lo because it was not blown for 12 more days. The no-fly zone was a great matter of concern to ARVN and their advisors (et al), who chafed at the protection one man was receiving as the NVA moved without molestation in the area.

These three major events also show some of the major problems that occurred in Vietnam. The creation, training, and deployment of the 3rd ARVN Division was an open invitation to the NVA to strike at the key to the western firebases.  The changing dynamics of the battlefield which caused Ripley and Smock to act, undoubtedly saved lives by forcing the NVA to find a crossing to the west. The knowledge that SAMs and AAA had set-up shop in South Vietnam were known to USAF. The NVA had also created and improved the road network through the DMZ into South Vietnam allowing the NVA an easier entry into the South, which was observed and reported by 1st MIBARS during the year before.

As can be imagined, contact with our agents became increasingly more difficult as the Offensive continued, especially the northern most network in South Vietnam. The NVA divisions roared through the DMZ and Laos, primarily fighting in a regimental organizational structure.

Dropping the Ball

There were many senior officers who quite literally dropped the ball in not embracing the intelligence given them and acting upon it.

We will begin with COL Donald J. Metcalf, Senior Advisor of Team 155, advising 3rd ARVN Division. His U.S. War College Paper is an interesting bit of equivocation.   The first few pages have to do with why he didn’t know the Offensive was coming and the role of intelligence. For instance, “I contend that among all the items of intelligence produced prior to the attack, a small fraction indicated that such an offensive might occur, but other equally sizable and equally believable fractions indicated that something less might occur. ‘The sources available to me were the G2’s of the 1st and 3rd ARVN Divisions, and the American estimates produced by XXIV Corps, and they were in general agreement that the enemy would repeat the dry season activities of previous years….”  Past activity patterns, he wrote “can cloud the observer’s vision…” and “may have led informed persons in the intelligence community to give less credence than was warranted to (other) indications….”[10] A not so nice way of blaming intelligence for the mistakes of a professional combat commander, it seems.

NVA soldiers taking over one of the northern firebases vacated by ARVN troops during the Easter Offensive

What COL Metcalf forgot to mention is that one the 571st’s Teams was co-located on Quang Tri and they were also recipients of our INTSUM, as well.

Kroesen states that, “Only a superficial study of the map, the foot mobility of the enemy, and the history of prior years was needed to conclude that these preparations would require two to three months.”[11] Yes, general, but there were many reports of vehicular Ho Chi Minh Trail activity and of NVA activity above the DMZ and let’s not forget the 1st MIBARS reports that stated the NVA were expanding and improving roads below the DMZ, too. As for the history of previous years, one wonders why, “It’s always been this way” is an excuse? General Kroesen’s FRAC also received our INTSUMs, though he admits his intelligence capabilities were limited, one would have thought he would have prized any information (especially in light of some of his statements).

MACV, PACFLT, 7th AF, CIA, DIA, JCS, the South Vietnamese JGS and even the Secretary of Defense had no expectations of a North Vietnamese offensive. All had preconceptions, helped along by the NVA who showed the U.S. and South Vietnamese what they expected to see. Americans still became KIAs and WIAs (as did the ARVN and South Vietnamese Marine Corps-SVMC), though only a couple of U.S. units remained in-country after all the U.S. divisions left. The indiscriminate artillery shelling of thousands of civilians caused thousands of deaths, as well.

One of the reasons given by some high-ranking individuals was that they never thought the North Vietnamese would break their agreement of not striking from the DMZ. This, despite the years of the North Vietnamese and VC lying only adds to the incredulity that the Easter Offensive of 1972 was allowed to happen.

“(John Paul) Vann (who commanded II Corps/SRAC), ever the doubting Thomas, stated on 7 February 1972 that ‘Intelligence gathering is the chief problem’ and that ‘Nearly all reliable intelligence is limited to US S.I. (Special Intelligence) Channels.”[12] Don’t listen to all of your intelligence personnel at your peril.

Aftermath

Having had this HUMINT experience, as I continued my MI career for a few more years in an all-source, multi-service environment, I found that HUMINT was often derided by commanders and analysts alike. Just as in Vietnam (and WWII before it), SIGINT was all knowing and all-important, with HUMINT relegated to a last-place position. I was to find years later that the remaining SIGINT units in Vietnam did have indications of some kind of NVA activity, but none of it was disseminated to other intel units. The question becomes why weren’t U.S. and ARVN/SVMC units warned?

LTG Michael Flynn, in his The Field of Fight, wrote about human intelligence and interrogation being “essentially nonexistent” at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Ft. Polk. He goes on to mention the “politicization of intelligence” and “don’t deliver bad news to your leaders” and how this “appears to be going in our intelligence system today regarding our fight against Radical Islamists….”[13]

Perhaps we need to relearn our lessons learned, again?

About the Author

W. R. (Bob) Baker graduated with the first 96B/Intelligence Analyst class at Fort Huachuca, AZ in 1971. He was then assigned to the 1st Battalion (which soon became the 571st MI Det.), 525th MI Group, headquartered in Da Nang, Vietnam. His further assignments included positions at Fort Bliss, Texas; two tours with the European Defense Analysis Center (EUDAC) in Stuttgart-Vaihingen, Germany; and the 513th MI Group in Fort Monmouth, New Jersey.

He left the US Army and worked as an analyst for Interstate Electronics, Northrop-Grumman and Xontec defense contractors before teaching in primary and secondary schools.

Mr. Baker has a bachelor of science degree in Government from the University of Maryland and a master’s degree in Educational Leadership from the University of Dayton. He has authored other Easter Offensive articles and is currently writing a book on this subject.

This article was originally published by the author on May 8, 2017 on Small Wars Journal. Here’s is the direct link to that website along with his posted end notes:  http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/humint-a-continuing-crisis


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A Perth Boy’s Perspective on the Vietnam War

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As a kid growing up in Perth, Western Australia in the 1960s and ’70s, I didn’t learn about the Vietnam War from classroom history lessons. Vietnam and the broader Indochina War were on our radio and TV news every morning and evening, and in the front page headlines of our daily newspapers (though I can’t claim the precociousness of reading beyond the headlines).

From the news and adult conversation, I knew the main combatants were the Americans and Communist North Vietnamese. Australian soldiers also fought in Vietnam. We had national service in those days, with conscription based on a “birthday ballot“. Twenty-year-olds had to register for the ballot and if your birthdate popped up in the “lottery draw”, you served in the army for two years, with every chance of overseas deployment, to Vietnam.

As far as I know, no one in my family was “called up” or served in Vietnam – my dad and uncles were too old, and we kids were too young. But I did have a footy coach whose birthdate came up in the “lottery”. I recall an end-of-season speech by an older club official, who may have said something blokey along the lines of, “Keep your head down, son.” We boys may have laughed and cheered – all I remember for sure is my coach looked grim.

Gough Whitlam and Labor were elected to government in 1972 with a promise to end conscription and Australia’s engagement in the Vietnam War. I have a vivid memory of watching Whitlam’s victory speech on the TV news and feeling relief.

I was ten-years-old at the time, but I had already worked out when it would be my turn to register for national service. I was only a schoolboy, and Perth was a long way from the Indochina conflict zones, but with the radio and TV news and newspapers, the Vietnam War felt much closer to home.

Hugh Van Es UPI [Photo via Newscom]
The years rolled on, as did the Vietnam War, engulfing neighbouring countries, until 1975, when the Americans helicoptered a hasty evacuation of their embassy in Saigon, and the city fell to the North Vietnamese forces.

One of my chores as a thirteen-year-old was to tend to the wood heater for our evening hot water. I remember pulling apart a daily newspaper to light under the wood and seeing an editorial cartoon of an Asian farmer squatting in a bomb-cratered rice paddy field. His head was tilted towards the sky, free of American bombers and helicopters, and in a single thought bubble he observed, “So this is peace.”

However, we know the fall of Saigon did not bring peace to the South Vietnamese, who took to boats to escape retribution and oppression under the regime of the new, unified Vietnam. Thousands of Vietnamese “boat people” arrived in Australia and many resettled in Perth. Under the Liberal Prime Ministership of Malcolm Fraser, we were a more welcoming nation in those days (though let’s be honest, there was still racism towards the “reffos”).

I grew up, left Perth, travelled and worked overseas, and read. My interest in the Vietnam War led me to build a small collection of books on the country and conflict. From Stanley Karnow’s weighty 750-page Vietnam A History – The First Complete Account of Vietnam at War (1983) to Charles Fenn’s slim Leaders of Modern Thought biography of Ho Chi Minh (1973). From actual and fictional accounts of reporters covering the Indochina War, like Christoper J Koch’s Highways to a War (1996), to the Vietnamese author, Bao Ninh’s award-winning novel, The Sorrow of War (1991).

Through my reading, I learned how the Vietnam War had much earlier roots than the America versus Communists conflict. It stretched back to Vietnamese armed resistance to the Japanese invasion of WWII. I read how conflict escalated with the return of the French colonialists after WWII, who ignored nationalist demands. And how America and its allies, like Australia, ramped up the war to never before seen heights of destruction in Vietnam and neighbouring countries, with their anti-Communist crusade.

Stanley Karnow quotes Phạm Văn Đồng, unified Vietnam’s first Prime Minister, as saying: “Yes, we defeated the United States. But now we are plagued by problems. We do not have enough to eat. We are a poor, underdeveloped nation. Waging war is simple, but running a country is very difficult.”

The Vietnam War from my boyhood perspective was real and frightening. And yet I was safe growing up in faraway W.A., unlike the boys and girls of my age, bombed in the villages and jungles of Vietnam (and who can forget the photo of the girl burnt by napalm, running down the road, naked and crying?).

As an adult, I read and learned more about the war and the mistakes that were made, particularly on the American side. And yet I have friends whose families fled Vietnam in leaky boats. Commonsense tells me you don’t risk your family’s lives unless Communism proved to be more of a nightmare than a fairytale “utopia”.

It’s a paradox this boy from Perth can only resolve by reading more about the Vietnam War, by learning from those with a closer connection to the country, its past and present, and perhaps by one day visiting Vietnam, as a middle-aged man.

© 2018 Robert Fairhead 

Sydney, NSW, Australia.

A middle-aged dad and dog owner, Robert is an editor and a writer for Tall And True and blogs at RobertFairhead.com. Robert enjoys reading and writing (fiction, nonfiction and reviews), playing the guitar (though seldom finds the time to practice), and riding his bike and swimming laps (when he can!). Robert has had a varied career, as an electrician, sales and marketing rep, computer programmer, volunteer dog trainer and wanna-be writer. He has also had a one-night stand as a stand-up comic.

NB: This piece is also published on the Robert Fairhead’s blog at http://tallandtrue.com


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If you enjoyed this article and want to learn more about the Vietnam War – subscribe to this blog and get each new post delivered to your email or feed reader.  Meanwhile, you can check into my special pages, most recent articles and those most popular – all listed to the right of each article. If you’d rather sample every post, then click HERE to be redirected to this blog’s main page.  There, you can scroll down through all the published titles, listed chronologically – the most recent is first.

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The Price of War: Wondering One Time Or Another If You Would Ever Make It Home Alive And In One Piece!

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Many Vietnam Veterans know who Bernie Weisz is and enjoy interfacing with him on Facebook. As a historian specializing in the Vietnam War, he has, over the years, shared war photos, articles, Vietnam War book reviews, and historical facts about the war. I met Bernie while working on “Cherries”, and sent my manuscript to him for a review; his initial recommendations were implemented and I later received a wonderful review on Amazon. Bernie adds historical data about the Vietnam War and pieces my story into the overall scheme of things. It’s like him giving a lecture about the war and using my story as the outline and then fleshing it out with historical facts. I’ve included his “lecture” below and hope you enjoy it as much as I did. If you hang on until the end, learn how you can get a free e-book version of “Cherries: A Vietnam War Novel.”

August 18, 2010

By Bernie Weisz “a historian specializing in the Vietnam War… (Pembroke Pines,Florida) –

This review is from: CHERRIES: A Vietnam War Novel (Paperback)

I am not quite sure where to start with John Podlaski’s blockbuster book “Cherries”, a fictionalized account of his 1970 to 1971 tour as a foot soldier in South Vietnam. As an avid reader of many historical memoirs, both fiction and autobiographical, rarely have I found one as in depth and revealing as Mr. Podlaski’s work. Thirty years in the making, it was originally written in a first person format. The Second Tour “Cherries” was started in 1979 and ground to a frustrating halt ten years later. It sat dormant until 2009, where Mr. Podlaski, with renewed verve, finally took it to task to complete it. At the advice of his publisher to change the story to a third person fictional approach, and the technical computer dexterity of his daughter, Nicole, the writing was first converted from carbon paper to Atari floppy disks and finally to Microsoft Word. “Cherries” is now available to the public. Regardless of the format, Mr. Podlaski takes the reader, through the protagonist of John Podlaski, of his personal tour conveying his impressions of a war America currently prefers to forget.

This historical gem will not let this happen. Through an incredible, larger than life manuscript, Mr. Podlaski reminds us that the jungle warfare against huge communist forces in Vietnam was a deadly and unique challenge to our U.S. forces. It is made clear in “Cherries” that the limited American forces faced an unlimited number of Communist troops who had the incomparable advantage of a sanctuary for their replacements beyond the 18th parallel. With the memory of the 1950-1953 Korean War debacles, the U.S. government granted this sanctuary fearing that any military action beyond it would cause reprisals by Communist China. In South Vietnam, our troops could not distinguish enemy from friendly Vietnamese. Within the storyline, the reader finds that a village could be friendly by day and enemy by night. It was a battlefield without boundaries. A secret supply route in Laos, known as the “Ho Chi Minh Trail,” funneled a constant arms supply to the enemy. The jungle provided the perfect cover for the Communists, constantly posing ambushes from the rear and flanks of our troops. The Shake ‘n Bake Sergeant: True Story of Infantry Sergeants in Vietnam Bayonet and gun butt, hand to hand fighting was frequent. Capture by the enemy could mean torture and a communist prison camp. The constant unbearable heat, with high humidity, enervated our troops.

Prior to John Podlaski’s arrival in South Vietnam, the U.S. had become involved in the S.E. Asian conflict under dubious circumstances. The alleged August, 1964 attack of two U.S. destroyers by North Vietnamese patrol boats in the South China Sea brought on the “Gulf of Tonkin Resolution” giving then President Lyndon B. Johnson a free hand to commit American troops to defend South Vietnam’s fledgling democracy. However, the South Vietnamese political situation crippled their war efforts. Bitterly opposed political factions of Buddhists verses Catholics caused the assassination of President Ngo Dinh Diem by a military coup, whose leaders then could not unify the country. Meanwhile, in the U.S., the drumbeat of communist propaganda split the citizens of this country, especially our youth. Mr. Podlaski brings this point to light at the beginning of his story. He describes that when a soldier would begin his trek to South Vietnam from the Overseas Processing Terminal in Oakland, California. There, masses of hippies and former soldiers picketed against the war. They would plead with Vietnam bound soldiers to quit the military and refuse to fight this war. Despite all these odds, U.S. forces had practically knocked out the North Vietnamese in South Vietnam by mid-1966 when new and highly trained North Vietnamese Communist forces poured into South Vietnam.

 Such was the situation when the January, 1968 Tet Offensive occurred. A cease-fire began on January 30, 1968 for the Vietnamese new year of Tet, which falls on the first new moon of January. On January 31, 1968 the Viet Cong broke their cease-fire and attacked many cities and provinces throughout South Vietnam. In Saigon, a small number of Viet Cong troops were able to reach the American Embassy grounds, but did not gain entry into the embassy itself. In the Northern part of South Vietnam, the city of Hue was taken over by the V. C. and executions of city officials and their families took place. Red Clay on My Boots: Encounters with Khe Sanh, 1968 to 2005 the initial reporting indicated the number of people executed was in the thousands (2,300 persons executed in and around Hue during the Tet Offensive). Saigon was the center for most if not all of the news agencies that were covering the war in South Vietnam. The Tet Offensive of 1968 was the first time, during the war, that actual street fighting took place in the major cities. Rear support personnel and MP’s did the initial fighting by American troops until support from infantry and armor could arrive. These men did an outstanding job in defending the cities, airfields and bases along with the embassy. This is incredible considering the fact that over 2.5 million U.S. men and women served in Vietnam during the entire war (1959 to 1975) but only 10% of that was in the infantry and actually, as Podlaski puts it “humped the boonies.” The American news media captured this street fighting on tape in addition to the attack on the American Embassy. This new offensive was immediately brought into the homes of American families through reporting by television and the press. The sensationalism of this reporting brought forth a misrepresentation of the actual facts that took place during the Tet Offensive of 1968. The reports led the American people to the false perception that we were losing the war in Vietnam and that the Tet Offensive was a major victory for North Vietnam. This was not the case. The reality was that the VC suffered high casualties and were no longer considered a fighting force. Their ranks had to be replaced by North Vietnamese regulars. The civilian population of South Vietnam was indifferent to both the current regime of President Nguyen Van Thieu in South Vietnam and the Viet Cong. The civilian population, for the most part, did not join with the VC during the Tet Offensive.

 Bui Tin, who served on the General Staff of the North Vietnamese Army and received the unconditional surrender of South Vietnam on April 30, 1975, gave the Wall Street Journal an interview following the Tet Offensive. From Enemy to Friend: A North Vietnamese Perspective on the War During this interview Mr. Tin was asked if the American antiwar movement was important to Hanoi’s victory. Mr. Tin responded “It was essential to our strategy”, referring to the war being fought on two fronts, the Vietnam battlefield and back home in America through the antiwar movement on college campuses and in the city streets. Furthermore, he stated the North Vietnamese leadership listened to the American evening news broadcasts “to follow the growth of the American antiwar movement.” Visits to Hanoi made by persons such as Jane Fonda, former Attorney General Ramsey Clark and various church ministers “gave us confidence that we should hold on in the face of battlefield reverses.” Mr. Tin asserted that: “America lost because of its democracy; through dissent and protest it lost the ability to mobilize a will to win.” Mr. Tin further declared that General Vo Nguyen Giap, the commanding general of the North Vietnamese Army, had advised him the 1968 Tet Offensive had been a tremendous defeat.

After the 1968 Tet offensive, the military defeat of North Vietnam ironically became a political victory for North Vietnam because of U.S. anti-war demonstrations and the sensationalism of the news media. The North Vietnamese interpreted the U.S. reaction to these events as the weakening of America’s resolve to win the war. The North Vietnamese believed that victory could be theirs, if they stayed their course. From 1969 until the end of the war, over 20,000 American soldiers lost their lives in a war that the U.S. no longer had the resolve to win. The sensationalism by the American news media and the anti-war protests following the 1968 Tet Offensive gave hope to Communist North Vietnamese, strengthening their belief that their will to succeed was greater than ours. Surreptitiously avoiding a successful resolution at the January, 1972 Paris Peace Conference following the disastrous defeat of the 1968 Tet Offensive, they used stalling tactics as another tool to inflame U.S. politics. This delaying tactic once again ignited further anti-war demonstrations. Militarily, America won the war on the battlefield but lost it back home on the college campuses and in the city streets.

John Podlaski’s story started in 1970, where America was in the process of what President Nixon called “Vietnamization.” This was the President’s policy of gradually returning the primary responsibility for conducting the war to the South Vietnamese. As US troops withdrew, South Vietnamese forces were increased in size and received additional training and equipment, with the ultimate goal being complete U.S. departure of the war. The South Vietnamese would be left to stand alone in their civil war with the Communists. John Podlaski’s emphasis was on the soldiers who recently arrived in South Vietnam that fought in triple canopy jungles of Vietnam. They were naive young recruits, just graduating from high school within the past year. Dubbed “F.N.G’s or “Cherries” by the veterans, these men found themselves in the middle of a situation never imagined in their wildest dreams. As Podlaski emphatically stated in the book: “I guess you really had to be there to understand.” As opposed to the ticker tape parades that U.S. servicemen were given upon their return from the W.W. II battlefields of the Far East and Europe, his terse remark in his epilogue spoke volumes upon his protagonist’s return from the war: “There were no speeches or parades. One night you’re getting shot at and looking at the bodies of your dead friends, and then two days later, you’re sitting on your front porch, watching the kids play in the street and the cars drive by. There was no transition period.” F. N. G.

Throughout Podlaski’s book, the general theme is for no U.S. grunt to be the last American to die in a war not sought for a victorious conclusion. The facts of American conduct of the war in 1970 to 1971 are interesting. As stated earlier, severe communist losses during the Tet Offensive allowed President Nixon to begin troop withdrawals. His Vietnamization plan, also known as the “Nixon Doctrine,” was to build up the South Vietnamese Army (known as ”ARVN”) so that they could take over the defense of South Vietnam on their own. At the end of 1969, Nixon went on national TV and announced the following: “I am tonight announcing plans for the withdrawal of an additional 150,000 American troops to be completed during the spring of next year. This will bring a total reduction of 265,500 men in our armed forces in Vietnam below the level that existed when we took office 15 months ago.” On October 10, 1969, Nixon ordered a squadron of 18 B-52′s armed with nuclear bombs to fly to the border of Soviet airspace in an attempt to convince the Soviet Union, North Vietnam’s main supporter along with Communist China, that he was capable of anything to end the Vietnam War. Nixon also pursued negotiations and ordered General Creighton Abrams, who replaced William Westmoreland, to shift to smaller operations, aimed at communist logistics, with better use of firepower and more cooperation with the ARVN. The former tactic of “Search and Destroy” was abandoned. Détente with the Soviet Union the Republic of China was also pursued. Easing global tensions, détente resulted in nuclear arms reduction on the part of both superpowers. Regardless, Nixon was snubbed as the Soviet Union and Red China continued to covertly supply the North Vietnamese with aid. In September 1969, Ho Chi Minh died at age seventy-nine.

 Nixon appealed to the “silent majority” of Americans to support the war. With revelations in the media of the “My Lai Massacre,” where a U.S. Army platoon commanded by Lt. William Calley raped and killed civilians, and the 1969 “Green Beret Affair” where eight Special Forces soldiers, including the 5th Special Forces Group Commander were arrested for the murder of a suspected double agent, national and international outrage was provoked and the American antiwar movement gained strength. The Forgotten Hero of My Lai: The Hugh Thompson Story Starting in 1970, American troops were being taken away from South Vietnamese border areas where much more killing took place, and instead positioned along the coast and interior, which is one reason why casualties in 1970 were less than half of 1969′s total casualties. In Cambodia, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, this nation’s leader, had proclaimed Cambodian neutral since 1955. This was a lie, as the Communists used Cambodian soil as a base and Sihanouk tolerated their presence to avoid being drawn into a wider regional conflict. Under pressure from Washington, however, he changed this policy in 1969. The Vietnamese communists were no longer welcome. President Nixon took the opportunity to launch a massive secret bombing campaign, called Operation Menu, against their sanctuaries along the Cambodia/Vietnam border. This violated a long succession of pronouncements from Washington supporting Cambodian neutrality. In 1970, Podlaski first set foot in South Vietnam., and in Cambodia Prince Sihanouk was deposed by his pro-American Prime Minister Lon Nol. Cambodia’s borders were closed, and both U.S. and ARVN forces launched joint incursions into Cambodia to attack North Vietnamese/Viet Cong bases and buy time for South Vietnam.

The invasion of Cambodia sparked massive nationwide U.S. outcry and protests. Public outrage peaked in the U.S. when 4 students were killed by National Guardsmen at Kent State University during an antiwar rally in Ohio. The Nixon administration reacted indifferently to this, and was publicly viewed as callous and uncaring, providing additional impetus for the anti-war movement. In 1971 the “Pentagon Papers” were leaked to The New York Times. The top-secret history of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, commissioned by the Department of Defense, detailed a long series of public deceptions. Into Cambodia the Supreme Court ruled that its publication was legal. Although not mentioned in “Cherries”, with U.S. support, The ARVN launched “Operation Lam Son 719″ in February 1971, designed to cut the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos. Similar to the sham of Cambodian neutrality, “”supposedly” neutral Laos had long been the scene of a secret war. After meeting resistance, ARVN forces retreated in a headlong, confused rout. Shamefully, they fled along roads littered with their own dead. When they ran out of fuel, South Vietnamese soldiers abandoned their vehicles and attempted to barge their way on to American helicopters sent to evacuate their wounded. Many ARVN soldiers clung to helicopter skids in a desperate attempt to save themselves. U.S. aircraft had to destroy abandoned equipment, including tanks, to prevent them from falling into enemy hands. Half of the invading ARVN troops were either captured or killed. The operation was a fiasco and represented a clear failure of Vietnamization. In 1971 Australia and New Zealand withdrew their soldiers. The U.S. troop count was further reduced to 196,700, with a deadline to remove another 45,000 troops by February 1972. As peace protests spread across the United States, disillusionment grew in the ranks. Drug use increased, race relations grew tense and the number of soldiers disobeying officers rose. Fragging, or the murder of unpopular officers with fragmentation grenades, increased. The phenomenon of “fragging” is mentioned in “Cherries” in a rather interesting scenario. Price of Exit

 “Cherries” is a “catch all” for all of the subtle nuances and innuendo a grunt in the jungles of Vietnam circa 1970 to 1971 would experience. Mr. Jack Stoddard wrote a book about a very common cliché Mr. Podlaski included in the nomenclature that was to arise out of this war. Aside from exposing racial conflict between blacks and whites in the beginning of the book, there is a small anecdote whereupon there is almost a fight between blacks and whites in a pool room in the States just prior to deployment to S.E. Asia. A sergeant tells the combatants the following: “I’d be willing to forget this incident if everybody just walks away and returns to what they were doing earlier. What are you going to do if we don’t? Send us to Vietnam? someone called out from the crowd”. No history book will ever contain this, but there were reasons that many returning veterans went back to Vietnam despite the antiwar movement and the lack of resolve for America to win. To quote Podlaski, he uses an example of Sgt. Larry Holmes, nicknamed “Sixpack” who returns to Vietnam rather than finish his military obligation stateside as a drill instructor training new recruits. Here is a poignant and true example of “the times”: “He had his orders changed during leave and volunteered for a second tour. Why would he do a thing like that? He told me he was fed up with the civilians and all the hippies. He said that while on leave, he was spit on and people were getting on his case because he was training soldiers to be baby killers and then sending them off to Vietnam. He said there wasn’t a day that went by without someone picking a fight with him. After the cops had jailed him for a second time for disorderly conduct, he went and signed the papers. The world is filled with jerks. Too bad he had to volunteer for Nam to get away from it all.”

Unfortunately, the reality is that this happened in the late 1960′s and early 1970′s more than one would suspect!

Regardless of the aspect of fiction being the backdrop, this story is so real, with nothing missed. Podlaski describes his protagonist’s reactions to Vietnam more accurately than over 100 memoirs combined. The red dust of Vietnam, the insects, leeches, the heat, rats, humidity and monsoons are all covered. Podlaski’s description of observing betel nut by the indigenous Vietnamese is a classic: “Everyone wore straw conical hats that helped to shield their faces from the strong rays of the sun and they were all smiling happily. All looked as if they had mouths filled with black licorice. Their lips, teeth and insides of their mouths looked like a poster advertisement from the Cancer Foundation, warning of the dangers of smoking”. Podlaski’s description of a Vietnamese village is incredibly authentic, only to be told by a participant: “The entire time they were there, the soldiers were surrounded by at least 30 kids at any given time. Most of them were hustlers who tried to sell them anything from pop to whiskey, to women, chickens and dope. It was like a flea market making a sales pitch.” Another truism is Podlaski explaining to the reader why soldiers were glad when children came to greet them: “The villagers know when Charlie is around and are smart enough to not let their kids be in the middle of a firefight.” The paradigm of a new soldier, i.e. “Cherry” is instructive: “Just don’t go out there thinking you’re John Wayne, because it’ll get you killed.” Equally telling is Podlaski’s “grunt rule” of Vietnam when objecting to training the military gave that turned out to be “useless” in the bush: “What more do we have to learn? There’s a little guy with a gun that’s trying to shoot me and I shoot him first. It’s as simple as that.” Another classic quote in “Cherries” is Podlaski’s lament of his 365 day “prison term of Vietnam: “We’re all locked up in this country for the next year and all we can do about that is serve our time.”

As I mentioned at the start of this book review, this book has everything. Firefights, medical evacuations, booby traps, punji pits, mechanical ambushes, Cobra attack helicopters, medical evacuations and very graphic, violent depictions of death in the sweaty jungles of Vietnam are mentioned. Some of Podlaski’s comments within this book can be found in countless memoirs that I have read. They are all “on the money”! Other classic quotes are of the soldier with only a few days left of his tour (usually 365 days), about to DEROS (return to the states-date of return from overseas service) on the “freedom bird” (an expression for a commercial airplane that would fly a soldier from Vietnam back to the U.S. Here is a classic quote of Podlaski’s found universally in every memoir I have encountered: “They say that you can be fearless as a lion after your first month in country, but feel like a Cherry again during that last month.” Fear of death runs rampant throughout the book. Unlike any World War II book where the only goal was annihilation of the enemy and victory, the only goal in “Cherries” is for the characters of this story to survive their tour and come home in one piece. “Fragging” is discussed. This expression refers to the act of attacking a superior officer in one’s chain of command with the intent to kill him. It boils down to the assassination of an unpopular officer of one’s own fighting unit. Killing was done by a fragmentation grenade, thus the term. This was used to avoid identification and apprehension. If a grenade was used, a soldier could claim in the heat of a battle that the grenade landed too close to the target and was accidentally killed, that another member of the unit threw the grenade, or even that a member of the other side threw it. Unlike a gun, a grenade cannot be readily traced to anyone, whether by using ballistics forensics or by any other means. The grenade itself is destroyed in the explosion, and the characteristics of the remaining shrapnel are not distinctive enough to permit tracing to a specific grenade or soldier. What Are They Going To Do, Send Me To Vietnam?

“Fragging” usually involved the murder of a commanding officer perceived as unpopular, harsh, inept or overzealous. As “Cherries” unfolds, the war became more unpopular. Soldiers became less eager to aggressively engage and seek out the enemy. The G.I.’s in the boonies preferred leaders with a similar sense of self-preservation. If a C. O. was incompetent, fragging the officer was considered a means to the end of self-preservation for the men serving under him. It would also occur if a commander took on dangerous or suicidal missions, especially if he was seeking self-glorification. Individual commanders would be “fragged” when demonstrating incompetency or wasting their men’s lives unnecessarily. The facts are that during the war, at least 230 American officers were killed by their own troops, and as many as 1,400 other officers’ deaths were inexplicable. Between Podlaski’s tour of 1970 and 1971 alone, there were 363 cases of “assault with explosive devices” against officers in Vietnam. Finally, there are explanations about the war rarely to be told in neither high school nor college curriculum. John Podlaski explains that in the ranks of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army, many women served as soldiers. Caves and spider holes were rampant, and this elusive enemy rarely left their wounded and dead on the battlefield. With the exception of the “Ia Drang” 1965 battle, the Communists rarely engaged in a “set piece”, toe to toe battle. The NVA and Viet Cong fought mostly at night, when they had an advantage, and were an extremely cunning, formidable foe. In regard to the enemy, Podlaski quotes: “If you don’t respect them and continue to underestimate them, you’ll never make it home alive.” In terms of surviving one’s tour, Podlaski pointed to luck as the decisive factor. One of his characters was named Zeke, a grunt who was “short” (less than a month left on his tour of Vietnam) and forced to go out on one final mission before going back home, as ominously asserting the following:” Training and experience don’t mean nothing in the Nam. It’s all luck. And I don’t feel like I have any left.” Nothing is missed in “Cherries”. Agent Orange is vividly brought up. Involvement of the Koreans, Thai’s and Australians, a fact underplayed and rarely discussed, is also mentioned. Podlaski interestingly mentions about the 1 year tour the following quip: “You learn more about this place every day. Yeah, and just when you think you know it all, it’s time to go home”.

There are other prophetic comments and anecdotes. In discussing a soldier’s difficulty in determining whether or not a villager is a Viet Cong or an innocent civilian, he wrote: “If we had that answer, the war would have been over a long time ago.” Podlaski compared humping the bush with a Halloween haunted house: “In both cases, you felt your way along, waiting for something to jump out at you. In the bush, to get surprised could very likely result in death.” His comment about humping around the 100 degree, insect, snake, rat and leech infested jungle with 60 lbs. on one’s back was as follows: “The grunts no longer thought of the never-ending jungle as Vietnam. Instead, they imagined themselves in a large box, constantly walking, but never able to reach the other side.” In regards to dealing with the death of a friend in combat, Podlaski expressed the following: “There will be others so you have to learn how to block out the emotions and live with the hurt, otherwise you’ll drive yourself crazy.” Unlike the camaraderie of W. W. II Vets with their V.FW’s and perpetual fellowship, Podlaski exposed this missing element of Vietnam Veterans. As one grunt went home for the last time and said goodbye to his fellow G.I’s, Podlaski wrote the following: “In the morning, as the 3 of them readied themselves for their final chopper ride out of the jungle, the men hugged and shed some tears. Promises were made to be broken, and it was unfortunate, but this would be the last time any of them heard or saw one other again.”

Co. B 1/501st 101st Airborne I-Corps – troops descending from hilltop  courtesy Tom Jones

This book, like Podlaski’s tour, is broken up in 2 parts. Podlaski served as an infantryman in both the southern part of Vietnam as a member of the Wolfhounds, 25th Division and in the northern part of South Vietnam at the end of his tour. There he was attached to the 501st infantry Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division. It was like 2 different wars entirely, with different uniforms and tactics used in the different tactical zones. This reality is translated into the story line. Podlaski summed up his frustration of the war with the following comment, as he thought his tour was over: “No more humping, ambushes, eating C-rations, and having to carry the weight of another person on your back. Goodbye Vietnam! Good Riddance! And good luck!” This comment he made when he incorrectly thought his tour with the Wolfhounds was over. Podlaski erroneously “thought” he would go with them in their redeployment to Hawaii. Instead, he was sent to the 101st Airborne Division in the northern part of South Vietnam to finish his tour. However, when he finally did arrive back home, and deplaned from the “freedom bird” (airplane) that finally brought him home, Podlaski, mimicking countless other accounts and memoirs, had the following classic commentary about his protagonist, John Kowalski. “Polack (Kowalski’s nickname) had changed physically, rarely paying any attention to it in Vietnam. He remembered that upon leaving for war, he weighed 196 lbs. and had a 36″ waist. That day, he weighed 155 lbs. and had a 29″ waist. Polock did not regret anything he did during his time in Vietnam. He was the only person from his graduating class and group of friends that went to Vietnam, so nobody could share his experiences or even have the faintest idea of what he’d gone through. In This Man’s Army Friends and family tried to understand but they weren’t quite able to comprehend what he told them. He was only able to get so far before they lost interest or rolled their eyes. In their minds it was just a bunch of war stories that he was blowing out of proportion. After all, it was impossible for somebody to go through that.” How sad! This is a case of P.T.S.D. waiting to happen, and undoubtedly this scene is occurring today with veterans returning form the Middle East. There are way too many more stories, examples and iota to mention, but you are just going to have to read “Cherries” for yourself. I read it twice, something I rarely do! By reading “Cherries” you will get the knowledge and feel of what it was like in Vietnam, stories that many memoirs of this war collectively failed to mention! Highly recommended!!!!

*****

If anyone has an interest in reading “Cherries: A Vietnam War Novel, I’m giving away 25 copies (e-book version only) to readers of this article. All you have to do is send me an email requesting a copy and I’ll send you a code. First come – first served. When they’re gone, they’re gone. Act fast. My email address:  john.podlaski@gmail.com


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Battlefield Chronicles: Into Cambodia (Guest post)

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My website is lacking in articles about Americans fighting in both Cambodia and Laos during the Vietnam War. I’ve recently come across one such story and thought to share it with you here. It’s written by the former company commander of a 1st Cav. unit (C 1/12) and chronicles their seven-week long incursion into Cambodia during May/June, 1970. This article by LtCol Michael Christy (ret) originally appeared on the “Together We Served” website and was included in the June, 2018 edition of their monthly magazine, “Dispatches”. Here is the direct link: https://army.togetherweserved.com/army/newsletter2/22/newsletter.html

If you have a story to tell about excursions into Cambodia/Laos and want to have them published here on this website, please get in touch with me.


I had been in command of Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry Regiment, for four months in late April 1970. We were only three days into a search and destroy mission in Phuoc Long Province, a sparsely populated, heavily wooded area along the Cambodian border 75 miles northeast of Saigon when I received a radio call from the battalion commander, Lt. Col. Norman Moffitt. He asked me to do something I didn’t do that often: go to the “green box,” the military euphemism for secure voice communications.

My radio operator, Spec. Merle “Denny” Dentino, slid a KY-38 encryption device into his PRC-77 radio which “scrambled” our conversation so it was indistinguishable to enemy eavesdroppers.

“The company is to be picked up tomorrow morning at 0900 hours,” Moffett instructed. The only information he provided was the map coordinates for our PZ (Pickup Zone). Curious why he wanted us to move after only three days, I asked, “What is this all about, sir?” But even with secure voice transmission, Moffett was secretive. “I’ll brief you when you get back to Fire Support Base Buttons tomorrow,” he responded before signing off. The time was 5 p.m.

I had the men unsaddle their equipment and prepare to bed down for the night. The mysterious call from battalion spread like wildfire among the troops, giving rise to wild speculation: Was the war over? Were we being sent as reinforcements into a major battle already in progress somewhere in Vietnam? These were the thoughts running through most of our heads for the rest of the evening.

We awoke at sunrise, wolfed-down some c-ration, packed our gear and were humping by 6 a.m. through the jungle to the designated PZ some two miles to the west. It was hard going. The heat was unbearable, and the humidity was stifling even at this early time in the morning. We pushed harder and miraculously arrived 30 minutes before the scheduled extraction and waited. And waited!  It wasn’t until nearly 11 a.m. when the sound of helicopters broke through the quiet.

It took 10 minutes to fly back to Song Be but long before we landed, we could see countless C-47 and Huey helicopters loaded with men and equipment flying in and out, forming dust clouds everywhere. There was now no doubt that we were embarking on a massive operation, we just didn’t know where or why.

Waiting for us as we jumped out of the helicopters was the company executive officer, 1st Lt. Dwight Taylor. He cupped his hands and yelled over the roar of the departing helicopters, “You are the last company to come in, Six. I will take the men back to the company area. You are to go immediately to the battalion TOC (tactical operations center) and wait for a briefing.” “Do you know what’s going on?” I shouted. With a shrug, he hollered back, “Not a clue.”

The TOC was already filled when I arrived. I found one of the few folding chairs still available in the back and sat down. The tension in the room was palatable. It seemed everyone had concerns about what was going on. Within 15 minutes Lt. Col. Moffitt came into the TOC and stood before his anxious audience. He looked at his watch, took a dramatic pause before saying, “Gentlemen, approximately four hours ago a massive South Vietnamese force crossed over the border into Cambodia to find and destroy NVA sanctuaries. We leave tomorrow on the same mission.”

The room filled with spontaneous chatter which was quickly silenced by the operations officer stepping in and laying out the operational plan and the sequence in which we were to carry it out. My company was scheduled for a mid-morning lift the next day, May 1. Moffitt finished the briefing by warning each of the company commanders that enemy resistance would be fierce and to expect heavy casualties. With that, we were dismissed. I hightailed it to Charlie Company area to brief the platoon leaders and platoon sergeants. They took the news of the dangerous mission with apprehension, yet with a spark of excitement. Inside I too was anxious and uncertain. But mostly I was energized. Finding the enemy in Vietnam had become more and more difficult but in Cambodia, we would be meeting the enemy head-on.

For the rest of the day, the base bustled with activity as men were taken to CONEX containers where they exchanged worn and dirty equipment for new. The weapons were recalibrated, and test fired for accuracy and reliability. While some troops joked nervously, most were quiet, filled with their own idea of what horror they might encounter once we crossed into Cambodia.

The first leg on our journey into Cambodia began the next morning. Shortly after 11 p.m., a single Air Force C-130 cargo plane landed, loaded the troops from Delta Company and took off. A second landed with the routine continuing until all of Delta Company was on its way. It was then our turn.

We were only in the air for maybe six minutes when FSB Snuffy’s airfield near Bu Gia Map came into sight. With another couple of minutes, our C-130 dropped precipitously, basically reversing the technique used when it took off. But with wheels inches from the ground, the pilot reacted to a single shot fired on the ground in the troop staging area. He quickly pulled back on the yoke, sending the aircraft straight up at a 60-degree angle. I thought it would stall. It didn’t but it came within feet of hitting the trees at the end of the runway. One careless shot and a nervous flight crew nearly got a planeload of us killed – before we even set foot in Cambodia.

Later that afternoon, Delta Company was taken by Huey helicopters into Cambodia. Our company was to follow within an hour but that didn’t happen. I was radioed by battalion that the “system” was overburdened and no helicopters were available until the next day, May 2.

Our unexpected stay overnight created more tension among the men. They’d been prepared mentally and emotionally to already be in Cambodia. Now they had to wait one more day before jumping into what we all believed were the ‘jaws of hell.’

Early the next morning the fully loaded company assembled along a tree line bordering the airstrip. In the distance, a 105 Artillery barrage and F4 fighter jets were pounding what was our LZ. Within minutes 20 helicopters swooped in with absolute precision: just the right distance between each bird. Moving quickly from the tree line, the entire company jumped aboard the aircraft. Once aboard, the command from the flight leader was given and like a slow-motion dance, all the helicopters drifted off the ground in unison, hovered for a few seconds, then headed straight ahead toward our LZ just five kilometers inside Cambodia. Charlie Company was finally part of the biggest air assault on record.

The helicopters flew low level, maneuvering around and above irregular growths. Tensions were mounting and became more heightened when we spotted two very surprised NVA soldiers scattering for cover as we flew over. One second, they were there, the next they were gone. No shots were fired.

Moments after the 105-artillery barrage was lifted, Cobra gunships peppered the LZ with rocket and machine fire then remained in the area as our helicopters landed in a large field surrounded by what could be called a tree line but unlike any we had seen in Vietnam. These trees were skinny and tall, widely separated from each other. We moved off the LZ into the skimpy tree line and set up security. We were on the ground safely and uncontested. The adrenaline rushing through my veins slowly subsided. I saw the same was happening with most of the men.

Once the company was assembled and prepared to move, we headed north. Within an hour, the point element spotted five enemy soldiers on the trail coming out of a wooded area. I motioned everyone to take cover in the tall grass and wait for them to get closer. But one of the men got nervous and opened fire with his M-16 Rifle. Others followed. The enemy soldiers instantly turned tail, running back in the direction they had come. Not one of our bullets found its mark. We moved through the open spaces of Cambodia for the rest of our first day without incident.

Around 4:30 p.m. we found a grove of trees ideal for an NDP (Night Defensive Position). Two squads went out a couple hundred meters looking for trails coming into our area on which they could set up automatic ambushes. The automatic ambush was a reasonably simple, but extremely lethal device. We’d connect commo wire to Claymore mines positioned at foot level and to fragmentation grenades hanging in trees at head level. The wire was then connected to a radio battery that connected to trip wire that we’d place across the trail. If one person or half a dozen hit the trip wire, they’d be blown away. The automatic ambush turned out to be the best night defensive weapon in our arsenal.

The next morning, I awoke just before dawn. As men began to stir, I prepared some coffee and was lacing it with dry cream and sugar when the blast of an automatic ambush shattered the calm. Minutes later, Spec. Rodney Young radioed, “You guys have got to see this to believe it.” On the trail, we found a dead North Vietnamese still on his bicycle, both hands clutching the handlebars, one foot on a pedal caught in mid-motion, his transistor radio still blaring with Vietnamese music. One of the riflemen quipped, “It’s like the show ‘Laugh-In’ where the guy rides a tricycle around and just falls over.”

The following evening, the company was setting up our NDP when I received another encrypted radio call from Moffett. He said an ‘arc light’ (B-52 bombing strike) was set for 0800 hours the next morning. “The target is a suspected enemy battalion,” he said. “I want you to conduct a BDA (bomb damage assessment) immediately after the strike,” I confirmed the mission, ending the call.

The next morning at 7:45 a.m. everyone got on the ground, placing whatever they could find between them and ground zero. At precisely 8 a.m., we heard a steady whistling of bombs dropping from an empty sky. Within seconds my ears were deafened by the loudest explosions I’d ever heard. The violent shaking of the ground and the massive strength of the concussion blast hit us like a tidal wave. Among the wows and holy shits, I got the company up and moving as quickly as we could.

The fast hump through the dank, humid jungle to the bomb zone was hard. Around 11 a.m. we began seeing the destruction. A few trees were down, along with some fresh dirt clumped in small mounds. The closer we got to ground zero, the greater the devastation: trees shattered at their base and huge bomb craters 20-30 feet deep in every direction. It looked like a hurricane, a tornado and an earthquake had combined their brutal and deadly force to render a thick jungle into a lunar-like landscape. Yet among all this destruction we found no evidence of the enemy: not one body or piece of equipment, not even a single blood trail. Either the intelligence was wrong, or the enemy had left the area, tipped off by enemy agents known to be scattered throughout the South Vietnamese command.

During the next five days, we ran into several small enemy forces, killing seven NVA while suffering no casualties. Our early success took away some of the edginess we had been feeling since the invasion began.

Every four days was “log day,” when we got resupplied with water, food, ammunition, radio batteries, mail and other essentials. On one log day, I sent 1st Lt. Billy Shine’s 2nd Platoon to find a landing zone while the rest of the company scoured the immediate area for signs of the enemy. After about an hour, Shine radioed saying he had found the “mother lode of caches” and was standing in the middle of a huge truck park and maintenance shop.

We hustled over to Shine’s position and spread over a quarter-acre were cargo trucks, pickups, and several Land Rovers – one with only 730 kilometers on its odometer. A veritable parts department loaded with bearings, brake shoes, axles, transmissions, batteries, pistons and more were scattered about, along with a large generator, welding tools, barrels of gasoline and cases of oil. In addition to the motor pool, we found underground sleeping quarters with electricity, a mess hall with live chickens and pigs, a recreation area complete with a ping-pong table, a first-aid facility, 50 tons of rice and lots of personal belongings.

I reported the find to the battalion. I was told to drive any serviceable vehicles to FSB Evans, some four kilometers away. Of the 33 vehicles, only 12 were drivable. Getting the vehicles running was no problem. We had Spec. Tom Hirst, the medic from 3rd Platoon. He had worked for a car dealership in Baltimore and with the precision of a car thief, hotwired the vehicles. In a couple of hours, men of 3rd Platoon mounted 10 vehicles (we kept 2 to carry our backpacks) and headed down the road toward Evans. Once there, they immediately flew back in helicopters to the site of the NVA motor pool.

It took us two days to get all the rice out by C-47 Chinooks and to blow up or burn everything of value to the enemy.  I was anxious to get out us of the immediate area but by the time we finished, it was too late to travel far so we set up our NDP in a thick clump of trees and underbrush about 300 meters from the now destroyed NVA motor pool. A perimeter was set up and several automatic ambushes were put in place on trails leading into the area. We then settled in for the night, completely satisfied with our three day’s work.

Around 8 p.m., the 3rd Platoon sector reported seeing several flashlights and hearing muffled Vietnamese voices. Suddenly one of the automatic ambushes went off, a few minutes later, another automatic ambush and a trip flare went off. Everything went silent outside our perimeter. Minutes later a dreadful moaning and crying of a badly injured enemy seared the quiet night for the next several hours. Finally, around midnight, we heard a single shot, and then silence. Nothing more happened that night.

At first light, we went out to check the area. Just 100 meters from our perimeter, we saw the torn and bloody bodies of nine North Vietnamese scattered about – one with a rifle in his mouth and a toe wrapped around the trigger. Hidden in some tall grass was a wounded soldier, who offered no resistance. The medics treated what appeared to be relatively minor wounds, and a helicopter came to take him away for treatment and an intelligence debriefing. We later heard that the prisoner died in the chopper.

We loaded our heavy backpacks onto our two NVA trucks and moved out “light” in open terrain to find more enemy. Three days later we hit heavy jungle, however, and had to ditch the vehicles. Reluctantly, we poured gasoline over our trucks and tossed torches on them. With the truck hulks smoldering, we slipped on our backpacks and moved off into the jungle. “Man, I sure got lazy with those trucks schlepping our gear,” one of my riflemen muttered. Yeah, I thought, so did I.

A few days later, we were following a river when we came upon a large waterfall cascading down a mammoth rock formation – a beautiful wonder of nature smack in the middle of a war zone. Behind the waterfall was a cave that housed an NVA hospital complete with surgical tables, oxygen tanks, a respirator and all the instruments needed for serious surgery. Nearby were cottages, shower stalls, enclosed latrines and a large covered dining hall but no enemy. We smashed the medical hardware and burned everything to the ground.

As we continued our mission, we discovered numerous bunker complexes and enemy caches. In one we found some 400-brand new SKS carbines, still wrapped in oilcloth, and enough ammunition to supply an NVA battalion. In another, we turned up tons of rice, mortar tubes, machine guns and boxes of AK-47s. During this time, we killed ten North Vietnamese and had yet to suffer any casualties.

In early June we found over a hundred 50-gallon barrels of oil under camouflage nets. Most barrels were marked “Dutch Shell Oil.”  Battalion sends in enough C4 plastic explosive, blasting caps, detonation cord and fuse igniters to blow it all up. I gathered three others plus myself and wrapped the barrels with det cord and TNT. We set the fuses and ran like hell toward the rest of the company much further down into the jungle. Before we got to them, the oil barrels blow up, sending us to the ground. No one was hurt. Flying close enough to see the explosion, the brigade commander said it looked like an atomic bomb had gone off.

On June 13th we’d been in Cambodia for 42 days. We had accomplished much. We had killed 25 enemy soldiers and found and destroyed incredible caches of weapons and food without having any men killed or severely wounded. I hoped our next 17 days would continue the same but the mission I had been given for the following day sounded perilous: check out a very large and occupied enemy bunker complex spotted a day earlier by a helicopter crew.

We begin early that morning and by mid-morning, we ran across a hard-packed trail – a good sign we were getting close to the bunker complex. Spec. Tom “the Black Prince” Johnson, the company’s best point man, was in the lead with Spec. Tony Harper when they spotted several NVA preparing to ambush us. Both Johnson and Harper opened fire, spraying the enemy location. Instantly the jungle on three sides erupted in heavy AK-47 machine gun fire and B-40 rockets. Spec. Lester “Uno” Langley, the second man from the point element, brought up his M-60machine gun and cut loose. Most of the 1st Platoon was pinned down and fired frantically at what seemed to be the center of the enemy ambush. The 3rd Platoon spread out in battle formation attempting to roll up the enemy’s left flank. The 2nd Platoon at the rear of our column attacked the enemy’s right flank.

I tried raising battalion but could not establish radio contact because of the thick jungle around us. Desperately, I stood behind a tree on a small hill and pulled Spec. Tom Thon up with me, ordering him to place his radio as high above his head as possible. He didn’t like it, but he braved it out. Several B-40 rockets smashed into our tree, showering us with bark and small pieces of shrapnel. Bullets cracked all around us, but Thon stood his ground. Although it was a faint signal, battalion acknowledged my request for immediate artillery support and Cobra gunships.

I got on the radio to Lieut. Richard Friedrich for a situation report on the 3rd Platoon. He said he was meeting heavy resistance and that Sgt Mickey Wright had been killed while charging a bunker. I ordered him to disengage and pull back into the perimeter as artillery was on the way. I also called 2nd Platoon to move into the center of the perimeter. A second or two later I heard Johnson scream, “I’m hit!” I saw him a few feet away on his back, fully exposed to the enemy fire raking the ground around him. Seeing Johnson trashing around on the ground, Spec. Larry “Doc” Stanberry rushed out into the open, flopped down beside Johnson and applied emergency aid. In a matter of seconds, Stanberry was joined by Specialists Nat Green, Rodney Young, Robert Delaney and Steve “Doc” Willey. A few returned enemy fire while the others pulled Johnson safely behind a large tree.

I was laying down fire on the enemy positions when Sgt. Wall, our artillery observer, tapped me on the shoulder. “Arty is cranking up and should be on target in three minutes,” he said. As promised, the artillery barrage was on time and on target 100 meters behind the enemy positions. The steady 10-minute barrage ended when the gunships arrived. They fired mini-guns and rockets directly in front of the company perimeter until they had fired their entire payload. When they flew off, the jungle became eerily silent. We carefully advanced toward the enemy positions. Trees and brush were ripped apart. Timbers on enemy bunkers were crushed or opened like smashed pumpkins. No enemy casualties were found, just a bunch of blood trails.

A medevac helicopter used a jungle penetrator to lift Johnson out, but not Mickey Wright. Policy dictates that medevac helicopters could not transport bodies. For the rest of the day, we carried Wright’s body in search of a suitable landing zone. We found one just before dark, but we’d have to wait until morning to start Wright’s final journey home. The next day is a long day, we remained at the LZ for our resupply. I had kept the automatic ambush in place from the night before as added protection. As the resupply helicopter was about to land, the automatic ambush went off. The pilot of the resupply helicopter aborted his landing and took off toward the cloudless blue sky, remaining overhead.

I grabbed a radioman, machine gunner, assistant gunner and four riflemen and headed for the ambush site. Bent over, weapons at the ready, we inched closer to what now looked like bodies lying in the trail. We found three dead North Vietnamese, two carrying AK-47s, and the other, a B-40 rocket launcher. Each was laden with extra ammunition and hand grenades. We felt a sense of elation that we had gotten some revenge for the death of Mickey Wright. Too bad there weren’t more. But, the next day as we headed out of the area we found 10 fresh graves. We had struck a mighty blow upon our comrade’s killers after all.

On June 28th, I received a secure radio call from Lt. Col. Moffett, informing me that President Richard Nixon ordered all U.S. troops out of Cambodia a day before the previously established June 30 deadline. He then told me that Charlie Company was designated to be the last company out, and, to chronicle the historical event, a group of journalists and TV reporters would accompany us back across the border.

We broke camp early the next morning, moved to the LZ where the journalists would be dropped. Within a half-hour, two helicopters landed, discharging more than a dozen journalists, photographers and TV reporters, each eager to cover “the last American fighting unit out of Cambodia.” For three hours we moved toward the Cambodian-Vietnam border without incident, leaving behind 38 dead enemy.

Around 2 p.m., we came across a large tree that had fallen across the river, providing us with a convenient bridge into Vietnam. The first few troops who crossed had left a thick coat of mud from their boots on the tree, making it perilous for the rest, a few of whom slipped off into the leech-infested river. Nevertheless, the entire contingent was soon across the river, giving the company a sense of relief. In some strange way, we had come home.

We moved on to FSB Thor, the battalion’s headquarters, about 300 meters away from the river’s edge in a large open field surrounded by trees. Invited into the firebase, the journalists left us for cold drinks and the chance to probe the minds of fresh troops. Meanwhile, we set up our NDP close to the firebase. Alpha company was already camped out in another quadrant of the same area. We felt secure, hoping this was a night we could sleep more soundly.

It turned out, sleep was elusive for me, so around midnight I got up to have a cigarette and noticed the heavy fog blanketing us, so thick I couldn’t see Merle Dentino’s hooch right next to mine. I butted the cigarette and determined to get some sleep.

Around 5 a.m. I was awakened by the thumping of mortar rounds hitting the base plate. Moments later two mortar rounds exploded inside our perimeter with a deadly fury, smashing shrapnel into trees, bushes, and sleeping men. One piece smashed through my mosquito net, flying past my face. I fell out of my hooch into bedlam. Wounded men were screaming in pain, others were screaming for medics. Through the fog, ghostly silhouettes moved in and out of the shadows – some in sheer panic, others calmly helping the wounded.

In front of me, Lieut. Craig Troup was clamping the blood spurting from his nearly amputated foot. He looked at me, quietly saying, “Six, my foot is hit.” In that same instant, Doc Stansberry was at his side. A few feet away, the company medic, Spec. Bruce Johnson, was desperately trying to stop his own chest wound. Doc Willey emerged out of the dark, dropped to Johnson’s side and slapped a compress on his chest to stop the sucking and bleeding. Johnson haltingly cried, “Tell my wife I love her.” He was certain he was a dead man.

Before long a jeep load of medics raced up from the firebase and began searching the area for the injured scattered everywhere. We were also told a medevac was on its way, so we scrambled to bring all the wounded to the end of a large clearing, so we could set up a triage. The wounded were still being brought out when we heard the medevac hovering just above the fog. I radioed the pilot that I would set out a ground flare for him to vector in on, but his response left me stunned. He refused to land until he had gunship support. This was friendly fire, I told him, not enemy. He wouldn’t budge, no gunships, no landing. I begged, but he still balked. I went ballistic: “Look, I have your tail number. I know who you are and if you don’t start down immediately, I swear to God, I will find you and put a bullet in your brain!” I think I really meant it and the pilot must have thought so, too. He told me to light the flare, he was coming in.

As soon as the medevac landed, we loaded the most seriously wounded. It had room for six. Doc Johnson was one. Lt. Troup was another. I ordered Mike Waters put on also, even though I was certain he was never going to make it. He died moments after the medevac lifted off.

With all the wounded out, we took a head count. Only one man was missing, my RTO, Denny Dentino. We found him still in his hooch. The same piece of shrapnel that nearly hit me in my hooch had killed him instantly.

Two men were dead and a total of 29 wounded, 9 so severely that they were evacuated out of Vietnam. Ironically, the medevac pilot did put me on the report – not for threatening to kill him but for putting a dead man on his chopper.

The “friendly fire” incident was determined to be erratic mortar rounds, which should never have been fired over our position. The Staff Sgt in charge was demoted and fined $500. We all felt he should have been court-martialed, incarcerated and kicked out of the Army.

Hours earlier, Charlie Company had triumphantly crossed the border as the last American unit to return to Vietnam from the historic invasion of Cambodia. Then, in less than 60 seconds, one deadly mistake tragically killed and wounded many of the company’s brave men than scores of enemy combatants were unable to achieve during our seven weeks in Cambodia.

*****

Lt. Col. Michael Christy’s first tour of duty in Vietnam began with the Delta Project, 5th Special Forces Group from 1967-68. On his second tour in 1969-70, he commanded Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 12th Cavalry Regiment,1st Cavalry Division for eight months before becoming the 3rd Brigade’s assistant operations officer in Bien Hoa.

Thank you, sir, for a peek into what it was like during the Cambodian Incursion. Thank you, too, for your service and sacrifice!

Together We Served has reconnected more military veterans than any other organization or website. If you served in any branch of the US military, stay connected with those you served with by joining TogetherWeServed.comhttps://army.togetherweserved.com


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